---
id: GH-WP-0002
type: workplan
title: "Approval evidence integrity"
domain: infotech
repo: gate-house
status: active
origin: GH-IN-0001
state_hub_workstream_id: "393d46ad-4f8c-5578-b63d-91cb0e8b9502"
---

# Approval evidence integrity

Promoted from `GH-IN-0001`, raised by `audit-core` with a drafted five-task
plan. It escalates correction 2 of the `AUDIT-IN-0001` assent from a caveat in a
reply to tracked work, because it must land before `approval-engine` is built
rather than after.

**The gap.** A hash chain proves accepted records were not altered or truncated.
It proves nothing about an event never emitted. Every `approval-engine` event
class degrades gracefully under omission except one: a suppressed **revocation**
leaves the chain intact, the attestation matching, and the record showing an
approval that was never revoked. The evidence half would look sound and not be.

Doctrine now at `net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.5.md` §9.6.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "538f0417-2d71-578c-8cf3-e7077fa410af"
```

Amend §9.4 so it does not rest on `audit-core`'s principle 6 omission claim.
Done in v0.4; §9.6 generalizes it estate-wide and v0.5 adds the load-bearing
versus attributive distinction.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T02
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "73a8feb0-02bd-5191-bdfd-82bcc42c6756"
```

Specify the transactional-outbox contract for `approval-engine`: same
transaction as the object mutation, queue local to the engine, at-least-once
into the outbox since `audit-core` dedupes on event id and a replay does not
fork the chain. Boundary and locality are in `approval-engine/INTENT.md` and
§9.4; the wire contract is not yet written.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T03
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1fc8fd3c-7af4-50e7-a07c-f45016f8b1f3"
```

Decide the revocation failure mode explicitly: fail closed, or proceed with a
detectable gap. Both are defensible; undecided is not, and an implementation
accident is the worst outcome. Note v0.5's local-outbox rule narrows this
considerably — fail-closed now triggers only when the engine's own store is
down — but the ruling is still owed.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T04
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "3d62dbf9-786e-58c1-bd87-fb43658ca865"
```

Give the gap a detection surface: outbox depth and age, or reconciliation of
`approval-engine` object counts against `audit-core` event counts per class.
Today nothing would surface a silent loss. Relate to §9.6's silence-as-signal
rule, which `kings-guard` offered to implement at its own layer.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T05
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "2a2a73ea-2778-59d2-94ef-7a70a22bb169"
```

Add a §11 conformance check so the next engine catalogued as an evidence source
declares its emission guarantee rather than reintroducing this silently.

```task
id: GH-WP-0002-T06
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "250cb9b3-713d-5607-ad1b-225e339693bf"
```

Settle the consumption ordering contract between `approval-engine` and
`access-engine` — who signals consumed, at what point relative to the decision,
and the handling of an allow never consumed, a double consumption by racing
callers, and consumption after a failed action. Raised by `flex-auth`; required
before `FLEX-WP-0017` T05. Recorded unresolved in `approval-engine/INTENT.md`.