tegwick
afd9be5aa9
secrets-engine probed the Service DNS name handed over in FLEX-WP-0021-T05 and found it resolves, from the workstation, to an unrelated public host. Reproduced here: search ad.binect.de answers wildcard, so flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local and this-service-does-not-exist.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local both resolve to 80.158.43.29, while the trailing-dot FQDN correctly fails. A bare Service name in a handover is not merely unreachable from there, it is a live misdirection, and the handover was ours. Had a deployment pointed at it, the CheckRequest body would have gone to that host: subject, tenant, lane and resource ids, stage, field names, purpose, plus the caller's bearer token. Trailing-dot FQDN and "in-cluster only" now replace the bare name in the example README, SCOPE.md, and the T05 note. Their real question was how the response channel is authenticated, and they declined to answer it locally because choosing a transport control for our service is not a consumer's call. Right boundary, so the answer is recorded here as FLEX-DEC-2026-010: it is not authenticated. Pins serve plain HTTP, the envelope carries no signature, and a responder that knows the package id and version can return a well-formed allow that passes every check a consumer performs. The part worth stating in the contract is that the digests do not help and look like they do. Every input to request_digest, policy_package_digest and registry_snapshot_digest is either sent by the caller or published in this repo, so a forger reproduces all three exactly. They establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of the source — and publishing more digests makes a forged envelope look more authenticated, not less. For secrets-engine specifically: fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying PDP allows. Third instance of one seam in three decisions. 008: a tenant carried into the digest and never compared — visible, not enforced. 009: a caller authenticated and never recorded — enforced, not visible. 010: a record verifiable and unauthentic — checkable, but not evidence. One nuance that changes the operator recommendation: kubectl port-forward does authenticate the responder, transitively — no DNS name, one named pod, API-server TLS. That is the exact reverse of the caller direction, where it bypasses the NetworkPolicy. Independent properties pointing opposite ways, so neither can be summarised as "the network protects it". FLEX-WP-0024 carries signing; key custody routes through warden/OpenBao rather than minting a key here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80 |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| caring | ||
| claims | ||
| markitect | ||
| ops-warden | ||
| qonto-assistant | ||
| railiance-platform | ||
| secrets-engine | ||
| tenant-engine | ||
| topaz | ||
| user-engine | ||
| README.md | ||
examples/
Runnable examples used both as documentation and as test fixtures.
Expected layout (filled in across FLEX-WP-0002 / FLEX-WP-0003 / FLEX-WP-0005):
examples/
claims/ # key-cape lightweight-mode and Keycloak heavy-mode
# claim envelopes (P5.5)
caring/ # executable CARING descriptor, request,
# decision, registry, and audit fixtures (P2.1)
markitect/ # FlexAuthResourceManifest fixtures, decision
# fixtures, and Rego-in-Markdown policy packages
ops-warden/ # SSH certificate signing policy-gate fixtures
# for ops-warden policy.enabled smoke checks
topaz/ # docker-compose + sample directory and policy
# for the Topaz alignment spike (P5.4)
policies/ # generic Rego-in-Markdown packages used by
# the standalone core tests