Prepare authenticated lifecycle runtime and production release candidate

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a10780-6d41-7952-9718-dfbc1f41236f

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/container.json

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "status": "passed",
+  "image_id": "sha256:2768bd1da3e651cc0be2d0f1ae6eea1af4eb057b31ef63ebb03b004c2ed76c3d",
+  "repo_digests": [
+    "informed-decision@sha256:2768bd1da3e651cc0be2d0f1ae6eea1af4eb057b31ef63ebb03b004c2ed76c3d"
+  ],
+  "checks_passed": 13,
+  "checks": [
+    "installed container entrypoint serves with projected configuration",
+    "non-root read-only runtime has no external network or published port",
+    "private config/database modes enforced; package installer absent",
+    "configured review refuses anonymous access and reports audit-unready status",
+    "private listener refuses anonymous lifecycle access and exposes no browser routes",
+    "public listener exposes no private workload route",
+    "a second writer cannot acquire the active evidence volume",
+    "synthetic uncertain intent and undelivered evidence remain explicit",
+    "consistent backup created while serving; overwrite refused",
+    "SIGTERM closes the serving writer without forced kill",
+    "restart preserves immutable content and unresolved submission without retry",
+    "separate restored volume preserves exact content and unresolved state",
+    "incomplete owner configuration exits before serving"
+  ],
+  "fixture_only": true,
+  "external_network": "none",
+  "content_snapshot_sha256": "7bcbffb5652f7784de477241c4fcc464f8f5fa26288c44876db87beec964a904",
+  "native_identity_policy_audit_proven": false,
+  "published": false,
+  "deployed": false,
+  "factory_attempts": 0,
+  "paid_model_calls": 0,
+  "cleanup_complete": true
+}

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/lifecycle-policy-validation.json

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "valid": true,
+  "caring_findings": [
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed canonical roles",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.canonical_roles"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed organization relations",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.organization_relations"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed scopes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.scopes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed planes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.planes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed capabilities",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.capabilities"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed exposure modes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.exposure_modes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed conditions",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.conditions"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed restrictions",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.restrictions"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "tests": [
+    {
+      "name": "test_empty_denied",
+      "passed": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "fixtures": [
+    {
+      "id": "unknown-request-denied",
+      "passed": true,
+      "expected": {
+        "effect": "deny"
+      },
+      "actual": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "lifecycle_scope_or_identity_refused"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+  "date": "2026-10-04",
+  "status": "prepared-not-deployed",
+  "server_dry_run": {
+    "cluster": "railiance01",
+    "objects": 25,
+    "passed": true
+  },
+  "sha256": {
+    "deploy/lifecycle/admission.candidate.json": "e3054aebb2338146b912121198eba0232973574b9f045710abc802e524fe43f6",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/intake-submitters.json": "58ba5ef87ecfd40bc7f0eaf2beb5e50f0c1f0e47315e79dbfa9e06411a17eba9",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/lifecycle-callers.json": "0b66382a64bdf81ee75d14a70ba3b19290084922a1e0bc8a873af0f039dc7041",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/policy.candidate.yaml": "e08fcb494d8d29f45b5fbce949246ce2de28e73a56efd2064f42dbfee8f3d11f",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/registries.candidate.json": "9bad6db5fbc2178d31b04120016a41830c3552fbb9e2517b718f9bbe87cf649e",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/review-groups.json": "1d61d2b82230981130936651a7fc4230e06ecaa51416a8a1be2bb2eb6ec4c353",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/review-policy.candidate.yaml": "6c49a9d520a553778935555351c70b3823b72dd0f1ed3a5383d5a4fc0e5e7998",
+    "deploy/lifecycle/service.candidate.json": "bf36ecb0160bf893a60fe059a3baf27a63668e2bb7b9f17c9582d6de8e842545"
+  }
+}

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/policy-scan.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "scanner": "aquasec/trivy@sha256:62b1e65e8869bc4b4c6aa4fa2b21595256c7c2f6018a9d9ad61caf87187c1969",
+  "scanner_version": "0.74.0",
+  "scanned_at": "2026-10-04T19:35:45.454792771Z",
+  "artifact": "flex-auth:wp0007-candidate",
+  "image_id": "sha256:f6ed8af69af766d7e9498465a23c292d91185b79352065736a2132216aac1d37",
+  "severities": [
+    "HIGH",
+    "CRITICAL"
+  ],
+  "vulnerabilities": 0,
+  "full_report_sha256": "e41d19c961f0e0d3a4051362c6769edc3069b4286612239861818d403c16ee6a",
+  "warnings": [
+    "vendor severity selection"
+  ],
+  "scope": "candidate artifact scan; not a general security attestation"
+}

