tegwick
a15fe032b0
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a0e747-8f27-7242-8df8-8bc44f88c929
315 lines
14 KiB
Python
315 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""Reusable HTTP enforcement for the private platform-root milestone.
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Owner adapters establish identity, live account/tenant facts, signed policy
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decisions and durable audit. An absent adapter never grants access.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import hashlib
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import json
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import math
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import time
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from importlib.resources import files
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from typing import Protocol
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from uuid import uuid4
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from starlette.requests import Request
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from starlette.routing import Match
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from hub_core.security.identity import AccessFailure, Actor
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PROFILE = "hub-core.access/1.0.0"
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class LiveFacts:
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issuer: str
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subject: str
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actor_tenant: str
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target_tenant: str
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account_active: bool
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actor_tenant_active: bool
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target_tenant_active: bool
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root_entitled: bool
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checked_at: float
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evidence_id: str
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producer_addresses: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
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def __post_init__(self):
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for value in (self.account_active, self.actor_tenant_active,
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self.target_tenant_active, self.root_entitled):
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if type(value) is not bool:
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raise ValueError("authoritative state must be boolean")
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if type(self.checked_at) not in {int, float} or not math.isfinite(self.checked_at):
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raise ValueError("finite fact observation time required")
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for value in (self.issuer, self.subject, self.actor_tenant,
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self.target_tenant, self.evidence_id, *self.producer_addresses):
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
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raise ValueError("nonempty authoritative references required")
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Authorization:
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actor: Actor
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action: str
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resource: str
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facts: LiveFacts
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correlation_id: str
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request_digest: str
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Decision:
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allowed: bool
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decision_id: str
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policy_version: str
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caller: str = ""
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signed_envelope: str | None = None
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def __post_init__(self):
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if type(self.allowed) is not bool or not self.decision_id or not self.policy_version:
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raise ValueError("explicit boolean decision and provenance required")
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class Identity(Protocol):
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async def authenticate(self, token: str) -> Actor: ...
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class FactSource(Protocol):
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async def resolve(self, actor: Actor, resource: str) -> LiveFacts:
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"""Query authoritative account/tenant state, without cached root grants."""
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...
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class Policy(Protocol):
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async def evaluate(self, request: Authorization) -> Decision:
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"""Verify signed origin, binding, lifetime, caller and obligations."""
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...
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class Audit(Protocol):
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async def append(self, record: dict) -> None:
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"""Return only after durable acceptance; raise on delivery failure."""
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...
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class AccessController:
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def __init__(self, *, identity: Identity, facts: FactSource, policy: Policy,
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audit: Audit, root_issuer: str, root_subject: str):
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if not root_issuer or not root_subject:
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raise ValueError("immutable root identity is required")
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self.identity, self.facts, self.policy, self.audit = identity, facts, policy, audit
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self.root_identity = (root_issuer, root_subject)
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async def authorize(self, token: str, action: str, resource: str,
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correlation_id: str, request_digest: str) -> Authorization:
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actor = await self.identity.authenticate(token)
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try:
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return await self._authorize_actor(actor, action, resource, correlation_id, request_digest)
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc if isinstance(exc, AccessFailure) else AccessFailure(503, "access_unavailable")
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failure.actor = actor
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raise failure
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async def _authorize_actor(self, actor: Actor, action: str, resource: str,
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correlation_id: str, request_digest: str) -> Authorization:
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if actor.expires_at <= time.time():
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raise AccessFailure(401, "expired_access_token")
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if actor.principal_type == "human" and (
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(actor.issuer, actor.subject) != self.root_identity
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or actor.tenant != "tenant:platform" or actor.assurance not in {"aal2", "aal3"}
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):
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raise AccessFailure(403, "root_required")
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facts = await self.facts.resolve(actor, resource)
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if (facts.issuer, facts.subject, facts.actor_tenant) != (
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actor.issuer, actor.subject, actor.tenant
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) or not 0 <= time.time() - facts.checked_at <= 5 or not facts.evidence_id:
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raise AccessFailure(503, "untrusted_or_stale_facts")
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# v1 explicitly classifies Hub records as platform-owned. Other tenants
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# require the Phase 2 resource resolver/storage contract, not a header.
