Draft provisioning-window sitting for hub decision D1 (CUST-WP-0075)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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# Provisioning-window sitting — operator packet (hub decision D1)
Hub decision: `62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483` (D1, attended OpenBao
provisioning window), routed by CUST-WP-0075. The founder approves through
informed-decision, not with a raw hub resolve.
Review group: `net-kingdom-admins`. Surface: https://decisions.coulomb.social/
Contract: `docs/specs/CompactSignoffBatches.md`.
Generator: `tools/prepare_provisioning_window_batch.py` (re-running rewrites the same bytes).
An agent drafted this. It may not `accept` / `decline` / `seal`. Only the human binds.
## One unsigned memo, four lanes excluded
| n | memo_id | Blocking record | Question |
| --: | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | `infd-20261003-p01` | RPF-WP-0035-T06 (railiance-platform) | Accept the passed 2026-09-13 CCR-2026-0019 scoped delivery proof? |
Packet hash: `sha256:ee53cae14ae86dbdec2936d72f99e1285b6c714d5bd322ef30df8ffbf0939ff2`.
Required acknowledgement: the wrong-group login is untested, the 404 proves
routing only, and acceptance does not close T06 (the CCR-2026-0018
disablement is still open).
Excluded (no memo; the reasons are in `provisioning/index.json` → `excluded`):
| Task | Why not ready now |
| --- | --- |
| MASON-WP-0007-T05 | The policy/role script exists, but the row-7 seed copy has no reviewed script; the T01 survey is still todo; ESO's right to create SA tokens in `tenant-engine` is unverified |
| RPF-WP-0035-T02 | The design is still `proposed`; no reviewed child command exists; KeyCape registration/custody is unverified; gated on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 |
| RPF-WP-0035-T08 | Already provisioned and delivered 2026-09-11; what remains is owner acceptance, not an attended act (stale gate) |
| RAPPCOREHUB-WP-0003-T04 | No CCR, design or script exists for the dedicated `read:repository` identity; the identity-canon fix is also outstanding |
Resolving hub decision D1 is a separate act, after the window has run. The
owners of the excluded lanes re-qualify their tasks.
## Part A — circulate and bind the memo
**A1. Dry run (shell, no credentials).** From `/home/worsch/informed-decision`:
```bash
.venv/bin/python -B tools/create_sitting_approvals.py --dry-run \
--sitting 2026-10-03-provisioning-window \
--receipt 2026-10-03-provisioning-window-approval-create.json --expect 1
```
Expect `memo_ids: ["infd-20261003-p01"]` and `posted: false`.
**A2. Approval Engine tunnel (shell, separate terminal).**
```bash
kubectl -n approval-engine port-forward svc/approval-engine 18281:8080
```
**A3. Create the native approval (shell, attended, in the founder's own terminal: `! …`).**
KeyCape OIDC/MFA opens in the browser. The installed warden bundle does not
know this lane yet, so name the source catalog. Note the `--` before the child.
```bash
WARDEN_ROUTING_CATALOG=/home/worsch/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml \
BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200 VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200 \
warden access informed-decision-sitting-requester-login --exec -- \
/home/worsch/informed-decision/tools/create_sitting_approvals.sh \
--sitting 2026-10-03-provisioning-window \
--receipt 2026-10-03-provisioning-window-approval-create.json --expect 1
```
The child is silent. The outcome is the receipt
`docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-approval-create.json`, which holds
the `approval_id` and the engine-computed binding digest and no secret. Read
warden's printed line, not its exit code. The fallback wrapper takes the same
child and the same arguments:
`python3 /home/worsch/railiance-platform/scripts/openbao-attended-exec.py --lane informed-decision-sitting-requester-login -- <child>`.