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/review-policy-validation.json

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+{
+  "valid": true,
+  "caring_findings": [
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed canonical roles",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.canonical_roles"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed organization relations",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.organization_relations"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed scopes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.scopes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed planes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.planes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed capabilities",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.capabilities"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed exposure modes",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.exposure_modes"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed conditions",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.conditions"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "code": "CARING-POLICY-MISSING-DIMENSION",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "message": "policy package should declare governed restrictions",
+      "fields": [
+        "caring.restrictions"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "tests": [
+    {
+      "name": "test_allow_does_not_prove_the_pin",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_approval_id_malformed",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_attribute_acts_are_eligible_only_when_sets_admit",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_bad_memo_id_refused",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_digest_mismatch",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_exact_pin_mismatch_is_not_rescued",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_exact_record_ignores_attribute_context",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_future_mfa_is_identity_refused",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_human_control_false",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_initial_release_allows_only_decision_record_class",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_initial_release_sets",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_list_does_not_use_attribute_admission",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_listable_is_exact_union",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_memo_review_group_is_not_hardcoded",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_memo_version_refused",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_requester_mismatch",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_review_group_must_be_verified",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_service_subject_is_identity_refused",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_six_exact_metered_memos_allow_human_review",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_stale_mfa_on_attribute_branch",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_t03_records_not_in_act_scope",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_tool_proof_exact_record_allowed",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_tool_proof_without_mfa_denied",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_tool_proof_wrong_digest_denied",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_tool_proof_wrong_native_id_denied",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_unknown_class",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_unknown_request_denied",
+      "passed": true
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "test_unknown_submitter",
+      "passed": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "fixtures": [
+    {
+      "id": "unknown-request-denied",
+      "passed": true,
+      "expected": {
+        "effect": "deny"
+      },
+      "actual": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "compact_sitting_scope_or_identity_refused"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "attribute-non-human-refused",
+      "passed": true,
+      "expected": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "identity_refused"
+      },
+      "actual": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "identity_refused"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "attribute-stale-mfa",
+      "passed": true,
+      "expected": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "stale_mfa"
+      },
+      "actual": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "stale_mfa"
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "attribute-future-mfa",
+      "passed": true,
+      "expected": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "identity_refused"
+      },
+      "actual": {
+        "effect": "deny",
+        "reason": "identity_refused"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}

docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/service-scan.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "scanner": "aquasec/trivy@sha256:62b1e65e8869bc4b4c6aa4fa2b21595256c7c2f6018a9d9ad61caf87187c1969",
+  "scanner_version": "0.74.0",
+  "scanned_at": "2026-10-04T19:30:26.955785485Z",
+  "artifact": "informed-decision:wp0007-candidate",
+  "image_id": "sha256:2768bd1da3e651cc0be2d0f1ae6eea1af4eb057b31ef63ebb03b004c2ed76c3d",
+  "severities": [
+    "HIGH",
+    "CRITICAL"
+  ],
+  "vulnerabilities": 0,
+  "full_report_sha256": "86543b4d8850008ada40e10f99f3b26c0564a77cab5932f61115e574e21a2ee4",
+  "warnings": [
+    "Alpine 3.24 absent from scanner EOL list"
+  ],
+  "scope": "candidate artifact scan; not a general security attestation"
+}

