flex-auth/examples/secrets-engine
tegwick afd9be5aa9
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fix: the address we published was a misdirection, and the channel is unauthenticated
secrets-engine probed the Service DNS name handed over in FLEX-WP-0021-T05
and found it resolves, from the workstation, to an unrelated public host.
Reproduced here: search ad.binect.de answers wildcard, so
flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local and
this-service-does-not-exist.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local both resolve to
80.158.43.29, while the trailing-dot FQDN correctly fails. A bare Service
name in a handover is not merely unreachable from there, it is a live
misdirection, and the handover was ours.

Had a deployment pointed at it, the CheckRequest body would have gone to
that host: subject, tenant, lane and resource ids, stage, field names,
purpose, plus the caller's bearer token.

Trailing-dot FQDN and "in-cluster only" now replace the bare name in the
example README, SCOPE.md, and the T05 note.

Their real question was how the response channel is authenticated, and
they declined to answer it locally because choosing a transport control
for our service is not a consumer's call. Right boundary, so the answer
is recorded here as FLEX-DEC-2026-010: it is not authenticated. Pins
serve plain HTTP, the envelope carries no signature, and a responder that
knows the package id and version can return a well-formed allow that
passes every check a consumer performs.

The part worth stating in the contract is that the digests do not help
and look like they do. Every input to request_digest,
policy_package_digest and registry_snapshot_digest is either sent by the
caller or published in this repo, so a forger reproduces all three
exactly. They establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of
the source — and publishing more digests makes a forged envelope look
more authenticated, not less.

For secrets-engine specifically: fail-closed protects against a PDP that
is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies; a lying
PDP allows.

Third instance of one seam in three decisions. 008: a tenant carried
into the digest and never compared — visible, not enforced. 009: a caller
authenticated and never recorded — enforced, not visible. 010: a record
verifiable and unauthentic — checkable, but not evidence.

One nuance that changes the operator recommendation: kubectl port-forward
does authenticate the responder, transitively — no DNS name, one named
pod, API-server TLS. That is the exact reverse of the caller direction,
where it bypasses the NetworkPolicy. Independent properties pointing
opposite ways, so neither can be summarised as "the network protects it".

FLEX-WP-0024 carries signing; key custody routes through warden/OpenBao
rather than minting a key here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 22:44:45 +02:00
..
replay fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had 2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
check_request_allow_destroy_dual_control.json Publish approval_binding_digest: a claim cannot name the request carrying it 2026-09-06 14:52:33 +02:00
check_request_allow_rotate.json Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
check_request_deny_destroy_without_claim.json Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
check_request_deny_revoke_not_an_action.json Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
check_request_deny_unknown_subject.json Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had 2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
policy_fixtures.yaml fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had 2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
policy_package.md fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had 2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
protected_system_manifest.yaml Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
README.md fix: the address we published was a misdirection, and the channel is unauthenticated 2026-09-06 22:44:45 +02:00
registry_snapshot.json Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
subject_manifest.yaml Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) 2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00

secrets-engine example

Policy package, manifests, and fixtures for secrets-engine's gated catalog-lane operations. Opened by FLEX-DEC-2026-005, carried by FLEX-WP-0021.

File What it is
policy_package.md secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2, allow_ttl: 15m
protected_system_manifest.yaml the secret-catalog-lane resource type and twelve actions
subject_manifest.yaml the single secrets-engine service identity
registry_snapshot.json loadable snapshot combining both manifests
policy_fixtures.yaml 32 fixtures — 11 allows, dual control both ways, and every denial branch
check_request_*.json standalone requests for POST /v1/check

The action vocabulary is secrets-engine's, delivered under FLEX-WP-0021-T01 and recorded in ../../docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md. Read that before changing any action string here.

Verify

go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file examples/secrets-engine/policy_package.md
go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file examples/secrets-engine/registry_snapshot.json

28 Rego tests and 32 fixtures.

Deployed, and the version to pin

FLEX-WP-0021-T04 deployed the flex-auth-secrets-engine pin on 2026-09-06:

Service:  http://flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local.:8080
                                                                    ^ trailing dot, required
Package:  secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle
Version:  v2
callerAuth.mode: warn   (not enforced caller authentication)

The trailing dot is not cosmetic, and this address is in-cluster only. secrets-engine reported and flex-auth reproduced that on the workstation a bare *.svc.cluster.local name resolves through search ad.binect.de to one unrelated public host — a name for a service that does not exist resolves to the same address, which proves it is suffix expansion rather than a record. The trailing-dot form correctly fails to resolve instead. A bare Service name in a handover is therefore not merely unreachable from a workstation, it is a live misdirection. See ../../docs/operator-caller-access-path.md.

Ingress admits namespace secrets-engine with pod label app.kubernetes.io/name=secrets-engine and default-denies everything else. A workstation CLI process is not that, and Service DNS is not workstation connectivity — an operator-run consumer needs a decided access path before it can call this pin at all (FLEX-WP-0021-T04's three shapes).

Pin _VERSION to v2, never v1. v1 is deployed and superseded: it had no tenant rule and allowed a foreign tenant. See the correction section in policy_package.md. The pin still serves v1 until the redeploy lands, which is why the version is stated here rather than left to be read off the running service.

SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE / _VERSION remain fallback-free and fail-closed by design; nothing here changes that.