**A4. Flex Auth exact-record admission (repo change + deploy).** In
`access-engine/examples/informed-decision-sitting/policy.md` (formerly
flex-auth): change `version: v6` to `v7` and add `"memo:infd-20261003-p01"` with
the receipt's `approval_id`, `binding_digest`, `label: "p01"`, the binding from
`approval-create-intents.json` and `memo_version: 1`. Mirror it in
`records.json` and keep every existing record. Never add the record before A3:
an empty approval id must not become a policy value. Build in CI, bump
`access-engine/values/informed-decision-sitting.yaml` and deploy. Then, in this
repo, set `deploy/sitting-admission.json` to `policy.version: v7` with the new
`package_digest`, and roll out the review service.
**A5. Attach and load (shell).**
```bash
.venv/bin/python -B tools/attach_compact_bindings.py \
--principal <exact-keycape-sub> \
--receipt docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-approval-create.json \
--sitting 2026-10-03-provisioning-window --batches provisioning
.venv/bin/python -B tools/load_sitting_memos.py --db <live review store> \
--bound docs/batches/2026-10-03-provisioning-window/bound
```
The attach step writes `bound/`; the unsigned drafts stay unsigned. Load into
the live store the same way as for the 2026-09-21 sitting.
**A6. Review and bind (browser).** Sign in at https://decisions.coulomb.social/
with fresh MFA. Open `infd-20261003-p01`, read the packet and acknowledge the
required highlight. Then accept, return or decline. One memo, one bind. There
is no approve-all.
## Part B — attended execution after acceptance
This is the pattern for any lane whose memo was accepted. It is a shell step,
run in the founder's own terminal:
```bash
BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200 VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200 \
warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- <the lane's reviewed command>
```
The child must be silent and idempotent. Read warden's printed line:
`attended command completed but session revocation could not be confirmed`
means the child ran; `attended login failed closed before command handoff`
means it never ran.
| memo | Command after acceptance | Owner records |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `p01` (RPF-WP-0035-T06) | **None.** The proof already ran; do not re-run it as a substitute. No platform-admin session is needed. | railiance-platform records the accepted approval id against T06 and keeps T06 open for the CCR-2026-0018 disablement. |
When an excluded lane becomes ready, it gets its own memo in a later sitting
before anything runs. For MASON-WP-0007-T05 the policy/role half would be
`... --exec -- sh scripts/openbao-tenant-engine-audit-core-sender-eso-attended.sh`,
run from a railiance-platform checkout (exit 3 means an existing object
differs). This sitting does not authorize it.
## Must not
- Paste or display any credential value
- Resolve hub decision D1 from this sitting alone
- Let an agent accept, decline or seal

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{
"kind": "informed-decision-approval-create-intents",
"sitting_id": "infd-sitting-2026-10-03-provisioning-window",
"status": "not-posted",
"posted": false,
"requester_client": "informed-decision-sitting-requester",
"human_control": true,
"pdp_path": false,
"required_count": 1,
"note": "Intents only. Digests are computed by approval-engine at create; do not invent them here.",
"intents": [
{
"memo_id": "infd-20261003-p01",
"create_client": "informed-decision-sitting-requester",
"binding": {
"action": "accept",
"actor": "informed-decision",
"principal": "railiance-platform",
"purpose": "Accept the 2026-09-13 scoped delivery proof for the CCR-2026-0019 secrets-engine approval-client reader",
"target": {
"id": "ccr:CCR-2026-0019-delivery-proof",
"type": "credential-lane",
"system": "railiance-platform"
}
}
}
]
}

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{
"kind": "informed-decision-batch",
"id": "infd-batch-2026-10-03-provisioning-window",
"review_group": "net-kingdom-admins",
