Two things that would have gone wrong on the first live run.
The plan promised "create bot.avatar" and apply had no avatar code at all:
/setuserpic needs a photo upload that is not implemented. A plan that
promises an action apply silently skips is worse than one that admits the
gap, because it makes every other line less trustworthy. The avatar is now
deferred, with instructions for setting it by hand.
The runbook wrote secrets to "<interface-path>/telegram/...", which is not
what the code computes. An operator following it would have put api_id and
api_hash somewhere the tool never looks, and found out at the first
connection attempt. Both documents now carry the real paths --
<mount>/fluid-telegram/<campaign>/telegram/<key> -- with a copy-pasteable
bao kv put for the one secret written by hand, and a verify step before
the session is minted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0172sgCZEEDJcnQmr4SGDvKa
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Completes the provisioner's write path. internal/tg drives BotFather as a
conversation rather than pretending it is an endpoint, creates channels,
claims usernames with fallbacks, and grants post_messages. internal/apply
sequences it: bot before administrator, test channel before public, and
state saved after every step that changed the world -- a channel that
exists but is unrecorded is worse than one that does not exist, because
the next run creates a second.
The operator session lives in OpenBao, not on disk. gotd's FileStorage
would leave a full-account credential in the working directory, where it
outlives the run and can be committed by accident.
The bot token goes straight from BotFather's reply to OpenBao and is
cleared from memory; if that write fails the error says how to recover by
hand and warns against re-running, since a retry creates a second bot.
Closes T05: the redaction salt is create-if-absent with no overwrite path,
and the test asserts it, because rotating it invalidates every longitudinal
comparison with no visible failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0172sgCZEEDJcnQmr4SGDvKa
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Go, per the toolchain decision. cmd/provision with internal/spec,
internal/state and internal/plan; plan computation is pure and takes live
observation through an interface, so the refusal logic is testable without
a Telegram account. It runs against the real campaign spec today.
Separates two refusals the design had treated as one. A deferral is the
design working -- the public channel waiting on a checked rendering, normal
on every first run. A block is the world disagreeing with the state file:
drifted rights, a taken-over username, a bot that is no longer reachable.
Collapsed together, a first run could never apply anything, because it
always defers the public channel.
The rights clamp and the private/public username rule are enforced in Go
and asserted against the same cases the JSON schema rejects, since mirroring
the schema in code is a drift risk worth a test rather than a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0172sgCZEEDJcnQmr4SGDvKa
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1361245@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: b3b428ef-f3e6-4688-b091-01f71461d66a
