docs: record production policy deployment and remaining approval gates

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0726e-5232-73f2-aaca-2c05ceb62efb

history/2026-09-06-174000-production-deployment.md

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+# Production deployment result — 2026-09-06
+
+User authorized production deployment. The dedicated secrets-engine policy
+service is deployed; the complete approval/credential chain is not activated.
+
+## Deployed
+
+- Helm release flex-auth-secrets-engine, namespace flex-auth, revision 1.
+- Image forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth at
+  sha256:89086c02c74a931068423e70937d03df7850fa0db9c63e70be56b3558f1756af,
+  verified against CI tag main-dd3ce4c before application.
+- Policy secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1.
+- Endpoint http://flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080.
+- Available 1/1; caller-auth warn per FLEX-WP-0021-T04. This mode does not
+  enforce authenticated caller identity. Ingress requires the secrets-engine
+  namespace and app.kubernetes.io/name=secrets-engine pod label.
+- Helm lint and server dry-run passed. Five published Check fixtures returned
+  two allows (rotate, dual-control destroy) and three denies (unknown subject,
+  missing destroy claim, unknown revoke action). These are policy evaluations,
+  not actual protected actions or approval consumption.
+- Network probes verified allowed identity access after initial propagation
+  retry, plus wrong-label and wrong-namespace denial across retries. All six
+  temporary pods and the local port-forward were removed.
+- Existing ops-warden, user-engine and tenant-engine Deployment specs compared
+  equal before/after. New secrets-engine namespace retained for future consumer.
+- Deployment input lives in flex-auth/values/secrets-engine.yaml; first-install
+  rollback is removal of only this dedicated Helm release.
+
+## Remaining production gates
+
+approval-engine is not deployed. Live preflight found:
+
+1. The two required KeyCape clients are absent; confidential client credentials
+   and audience/scope validation are still needed.
+2. audit-core sender scope registers only user-engine. Approval sender
+   registration, token custody and ingress are still needed.
+3. Store tenant platform, requested client tenant:coulomb and PDP tenant:platform
+   differ. Owner contracts must align before exact tenant verification can pass.
+4. The approval image still needs a built/scanned immutable release digest.
+
+Corrected approval-engine's deployment issuer to https://kc.coulomb.social and
+JWKS service DNS to keycape.sso.svc.cluster.local, matching observed live
+configuration. No KeyCape client, audit registry or secret custody was mutated.
+No secret values were emitted and no Anthropic key was read.
+
+Live records: FLEX-WP-0021-T04 done, T05 awaiting consumer adoption/handoff;
+APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01/T03/T04 remain gated; SECRETS-WP-0009-T03 and
+GLAS-WP-0012-T02 remain waiting. The local Glas profile stays blocked. This
+partial deployment must not be described as a production Claude run.