tegwick
68ad039a3f
approval-engine flagged the class one message earlier -- a contract whose examples contradict its prose gets implemented as its examples -- and yesterday's package was a fresh instance of it, committed while flagging it. The published rule required context.approval.status == "approved" and counted context.approval.approvals[].subject_id. Neither field exists. approval-engine's approval_claim.schema.json has `state` (whose operative value is `valid`, not `approved`) and carries no approver list at all. The rule was unsatisfiable: every live destroy would have denied dual_control_required no matter how good the approval was. It failed closed, so it was never a hole, but it was policy written against a shape of our own devising rather than a published one. The rule now consumes valid_now from the real claim, guarded on kind and issuer. valid_now is the summary predicate that already folds in the distinct-approver threshold, with reason_code insufficient_approvers for a claim that failed it -- so this is also the correct layering, not just the correct shape. Counting approvers here is exactly the duplication GH-DEC-2026-005 removes; the compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under 9.6, which is approval-engine's. Recorded as a correction section in the package and the vocabulary doc rather than quietly rewritten. 25 Rego tests and 29 fixtures pass, covering insufficient_approvers, consumed, revoked, approved-but-not-yet- valid, foreign issuer, and wrong kind. Two things the package deliberately does not do, both now written down: it does not compare binding.pdp_digest, because the request digest is computed after policy evaluation and a Rego rule cannot see it; and it makes no cross-check that the claim was approved for this action and target, because the claim's binding uses approval-engine's vocabulary and no mapping between the two is published. Inventing one would silently accept a claim approved for something else. Both belong to the PEP until a mapping exists, and that is worth closing before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 makes destroy reachable. Also swept the other published fixtures on approval-engine's reasoning. One more instance: the inner decision in examples/caring/action_authorization.json declared contract_version flex-auth.decision-record.v1 while its provenance omitted policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest, and input_claim_digests -- all published contract fields since 2026-09-02. Completed. The remaining example context vocabularies are consumer-owned and match their integrations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
124 lines
3.6 KiB
JSON
124 lines
3.6 KiB
JSON
{
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"schema_version": "0.1",
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"id": "8bfc20be-47a4-4fb0-97a2-bf0a920afad8",
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"status": "approved",
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"request": {
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"id": "check:secrets-engine-destroy-example",
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"subject": {
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"id": "user:alice",
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"type": "Human"
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},
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"action": "destroy",
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"resource": {
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"id": "catalog:example-build-test-token",
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"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
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"system": "secrets-engine",
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"attributes": {
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"stage": "build",
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"fields": [
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"token"
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],
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"policy_targets": [],
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"auth_targets": []
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}
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},
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"context": {
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"purpose": "contract-test"
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}
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},
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"validity": {
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"not_before": "2026-08-23T10:00:00Z",
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"expires_at": "2026-08-23T10:15:00Z"
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},
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"approvals": {
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"required_count": 2,
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"entries": [
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{
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"subject_id": "user:alice",
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"approved_at": "2026-08-23T10:01:00Z",
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"assurance": "mfa",
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"evidence_ref": "approval:alice"
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},
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{
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"subject_id": "user:bob",
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"approved_at": "2026-08-23T10:02:00Z",
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"assurance": "mfa",
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"evidence_ref": "approval:bob"
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}
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]
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},
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"decision": {
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"id": "decision:contract-example",
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"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
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"request_id": "check:secrets-engine-destroy-example",
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"effect": "allow",
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"reason": "destruction_approved",
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"matched_policy_version": "v1",
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"matched_rule": "allow_destroy",
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"resource": {
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"id": "catalog:example-build-test-token",
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"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
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"system": "secrets-engine",
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"attributes": {
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"stage": "build",
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"fields": [
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"token"
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],
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"policy_targets": [],
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"auth_targets": []
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}
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},
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"subject": {
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"id": "user:alice",
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"type": "Human"
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},
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"binding": {
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"subject": {
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"id": "user:alice",
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"type": "Human"
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},
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"action": "destroy",
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"resource": {
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"id": "catalog:example-build-test-token",
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"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
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"system": "secrets-engine",
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"attributes": {
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"stage": "build",
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"fields": [
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"token"
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],
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"policy_targets": [],
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"auth_targets": []
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}
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},
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"context": {
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"purpose": "contract-test"
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},
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"request_digest": "sha256:eb9d856a060813aebe039f19b82d4be1c4589fa6c0429cf20e15fb115db3ef9a"
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},
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"lifetime": {
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"kind": "ttl",
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"ttl": "15m",
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"not_before": "2026-08-23T10:00:30Z",
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"expires_at": "2026-08-23T10:15:30Z"
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},
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"provenance": {
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"evaluator": "flex-auth/local",
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"mode": "standalone",
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"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
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"policy_version": "v1",
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"policy_package_digest": "sha256:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
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"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
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"input_claim_digests": {
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"context": "sha256:cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
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},
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"decision_time": "2026-08-23T10:00:30Z",
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"policy_package_note": "Reserved coordinate, not yet published (FLEX-DEC-2026-005). Illustrative only."
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}
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},
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"provenance": {
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"note": "DEFERRED EXAMPLE (FLEX-DEC-2026-006). Not a contract. The approval fact's authority is approval-engine; the decision's authority is flex-auth. State Hub is never the authority for either -- do not derive a provenance.authority constant from this file.",
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"approval_authority": "approval-engine",
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"decision_authority": "flex-auth"
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}
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}
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