FLUID-WP-0004 T01, T02, T05, T06. The pipeline is the only path from Candidate to Verified: no other code constructs a Verified value, and Publish takes one, so "AI-generated artifacts are untrusted until verified" is a property of the type signatures rather than a rule people are asked to remember. The policy gate is a pure function of the candidate, the governing intent and configured limits. It cannot consult a model or take an opinion as input, because a gate that can be argued with is not a gate. Two behaviours it enforces are worth naming: the tighter of the descriptor's own traffic ceiling and the gate's wins, so a descriptor can restrict itself but never widen; and a daimon cannot authorize its own promotion below FLUID-5, since generation authority is not promotion authority. Signatures cover the canonical document with the signature member removed, so a signed descriptor round-trips and a tampered one does not. The registry now refuses anything that does not verify, which is what makes the pipeline's signature mean something at the router. An unchecked pipeline stage is recorded as unchecked rather than omitted, so a pipeline with no security check cannot look identical to one that passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014KmVxhJ35tCo7rE7UnLwWu Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1116572@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 8ba9bb93-a72a-4883-b189-2499cce5c400
213 lines
6.6 KiB
Go
213 lines
6.6 KiB
Go
package policy
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/tegwick/fluid-core/internal/contract"
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"github.com/tegwick/fluid-core/internal/intent"
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)
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func passing() contract.Revision {
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pc := contract.RevisionPolicyPolicyCheckPassed
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return contract.Revision{
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ID: "R-2",
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Interface: "hall-publishing",
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State: contract.RevisionStateCandidate,
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Policy: contract.RevisionPolicy{
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Compatibility: contract.RevisionPolicyCompatibilityAdditive,
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SecurityCheck: contract.RevisionPolicySecurityCheckPassed,
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PolicyCheck: &pc,
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},
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}
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}
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func human() *contract.Actor {
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return &contract.Actor{Type: contract.ActorTypeHuman, ID: "worsch"}
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}
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func baseInput() Input {
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return Input{
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Descriptor: passing(),
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GoverningMode: intent.ModeAdvisory,
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AdaptationClasses: []contract.AdaptationClass{contract.AdaptationClassPresentation},
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ComplexityDelta: 0.2,
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RequestedTrafficShare: 0.10,
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Approved: true,
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ApprovedBy: human(),
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}
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}
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func TestGateAllowsAConformingCandidate(t *testing.T) {
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d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(baseInput())
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if !d.Allowed {
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t.Fatalf("conforming candidate rejected: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateRefusesUnverifiedSecurity(t *testing.T) {
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in := baseInput()
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in.Descriptor.Policy.SecurityCheck = contract.RevisionPolicySecurityCheckPending
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d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a candidate with a pending security check was allowed")
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}
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if !mentions(d.Reasons, "security check") {
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t.Errorf("reasons do not name the security check: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateRefusesBreakingChange(t *testing.T) {
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in := baseInput()
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in.Descriptor.Policy.Compatibility = contract.RevisionPolicyCompatibilityBreaking
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if d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in); d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a breaking change passed the default gate")
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}
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}
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func TestGateEnforcesAuthorityMode(t *testing.T) {
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limits := DefaultLimits()
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limits.RequiredMode = intent.ModeExperimental
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in := baseInput()
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in.GoverningMode = intent.ModeAdvisory
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d := NewGate(limits).Evaluate(in)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("promotion requiring FLUID-4 was allowed under a FLUID-2 intent")
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}
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if !mentions(d.Reasons, "FLUID-2") {
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t.Errorf("reasons do not name the governing mode: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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in.GoverningMode = intent.ModeEvolutionary
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if d := NewGate(limits).Evaluate(in); !d.Allowed {
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t.Errorf("FLUID-6 should satisfy a FLUID-4 requirement: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateEnforcesComplexityBudget(t *testing.T) {
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// FluidAPIStandards.md section 23: a candidate may be rejected even when it
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// increases local utility.
