The role set — Principal, effective actor, Delegator, tool or agent, policy
ceiling, execution context, audit identity — now applies wherever a subject's
access is exercised through another party, rather than to non-human subjects
only.
The gap this closes is not about agents. A support operator impersonating a
customer involves no non-human subject anywhere in the path, yet without the
decomposition that operator's audit identity and policy ceiling collapse into
the customer's, which is the outcome CARING's exposure analysis exists to
prevent. CARING already names customer impersonation as an exposure mode and
ImpersonationBlocked as a control; the vocabulary for analysing it was gated to
subjects the case does not involve. Section 33 was already subject-agnostic, so
the canon applied the execution paths to any subject while restricting the roles
along those paths to non-human ones — an artifact of the section heading, not a
considered position.
Accepted narrowly. Section 32.1 stays agent-stated, with a note on reading the
capability ceiling for a human effective actor. No role is removed, renamed or
added, and section 33 is untouched. Option C, a twelfth dimension, is rejected as
duplicating sections 32 and 33 while touching a dimension set the Kubernetes RBAC
benchmark depends on.
Canon version moves to 0.4.0-RC2-itc2; source version stays 0.4.0-RC2, since
this revises the InfoTechCanon-aligned standard and claims nothing about
upstream CARING. The change is additive: an implementation that applied the set
only to non-human subjects stays conformant for those subjects.
Review record in history/; the SecurityCanon boundary file and placement record
are updated to show R-2 resolved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
R-3 is resolved by disambiguation without a rename. CARING section 10.7 now says
its Authority exposure mode names a demanding party rather than a right, links to
ITC-ORG section 10.17, and notes that such an Authority holds no organizational
authority over the system it compels. ITC-ORG carries the reciprocal sentence and
records that SecurityCanon's AuthMode qualifies the exercise of the right rather
than redefining it.
The seventeen concepts no artifact declared are now declared: eleven to the
Organization Model, four to CARING and two to the Capability Model. Capacity in
the Organization Model and Capacity behaviour in the Capability Model are two
concepts, not one, and neither moves. Two of CARING's four turned out not to be
new concepts at all but the prose spellings of CaringCapabilityProfile and
CaringDerivedCapability; both spellings are declared to the same owner so the
name a reader meets resolves. Effective Access and Declared Access were
genuinely undeclared.
Three boundary reviews are added for organization, caring and capability,
bringing the count to fourteen. The concept_defined_without_owner warning is at
zero, and the test that asserted it fires now proves it on a modified corpus
instead of on the live one.
make check passes with 54 tests, clean validation, no warnings, no stale assets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
The SecurityCanon boundary review recorded a residual: CARING and ITC-ACCESS
hold two definitions of Scope, with ITC-ACCESS named owner. Reading the corpus
corrects both halves. ITC-IDENT section 2.10 owns Scope as the general boundary
within which identifiers, meanings, relationships, accounts, policies or
lifecycle states are valid, and ITC-ACCESS section 11.8 ResourceScope already
declares itself a refinement of that general identity Scope rather than a
competing definition.
The second use the residual was reaching for is CARING section 21, which
presented a dimension named Scope with a ladder from Ecosystem to Field without
saying what the dimension ranges over. It now states that it ranges over
ITC-IDENT Scope instances, that the ladder is the canonical value set rather
than a second definition, and that ResourceScope refines the same concept for
resource boundaries.
No concept is renamed, moved or removed and no ladder value changes, so the
corpus is unchanged in shape; make check passes with 46 tests, clean validation
and a passing small-saas profile. The correction is carried back to the
SecurityCanon placement record and imports.json, where Scope now imports from
the identity model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 3588@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 24b80f66-e5a7-4e61-99fe-2d422e6d17da
