diff --git a/WORK-RECORDS.md b/WORK-RECORDS.md
index 088cbd0..1a06cbf 100644
--- a/WORK-RECORDS.md
+++ b/WORK-RECORDS.md
@@ -9,11 +9,18 @@
 | Kind | ID | Status | Lane | Source |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | workplan | GH-WP-0001 | active | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
+| workplan | GH-WP-0002 | active | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T01 | done | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T02 | done | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T03 | done | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T04 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T05 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
 | task | GH-WP-0001-T06 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0001-foundation.md |
-| intake | GH-IN-0001 | open | red | intakes/intakes.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T01 | done | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T02 | progress | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T03 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T04 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T05 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| task | GH-WP-0002-T06 | todo | — | workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md |
+| intake | GH-IN-0001 | closed | red | intakes/intakes.md |
 | decision | GH-DEC-2026-001 | resolved | — | decisions/decisions.md |
diff --git a/workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md b/workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a63943
--- /dev/null
+++ b/workplans/GH-WP-0002-approval-evidence-integrity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+---
+id: GH-WP-0002
+type: workplan
+title: "Approval evidence integrity"
+domain: infotech
+repo: gate-house
+status: active
+origin: GH-IN-0001
+---
+
+# Approval evidence integrity
+
+Promoted from `GH-IN-0001`, raised by `audit-core` with a drafted five-task
+plan. It escalates correction 2 of the `AUDIT-IN-0001` assent from a caveat in a
+reply to tracked work, because it must land before `approval-engine` is built
+rather than after.
+
+**The gap.** A hash chain proves accepted records were not altered or truncated.
+It proves nothing about an event never emitted. Every `approval-engine` event
+class degrades gracefully under omission except one: a suppressed **revocation**
+leaves the chain intact, the attestation matching, and the record showing an
+approval that was never revoked. The evidence half would look sound and not be.
+
+Doctrine now at `net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.5.md` §9.6.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Amend §9.4 so it does not rest on `audit-core`'s principle 6 omission claim.
+Done in v0.4; §9.6 generalizes it estate-wide and v0.5 adds the load-bearing
+versus attributive distinction.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T02
+status: progress
+priority: high
+```
+
+Specify the transactional-outbox contract for `approval-engine`: same
+transaction as the object mutation, queue local to the engine, at-least-once
+into the outbox since `audit-core` dedupes on event id and a replay does not
+fork the chain. Boundary and locality are in `approval-engine/INTENT.md` and
+§9.4; the wire contract is not yet written.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T03
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Decide the revocation failure mode explicitly: fail closed, or proceed with a
+detectable gap. Both are defensible; undecided is not, and an implementation
+accident is the worst outcome. Note v0.5's local-outbox rule narrows this
+considerably — fail-closed now triggers only when the engine's own store is
+down — but the ruling is still owed.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T04
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+
+Give the gap a detection surface: outbox depth and age, or reconciliation of
+`approval-engine` object counts against `audit-core` event counts per class.
+Today nothing would surface a silent loss. Relate to §9.6's silence-as-signal
+rule, which `kings-guard` offered to implement at its own layer.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T05
+status: todo
+priority: medium
+```
+
+Add a §11 conformance check so the next engine catalogued as an evidence source
+declares its emission guarantee rather than reintroducing this silently.
+
+```task
+id: GH-WP-0002-T06
+status: todo
+priority: high
+```
+
+Settle the consumption ordering contract between `approval-engine` and
+`access-engine` — who signals consumed, at what point relative to the decision,
+and the handling of an allow never consumed, a double consumption by racing
+callers, and consumption after a failed action. Raised by `flex-auth`; required
+before `FLEX-WP-0017` T05. Recorded unresolved in `approval-engine/INTENT.md`.