Request fresh KeyCape login for timed reviews with narrow image candidate

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6.1-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a1029c-c003-7283-acc9-930b434e6cae
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-10-03 20:33:34 +02:00
parent 219d83ad1b
commit 2d2161bc64
7 changed files with 83 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -118,8 +118,9 @@ A6 refusal diagnosis: read at 18:27:49 UTC still carried exactly the same
KeyCape `assurance.at=1791047288` (17:08:08 UTC), age 4,781 seconds. Exact
identity, group, memo and native approval pins match v7; the 900-second MFA
limit refuses this request. The latest attempt has not supplied fresh evidence;
whether the browser actually performed a fresh OTP is awaiting operator
confirmation. Do not infer a new authentication from a successful redirect.
the founder confirms account-portal logout followed by password and OTP login
in the same browser. That did not propagate fresh assurance into this review
request. Do not infer a new review authentication from portal login.
KeyCape's `/account/logout` confirmation clears its session and routes through
upstream Authelia sign-out; informed-decision sign-out alone is local. Complete
that browser flow, then start a new review login with password and OTP.
@ -127,3 +128,5 @@ If the verified timestamp remains old after that, KeyCape must correct the
authentication-time contract under existing intake `INFD-IN-0005` and prove
it with a completed browser journey. Retain all policy freshness limits.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-review-refusal.json`.
`INFD-WP-0006` implements an explicit fresh-authentication request from review
sign-in; its narrow image rollout and native browser proof remain blocked.

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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
---
id: INFD-WP-0006
type: workplan
title: "Request fresh issuer authentication for timed decision reviews"
domain: infotech
repo: informed-decision
status: blocked
owner: codex
created: "2026-10-03"
updated: "2026-10-03"
related: [INFD-IN-0005, KEY-WP-0033, INFD-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03]
---
## Request fresh authentication on review sign-in
```task
id: INFD-WP-0006-T01
status: done
priority: high
```
The founder reported signing out through users.coulomb.social and entering
password and OTP again in the same browser, but p01 read still carried the
17:08:08 UTC authentication time. Portal and review sessions are independent.
Review sign-in currently permits reused KeyCape assurance. Request
`prompt=login` and `max_age=0` via the existing state/nonce/PKCE flow, using
KeyCape's completed KEY-WP-0033 compatibility implementation. Retain the
signed authentication timestamp and every action policy freshness check.
Update the existing browser authentication regression and document the owner
contract. No new identity assertion or local authorization decision.
Implemented and validated: all 80 browser-authentication tests pass, including
preservation of the issuer's original signed authentication time. The candidate
uses `Containerfile.fresh-auth` to replace only `oidc.py` in the exact admitted
image, excluding pending intake implementation and schema migration. Native
browser proof remains T02.
## Deploy and prove the fresh browser journey
```task
id: INFD-WP-0006-T02
status: wait
priority: high
needs_human: true
blocking_reason: "Publish and prepare a pinned review image, obtain founder approval for the live rollout, then complete human password/OTP login and verify a new signed authentication time and p01 read allowance."
```
Source tests are insufficient for native admission. Publish the exact tested
source and prepare the existing deployment image update with previous image
rollback; preserve runtime policy and memo pins. Live replacement needs the
founder's go under the agent environment orientation attended-window rule.
The founder alone completes password/OTP and any disposition. Verify the
signed timestamp is new and exact p01 read is allowed. If genuine fresh MFA
still reports the prior time, KeyCape must correct assurance issuance under
INFD-IN-0005; if its upstream freshness check fails, KeyCape/Authelia own that
dependency. Do not increase the 900-second action limit to mask either issue.