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if facts.target_tenant != "tenant:platform":
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raise AccessFailure(403, "unsupported_target_tenant")
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if not (facts.account_active and facts.actor_tenant_active and facts.target_tenant_active):
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raise AccessFailure(403, "inactive_identity_or_tenant")
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if actor.principal_type == "human" and not facts.root_entitled:
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raise AccessFailure(403, "root_entitlement_required")
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context = Authorization(actor, action, resource, facts, correlation_id, request_digest)
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decision = await self.policy.evaluate(context)
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await self.audit.append({
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"profile": PROFILE, "correlation_id": correlation_id,
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"issuer": actor.issuer, "subject": actor.subject,
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"principal_type": actor.principal_type, "actor_tenant": actor.tenant,
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"target_tenant": facts.target_tenant, "action": action,
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"resource_digest": hashlib.sha256(resource.encode()).hexdigest(),
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"request_digest": request_digest, "facts_evidence": facts.evidence_id,
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"decision_id": decision.decision_id, "policy_version": decision.policy_version,
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"policy_caller": decision.caller,
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"signed_decision": decision.signed_envelope,
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"outcome": "authorized" if decision.allowed else "denied",
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})
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if not decision.allowed:
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raise AccessFailure(403, "policy_denied")
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if actor.expires_at <= time.time():
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raise AccessFailure(401, "expired_access_token")
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if time.time() - facts.checked_at > 5:
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raise AccessFailure(503, "facts_expired_during_authorization")
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return context
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def route_key(route, method: str) -> str:
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endpoint = route.endpoint
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return f"{method}:{route.path}:{endpoint.__module__}.{endpoint.__name__}"
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def iter_routes(router):
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for route in router.routes:
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if hasattr(route, "original_router"):
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yield from iter_routes(route.original_router)
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else:
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yield route
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class AccessBoundary:
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"""ASGI boundary also covers docs, redirects, unknown routes and WebSockets.
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Install on an embedded host with its own explicit catalog to protect SDK
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routers. Routes added without catalog admission remain denied.
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"""
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def __init__(self, app, *, host, controller: AccessController | None,
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catalog: dict[str, str] | None = None, body_timeout: float = 10, browser=None):
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if not 0 < body_timeout <= 10:
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raise ValueError("body timeout must be positive and at most ten seconds")
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self.app, self.host, self.controller = app, host, controller
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self.body_timeout = body_timeout
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self.browser = browser
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self.catalog = catalog if catalog is not None else json.loads(
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files("hub_core.security").joinpath("routes.json").read_text()
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)["routes"]
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async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
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if scope["type"] == "websocket":
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await send({"type": "websocket.close", "code": 1008})
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return
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if scope["type"] != "http":
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await self.app(scope, receive, send)
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return
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# No prefix or trailing-slash exception. Detailed readiness is protected.