"status": "draft-unsigned",
"submitted": false,
"one_question_per_memo": true,
"approve_all_forbidden": true,
"agent_disposition_forbidden": true,
"hub_decision": "62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483",
"ordinal": [
{
"n": 1,
"memo_id": "infd-20261003-p01",
"workplan": "RPF-WP-0035",
"task": "RPF-WP-0035-T06",
"hub_task_prefix": "68bff751",
"question": "Accept the passed 2026-09-13 scoped delivery proof for the CCR-2026-0019 secrets-engine approval-client reader as that reader's native delivery acceptance?",
"memo": "infd-20261003-p01.memo.json",
"packet": "infd-20261003-p01.packet.md",
"packet_hash": "sha256:ee53cae14ae86dbdec2936d72f99e1285b6c714d5bd322ef30df8ffbf0939ff2",
"required_highlight": "infd-20261003-p01-h1"
}
],
"excluded": [
{
"workplan": "MASON-WP-0007",
"task": "MASON-WP-0007-T05",
"owner_repo": "ops-mason",
"reason": "Half the act has no reviewed command. The policy + Kubernetes-auth role script railiance-platform scripts/openbao-tenant-engine-audit-core-sender-eso-attended.sh exists (silent, idempotent, exit 3 on drift), but the row-7 wrapped seed that copies the tenant-engine sender token from the registry to platform/workloads/tenant-engine/audit-core-sender has no script: railiance-platform says it has no helper and the plan only names 'the user-engine migration technique'. A placeholder child must not be approved. Also MASON-WP-0007-T01 (metadata survey: path unused, no conflicting names) is still todo, and ESO's right to create serviceaccounts/token in namespace tenant-engine is unverified (MASON-WP-0007-T06).",
"ready_when": "ops-mason or railiance-platform commits a reviewed silent seed helper, T01 survey is recorded, then one memo covers policy/role apply plus seed."
},
{
"workplan": "RPF-WP-0035",
"task": "RPF-WP-0035-T02",
"owner_repo": "railiance-platform",
"reason": "Design docs/credential-lane-designs/secrets-engine-service-jwt.md is 'proposed, not provisioned'. Its 2026-09-27 return supplies inputs (openbao/auth/keycape-services-config.json, openbao/auth/secrets-engine-jwt-role.json, openbao/policies/secrets-engine-login-self.hcl) but no reviewed child command and says 'Do not execute a placeholder command'. Live KeyCape client registration and protected client-side custody remain unverified, and first-lane apply is gated on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04. The earlier sitting memo infd-20260914-c02 for this task was created 2026-09-15 and expired unbound 2026-09-16.",
"ready_when": "railiance-platform accepts the design, commits the reviewed silent install/verify child, and records KeyCape registration + custody."
},
{
"workplan": "RPF-WP-0035",
"task": "RPF-WP-0035-T08",
"owner_repo": "railiance-platform",
"reason": "The attended first-provision already happened. factory-audit-senders-review.md 'Current execution status': both version-1 credentials provisioned (seed receipt 2026-09-11-factory-audit-sender-seed.json) and delivered (2026-09-11-factory-audit-delivery-live.json, delivered_and_scope_verified_pending_producer_acceptance); CCR-2026-0021/0022 applied; 'Do not repeat provisioning or delivery'. What remains is owner acceptance (independent archive readback, audit bearer-revocation), not an attended OpenBao act. The task's blocking_reason is stale.",
"ready_when": "railiance-platform re-qualifies T08 to its real remaining owner acceptance work."
},
{
"workplan": "RAPPCOREHUB-WP-0003",
"task": "RAPPCOREHUB-WP-0003-T04",
"owner_repo": "rapp-core-hub",
"reason": "No credential change request, design or provisioning script exists for a dedicated read:repository Forgejo identity for the core-hub publisher (the only read:repository lane, CCR-2026-0014, belongs to policy-nexus and must not be reused). The task also needs Repo Manager to fix the identity-canon registry identity and publish a corrected image before the 123/0 snapshot can pass.",
"ready_when": "The Forgejo identity/custody owner drafts the CCR and silent provisioning child; Repo Manager ships the identity-canon correction."
