tegwick
3081067325
tenant-engine named the relation in TEN-DEC-2026-002: `tenant` is the target tenant record and always equals `resource.id`; the write API is cross-tenant by design and `tenant.guardrail.read` does not differ. v2 carried no tenant rule and a constant fixture tenant, so the deliberate scope and an omitted rule were indistinguishable. tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v3 (FLEX-DEC-2026-016): - allowed requires tenant_is_target; a mismatch or absent tenant is denied tenant_not_target (object.get, so an absent key names the right cause). - the cross-tenant scope is stated in the package and quantified by test_tenant_never_changes_effect over every action, three subjects and four tenants, with guards against passing by denying everything. - fixtures rotate tenant across four tenants; five cross-tenant allows and two tenant_not_target denies added (42 fixtures, 33 tests, all pass). - user-engine's tenant:platform exclusion is named as a fixed-record rule, not a subject/tenant relation, and tested separately. Closes FLEX-WP-0022 (T01, T02 done). Also records TEN-IN-0004 and SECRETS-IN-0002 on FLEX-WP-0020 and acknowledges the GH-DEC-2026-017 replies on FLEX-WP-0030-T04. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
15 lines
320 B
JSON
15 lines
320 B
JSON
{
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"id": "check:tenant-engine-guardrail-read-pdp",
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"tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",
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"subject": {
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"id": "flex-auth",
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"type": "service"
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},
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"action": "tenant.guardrail.read",
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"resource": {
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"id": "tenant:friendly:binky",
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"type": "guardrail",
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"system": "tenant-engine"
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},
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"context": {}
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}
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