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if scope["method"] == "GET" and scope["path"] == "/healthz":
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await JSONResponse({"status": "ok"})(scope, receive, send)
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return
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if self.browser is not None:
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from hub_core.security.browser import BROWSER_ROUTES
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if (scope["method"], scope["path"]) in BROWSER_ROUTES:
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response = await self.browser.handle(Request(scope, receive))
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await response(scope, receive, send)
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return
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correlation = str(uuid4())
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context = None
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cookie_auth = False
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action = None
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digest = None
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try:
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request = Request(scope, receive)
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headers = request.headers.getlist("authorization")
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if self.browser is not None and not headers:
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token = self.browser.access_token(request)
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cookie_auth = True
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else:
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if self.browser is not None:
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from hub_core.security.browser import SESSION_COOKIE
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if SESSION_COOKIE in request.cookies:
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raise AccessFailure(400, "mixed_browser_credentials")
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if len(headers) != 1 or not headers[0].startswith("Bearer "):
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raise AccessFailure(401, "bearer_required")
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token = headers[0][7:]
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if not token or len(token) > 16384 or any(c.isspace() for c in token):
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raise AccessFailure(401, "invalid_access_token")
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if self.controller is None:
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raise AccessFailure(503, "access_dependencies_unavailable")
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route = next((r for r in iter_routes(self.host)
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if r.matches(scope)[0] == Match.FULL), None)
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key = route_key(route, scope["method"]) if route and hasattr(route, "endpoint") else None
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action = self.catalog.get(key)
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if not action:
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raise AccessFailure(403, "surface_not_admitted")
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# Bind policy to the exact request without exposing content to PDP/audit.
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request = Request(scope, receive)
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chunks, size = [], 0
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try:
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async with asyncio.timeout(self.body_timeout):
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async for chunk in request.stream():
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size += len(chunk)
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if size > 1024 * 1024:
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raise AccessFailure(413, "request_too_large")
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chunks.append(chunk)
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except TimeoutError as exc:
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raise AccessFailure(408, "request_body_timeout") from exc
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body = b"".join(chunks)
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digest = hashlib.sha256(b"\0".join([
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scope["method"].encode(), scope["path"].encode(),
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scope.get("query_string", b""), body,
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])).hexdigest()
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async with asyncio.timeout(10):
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context = await self.controller.authorize(
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token, action, scope["path"], correlation, digest,
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)
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if body:
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try:
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payload = json.loads(body)
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except (ValueError, UnicodeError):
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payload = None # Handler owns content validation.
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if isinstance(payload, dict):
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for field in ("from_address", "from_agent", "author"):
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if field in payload and payload[field] not in context.facts.producer_addresses:
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raise AccessFailure(403, "producer_identity_mismatch")
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if cookie_auth:
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self.browser.access_token(request) # Recheck expiry/logout after owner awaits.
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scope.setdefault("state", {})["hub_access"] = context
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except Exception as exc:
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failure = exc if isinstance(exc, AccessFailure) else AccessFailure(503, "access_unavailable")
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actor = context.actor if context else getattr(failure, "actor", None)
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if self.controller is not None:
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try:
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async with asyncio.timeout(3):
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await self.controller.audit.append({
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"profile": PROFILE, "correlation_id": correlation,
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"outcome": "refused", "reason": failure.code,
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"subject": actor.subject if actor else None,
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"issuer": actor.issuer if actor else None,
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"actor_tenant": actor.tenant if actor else None,
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"principal_type": actor.principal_type if actor else None,
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"action": action,
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"resource_digest": hashlib.sha256(scope["path"].encode()).hexdigest(),
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"request_digest": digest,
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"target_tenant": "tenant:platform",
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})
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except Exception:
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failure = AccessFailure(503, "audit_unavailable")
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headers = {"Cache-Control": "no-store", "X-Correlation-ID": correlation}
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if failure.status == 401:
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headers["WWW-Authenticate"] = "Bearer"
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await JSONResponse({"detail": failure.code}, status_code=failure.status,
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headers=headers)(scope, receive, send)
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return
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delivered = False
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async def replay():
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nonlocal delivered
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if not delivered:
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delivered = True
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return {"type": "http.request", "body": body, "more_body": False}
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return await receive()
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async def protected_send(message):
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if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
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message["headers"] = [(k, v) for k, v in message.get("headers", [])
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if k.lower() not in {b"cache-control", b"x-correlation-id"}]
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message["headers"].extend([(b"cache-control", b"no-store"),
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(b"x-correlation-id", correlation.encode())])
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await send(message)
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await self.app(scope, replay, protected_send)
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