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in := baseInput()
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in.ComplexityDelta = 9.0
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d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a candidate far over the complexity budget was allowed")
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}
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if !mentions(d.Reasons, "complexity") {
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t.Errorf("reasons do not name complexity: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateTakesTheTighterTrafficCeiling(t *testing.T) {
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limits := DefaultLimits()
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limits.MaxTrafficShare = 0.50
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in := baseInput()
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share := contract.UnitInterval(0.10)
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in.Descriptor.Routing = &contract.RevisionRouting{MaxTrafficShare: &share}
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in.RequestedTrafficShare = 0.30
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// The descriptor restricts itself below the gate's ceiling; the tighter of
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// the two must win, or a descriptor's self-restriction would be advisory.
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if d := NewGate(limits).Evaluate(in); d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("requested share exceeded the descriptor's own ceiling but was allowed")
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}
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// A descriptor must not be able to widen past the gate.
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wide := contract.UnitInterval(0.99)
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in.Descriptor.Routing = &contract.RevisionRouting{MaxTrafficShare: &wide}
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in.RequestedTrafficShare = 0.80
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if d := NewGate(limits).Evaluate(in); d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a descriptor widened its own exposure past the gate ceiling")
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}
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}
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func TestGateRequiresApproval(t *testing.T) {
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in := baseInput()
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in.Approved = false
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in.ApprovedBy = nil
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if d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in); d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("an unapproved candidate passed a gate that requires approval")
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}
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}
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// TestDaimonCannotSelfApproveBelowBoundedAutonomy defends Blueprint 28.1:
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// generation authority is not promotion authority. A candidate a Daimon both
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// produced and approved has had no independent check.
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func TestDaimonCannotSelfApproveBelowBoundedAutonomy(t *testing.T) {
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in := baseInput()
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in.ApprovedBy = &contract.Actor{Type: contract.ActorTypeDaimon, ID: "fluid-daimon/hall"}
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d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a daimon authorized its own promotion at FLUID-2")
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}
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if !mentions(d.Reasons, "daimon") {
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t.Errorf("reasons do not name the daimon authorization: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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// At bounded autonomy, with the policy demanding it, this is legitimate.
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limits := DefaultLimits()
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limits.RequiredMode = intent.ModeBoundedAutonomous
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in.GoverningMode = intent.ModeBoundedAutonomous
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if d := NewGate(limits).Evaluate(in); !d.Allowed {
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t.Errorf("daimon authorization refused at FLUID-5: %v", d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateReportsEveryFailure(t *testing.T) {
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// A caller fixing one rejection only to hit the next learns less than one
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// told everything at once, and the audit trail wants the whole list.
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in := baseInput()
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in.Descriptor.Policy.SecurityCheck = contract.RevisionPolicySecurityCheckFailed
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in.Descriptor.Policy.Compatibility = contract.RevisionPolicyCompatibilityBreaking
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in.ComplexityDelta = 50
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in.Approved = false
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in.ApprovedBy = nil
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in.AdaptationClasses = []contract.AdaptationClass{contract.AdaptationClassContract}
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d := NewGate(DefaultLimits()).Evaluate(in)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Fatal("a candidate failing five gates was allowed")
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}
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if len(d.Reasons) < 5 {
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t.Errorf("expected at least five reasons, got %d: %v", len(d.Reasons), d.Reasons)
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}
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}
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func TestGateIsDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
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// The gate must be a pure function: same input, same verdict, same reasons
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// in the same order. A gate whose output varies cannot be audited.
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in := baseInput()
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in.Descriptor.Policy.SecurityCheck = contract.RevisionPolicySecurityCheckFailed
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in.AdaptationClasses = []contract.AdaptationClass{contract.AdaptationClassContract}
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g := NewGate(DefaultLimits())
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first := g.Evaluate(in)
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for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
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again := g.Evaluate(in)
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if again.Allowed != first.Allowed || len(again.Reasons) != len(first.Reasons) {
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t.Fatalf("verdict varied between runs")
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}
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for j := range first.Reasons {
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if again.Reasons[j] != first.Reasons[j] {
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t.Fatalf("reason order varied: %q vs %q", first.Reasons[j], again.Reasons[j])
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}
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}
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}
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}
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func mentions(reasons []string, substr string) bool {
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for _, r := range reasons {
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if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(r), strings.ToLower(substr)) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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