flex-auth/examples/tenant-engine/protected_system_manifest.yaml
tegwick 8e127e50f7 Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010)
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.

- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
  CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
  registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
  guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)

T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.

Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).

Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:52:10 +02:00

112 lines
2.2 KiB
YAML

id: tenant-engine
name: Tenant Engine
resource_types:
- name: tenant
scope_level: Resource
planes:
- Identity
- Audit
metadata:
description: A tenant record (existence, onboarding grouping).
- name: role-grant
scope_level: Resource
planes:
- Identity
- Policy
- Audit
metadata:
description: A capability-role grant or revocation (PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS).
- name: plan-assignment
scope_level: Resource
planes:
- Identity
- Audit
metadata:
description: A tenant's plan/subscription assignment (by reference id).
actions:
- name: tenant.create
capabilities:
- Create
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.role.grant
capabilities:
- Grant
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Policy
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.role.revoke
capabilities:
- Revoke
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Policy
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.plan.assign
capabilities:
- Bind
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.update
capabilities:
- EditAny
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.retire
capabilities:
- Archive
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Policy
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
- name: tenant.reactivate
capabilities:
- Restore
- Audit
planes:
- Identity
- Policy
- Audit
exposure_modes:
- Metadata
metadata:
required_context: []
caring_profiles:
- caring-0.4.0-rc2
metadata:
flex_auth_contract: protected-system-v0
boundary_contract: net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md