docs: record enforced provider egress acceptance
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docs/evidence/GLAS-WP-0012-egress-2026-09-05.md
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docs/evidence/GLAS-WP-0012-egress-2026-09-05.md
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# Local provider egress acceptance
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Sand-boxer now supports owner allowlisted HTTPS CONNECT egress with isolated
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network namespaces. No credentials were read or model calls made.
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- Extension smoke sandbox `e290e788`: Anthropic verified TLS, HTTP 404;
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undeclared example.com and direct 1.1.1.1:443 denied; proxy/workspace removed.
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- Persisted-manager smoke sandbox `1c64fa89`: the same checks passed after
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reconstructing the manager/store, including proxy teardown from saved state.
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- Glas regression: 101 tests passed in its .venv. The system Python lacks the
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sandboxer dependency and could not collect the suite; the configured venv passed.
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- Glas deterministic boundary smoke `741a9b87`: source absent/unchanged,
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exact identity, task mode0600/removal, only lo and workspace teardown passed.
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Implementation and scope: ../sand-boxer/docs/bwrap-egress.md. The proxy enforces
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connection destinations, not HTTP path or TLS SNI on shared hosting; the trusted
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host resolver supplies addresses and non-global results refuse. Existing
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production profiles remain blocked and opt out of the new egress by default.
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Remaining GLAS-WP-0012-T02 / SAND-WP-0015-T04: concrete machine auth binding,
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protected credential delivery from confirmed KV version 2, pinned Claude
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executable and real authentication/task acceptance. The platform CCR applier
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currently supports OIDC/Kubernetes and transitional token auth, not AppRole;
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local machine identity must be implemented through its owner before activation.
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Do not use the operator UI session as runtime authentication.
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@ -202,3 +202,12 @@ One version-pinned local profile runs its actual rein/model task entirely in
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the declared sandbox, produces validated local output, and tears down cleanly.
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Its readiness describes the proven runtime scope. Other profile readiness and
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consumer schedules remain independently governed.
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## 2026-09-05 egress owner return
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Owner-controlled HTTPS egress is implemented and live-tested through both the
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extension and a persisted manager: provider TLS/HTTP response, undeclared-host
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and direct-IP denial, isolated namespace and proxy/workspace cleanup passed.
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See [egress evidence](../docs/evidence/GLAS-WP-0012-egress-2026-09-05.md).
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T02 remains waiting on machine auth, protected credential delivery, the pinned
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Claude executable and the combined production acceptance. Profiles remain blocked.
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