docs/specs/LifecycleProductionRuntime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Initial production runtime candidate
+
+INFD-WP-0007 / INFD-WP-0005. Founder selected net-kingdom-admins humans and
+system:serviceaccount:state-hub:state-hub on 2026-10-04. This is a preparation
+contract; deployment still requires the concrete rollout approval.
+
+## Identity and listeners
+
+The same process/store serves browser routes on 8080 and private workload routes
+on 8081. Only the public listener is behind decisions.coulomb.social. A separate
+ClusterIP and exact State Hub namespace AND app-label ingress expose 8081.
+`/v1/decisions` uses a projected token with audience informed-decision-lifecycle;
+`/v1/memos` uses a different token with audience informed-decision-intake. Neither
+route accepts a browser cookie. Browser authoring retains KeyCape sessions,
+CSRF and origin checking. The private listener exposes no browser routes.
+
+Every workload request performs Kubernetes TokenReview over CA- and
+hostname-verified HTTPS with a freshly read rotating reviewer credential. The
+review service needs only create on tokenreviews, not token creation or Secret
+read. The API-server audience is used for its reviewer token. Workload UID and
+subject come from TokenReview; tenant comes from the reloadable exact-account
+registry. JWT expiry is read only after TokenReview verifies that same token.
+Callers expire within 30 seconds or token expiry, whichever is earlier.
+
+The registry is identity registration, not an action permit. Every operation
+still requires a fresh external PDP decision. The lifecycle PDP has a distinct
+package, version and digest from human review. Only humans can bind via the
+existing protected review flow. Access Engine keeps the authorization decision;
+Approval Engine keeps authoritative approval state.
+
+## Initial proposal data
+
+`deploy/lifecycle/lifecycle-callers.json` names the exact State Hub account and
+platform tenant. The intake registry permits only decision-record class and
+net-kingdom-admins, with a proposed cap of 50 new attempts per UTC day. Replays
+do not spend a second attempt; uncertain creation never automatically reposts.
+The cap and routing are configuration, not per-decision deployments.
+
+The review-group recipient is the existing platform-root KeyCape subject found
+in previously bound review records. This is the initial single recipient; group
+membership alone does not turn every admin into that bound principal. Expanding
+to multiple human recipients needs a reviewed binding contract. The default
+legacy registries remain empty; only the reviewed release ConfigMap mounts the
+initial proposal. Directory group verification remains independent of this map.
+
+Registry volumes use no subPath and reload on each request. Requester custody is
+read-only at `/var/run/secrets/informed-decision/requester/client-secret`, matching
+CCR-2026-0032. No secret value is copied into release files or SQLite. Kubernetes
+Secret objects are not emitted by the renderer.
+
+## Evidence and compatibility
+
+Runtime options enable lifecycle audit delivery, intake audit/notification
+delivery and verified intake metadata for human review. The latter reloads the
+live Approval Engine object, checks its binding pin, requester informed-decision
+and human_control=true before the PDP call. Store guards recheck retained intake
+metadata at the mutation boundary. A valid-looking UUID/digest alone is not proof.
+
+State Hub forwarding currently exists as a dev fixture, not a production worker.
+The selected identity still needs projected lifecycle/intake tokens and an owner
+runtime integration. State Hub notifications/write-back require admitted receiver
+routes; `INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK` stays off in this candidate. Pending rows remain
+explicit. These are live INFD-WP-0005 dependencies, not claimed release evidence.
+
+The image migrates schema 2 to schema 5 on open. Existing records, presentations,
+dispositions, submissions and outbox evidence must survive. Rollback to the old
+image against the migrated database is forbidden: stop the new writer, retain all
+new evidence, and restore a verified pre-cutover copy on a separate private volume
+only under the reviewed recovery plan. An in-flight/unresolved human submission
+must be reconciled, never retried or discarded to make rollback convenient.
+
+## Remaining live gates
+
+- CCR-2026-0032 requester projection: current namespace has only the audit
+  ExternalSecret; requester custody, native identity/path refusals and rotation
+  evidence remain with RPF-WP-0051.
+- FLEX-WP-0033: publish scanned policy artifact; approve exact policy/RBAC/network
+  objects and native caller/subject allow/refusal tests.
+- INFD-WP-0005: production State Hub forwarding/receiver and token projections.
+- INFD-WP-0007-T06/T07: backup/restore, exact rollout approval, native human review
+  and independent audit receipts across two decisions and a revision with unchanged
+  release/configuration pins. Browser packet authoring and broader binding profiles
+  remain on T05; the supported review handoff profile is documented separately.

docs/specs/LifecycleServiceContract.md

@@ -102,3 +102,9 @@ HTTP schemas with canonical URLs and request limits; service admission and
 publication audience contracts; lifecycle audit receiver admission and readiness
 accounting. Test fixtures exercise the real PolicyClient against synthetic policy
 transport. They are not evidence of a deployed lifecycle policy grant.
+
+
+Production candidate record facts also include `revision_by`, the immutable actor
+of the requested revision. This lets its editor retain access to an unpublished
+successor after refining a published decision. Original authorship remains
+`registered_by`; both facts participate in the same transaction/read race guard.