Generalise the CARING section 32 role set (R-2, INFO-DEC-2026-001)

The role set — Principal, effective actor, Delegator, tool or agent, policy
ceiling, execution context, audit identity — now applies wherever a subject's
access is exercised through another party, rather than to non-human subjects
only.

The gap this closes is not about agents. A support operator impersonating a
customer involves no non-human subject anywhere in the path, yet without the
decomposition that operator's audit identity and policy ceiling collapse into
the customer's, which is the outcome CARING's exposure analysis exists to
prevent. CARING already names customer impersonation as an exposure mode and
ImpersonationBlocked as a control; the vocabulary for analysing it was gated to
subjects the case does not involve. Section 33 was already subject-agnostic, so
the canon applied the execution paths to any subject while restricting the roles
along those paths to non-human ones — an artifact of the section heading, not a
considered position.

Accepted narrowly. Section 32.1 stays agent-stated, with a note on reading the
capability ceiling for a human effective actor. No role is removed, renamed or
added, and section 33 is untouched. Option C, a twelfth dimension, is rejected as
duplicating sections 32 and 33 while touching a dimension set the Kubernetes RBAC
benchmark depends on.

Canon version moves to 0.4.0-RC2-itc2; source version stays 0.4.0-RC2, since
this revises the InfoTechCanon-aligned standard and claims nothing about
upstream CARING. The change is additive: an implementation that applied the set
only to non-human subjects stays conformant for those subjects.

Review record in history/; the SecurityCanon boundary file and placement record
are updated to show R-2 resolved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da

infospace/standards/caring/InfoTechCanonCaringAccessGovernanceStandard.md

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ updated_at: 2026-05-23
 **CARING:** Canonical Access Roles for Information Needs Governance
 **Document Status:** Release Candidate, InfoTechCanon-aligned refactor
 **Source Version:** 0.4.0-RC2
-**Canon Version:** 0.4.0-RC2-itc1
+**Canon Version:** 0.4.0-RC2-itc2
 **Document Type:** Specialized InfoTechCanon Standard
 **Recommended Repository Path:** `standards/caring/InfoTechCanonCaringAccessGovernanceStandard.md`
 
@@ -3321,7 +3321,8 @@ If a namespace is used as a tenant boundary, the analysis must verify whether th
 
 CARING treats agents, automations, and services as first-class subjects.
 
-For non-human subjects, access must distinguish:
+Where a subject's access is exercised **through another party**, access must
+distinguish:
 
 ```text
 
@@ -3341,8 +3342,25 @@ Audit identity
 
 ```
 
+This role set was written for non-human subjects and generalised to any subject
+in canon version 0.4.0-RC2-itc2, under INFO-DEC-2026-001. The motivating case is
+human-on-human: a support operator impersonating a customer involves no agent at
+all, yet without this decomposition the operator's audit identity and policy
+ceiling collapse into the customer's. Section 33 classifies the execution paths
+— delegated, mediated, induced — over which the role set applies, and it is
+already subject-agnostic.
+
+The generalisation is additive. No role is removed or renamed, the formula in
+32.1 generalises unchanged, and an implementation that applied the set only to
+non-human subjects remains conformant for those subjects.
+
 ### 32.1 Agent Access Formula
 
+The formula below is stated for the agent case, where the capability ceiling is
+a property of the tool. For a human effective actor, read the ceiling as the
+impersonating operator's own policy ceiling.
+
+
 ```text
 
 Effective Agent Access =