feat: integrate durable authorization audit and runtime composition

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a0e747-8f27-7242-8df8-8bc44f88c929

docs/evidence/hub-wp-0012-owner-integration-20260928.md

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+# HUB-WP-0012 owner integration continuation — 2026-09-28
+
+Initial foundation committed and pushed: `3e38614`.
+
+Implemented in the follow-up:
+
+- Audit Core sender conforming to its real eight-field ingestion contract,
+  authenticated with a distinct rotating credential, and requiring operational
+  durable custody plus an explicit accepted/duplicate receipt before execution.
+- Exact verified signed policy artifacts retained in the archive; secret-shaped
+  decision fields fail closed before serialization. Refusals retain verified
+  identity, action and request/resource digests where available.
+- Explicit `SecuritySettings` + owner `FactSource` runtime composition, bounded
+  HTTP calls, no proxy-environment inheritance, and runtime-owned client cleanup.
+  Configuration alone cannot activate a missing authority implementation.
+
+Validation:
+
+- Full suite with `HUB_CORE_AUDIT_CORE_SOURCE=/home/worsch/audit-core`:
+  **304 passed**, one existing TestClient deprecation warning, 52.56 seconds.
+- Final focused owner/denial checks after enriching refusal attribution: **7 passed**.
+- Source inventory unchanged and validated: 161 Hub surfaces / 48 platform rows /
+  250 observed cluster objects.
+- `uv build` succeeds; `git diff --check` passes.
+
+Five opt-in owner-source cases use the actual Audit Core receiver:
+
+1. Hub envelope accepted and exact evidence retained across storage reopen.
+2. Unmodified development custody rejected before posting.
+3. A lost receipt blocks execution even though the receiver holds the attempt.
+4. Invalid sender credential creates no record.
+5. Composed JWT verification, current facts, signed decision, real receiver
+   ingestion and native Hub write; archived decision independently verifies;
+   root entitlement withdrawal denies the next attempt.
+
+These are local tests with synthetic identities, keys and sender registration.
+SQLite is durable test storage, not operational production custody. A clearly
+named test-only readiness fixture simulates that custody classification; no
+live receiver admission, real root login or platform access is claimed.
+
+The [owner review](../owner-access-integration.md) records concrete next gates:
+User Engine's `platform:root` mapping, a non-provisioning immutable identity and
+root-entitlement lookup (its `/api/v1/me` can create an account), authenticated
+Tenant Engine caller admission, and actual Hub Audit Core sender custody.
+`warden route show audit-core-senders --json` routes registry ownership to
+ops-mason/OpenBao and is unresolved. No secrets were retrieved or grants changed.