}
]
}

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{"approval_binding_digest":null,"approval_id":null,"binding":{"justification":null,"principal":{"display_name":"Named reviewer in net-kingdom-admins","id":"pending-human-session","identifiers":[],"kind":"person","role":"reviewer"},"target":{"environment":"prod","id":"ccr:CCR-2026-0019-delivery-proof","kind":"credential-lane","label":"secrets-engine approval-client reader, scoped delivery proof","requires_new_bind":false},"terms":null},"binding_level":"organizational","brief":"Reader 1 (CCR-2026-0019, applied 2026-09-14) already ran its scoped delivery proof under the attended reader lane and the receipts say passed. RPF-WP-0035-T06 waits only on a human accepting that proof. Accepting runs nothing, delivers no credential and changes no OpenBao object. It does not close T06 by itself.","highlights":[{"id":"infd-20261003-p01-h1","item_id":"infd-20261003-p01-packet","locator":{"kind":"work_record","task":"RPF-WP-0035-T06","workplan":"RPF-WP-0035"},"note":"Known gaps you accept: the wrong-group human login is untested, and the read check used a nonexistent approval id (HTTP 404 proves authenticated routing, not a usable claim). The proof is from 2026-09-13 and is not re-run. Accepting does not close RPF-WP-0035-T06: the CCR-2026-0018 coordinated disablement still needs KeyCape and Approval Engine confirmation, and the file-delivered secret's removal depends on operator hygiene.","required_ack":true,"severity":"critical"}],"id":"infd-20261003-p01","locale":"en","packet":[{"hash":"sha256:ee53cae14ae86dbdec2936d72f99e1285b6c714d5bd322ef30df8ffbf0939ff2","item_id":"infd-20261003-p01-packet","label":"infd-20261003-p01-packet"}],"question":"Accept the passed 2026-09-13 scoped delivery proof for the CCR-2026-0019 secrets-engine approval-client reader as that reader's native delivery acceptance?","requested_act":"approve","sealed":false,"step_kind":"approve","ui_release":"informed-decision@0.2.0","version":1}

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# RPF-WP-0035-T06 — accept the CCR-2026-0019 scoped delivery proof
Blocking workplan: RPF-WP-0035 (railiance-platform)
Blocking task: RPF-WP-0035-T06 (hub prefix 68bff751)
Hub decision: 62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483 (D1, attended provisioning window)
Design: railiance-platform `docs/credential-lane-designs/keycape-approval-client-side-readers.md`
Request: railiance-platform `credential-change-requests/CCR-2026-0019-secrets-engine-approval-client-read.yaml` (status `applied`)
## Question
Accept the passed 2026-09-13 scoped delivery proof for the CCR-2026-0019
secrets-engine approval-client reader as that reader's native delivery acceptance?
## One act
Record a human acceptance of a proof that has already run. Nothing executes
because of this memo. No OpenBao, KeyCape or cluster object changes.
## What already ran (reference only)
Both under the attended reader lane, never the platform-admin lane:
```sh
warden access secrets-engine-approval-client-login --exec -- \
python3 /home/worsch/railiance-platform/scripts/approval-client-reader-preflight.py
warden access secrets-engine-approval-client-login --exec -- \
/home/worsch/secrets-engine/.venv/bin/python -B \
/home/worsch/railiance-platform/scripts/approval-client-delivery-check.py
```
## Non-secret receipts (railiance-platform `docs/evidence/`)
- `2026-09-14-ccr0019-operator-binding.json` — role/policy apply and readback
- `2026-09-14-ccr0019-reader-preflight.json` — `status: passed`, `secret_values_read: false`
- `2026-09-14-ccr0019-delivery-check.json` — `status: passed`, `approval_mutations: false`, `cleanup: true`
## Positive evidence the owner expects
- Exact read of `platform/data|metadata/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client`
- Private delivery of the existing version-1 value; private runtime file removed
- `approval:read` token reaches Approval Engine authenticated (HTTP 404 on a fresh id)
- Warden session exited 0 after self-revocation and helper cleanup
## Negative evidence the owner expects
- Denied: sibling `approval-engine/operator-client`, parent metadata/listing,
an unrelated workload path, policy read, role read
- `approval:consume` token refused on the read route (HTTP 403); no real approval consumed
## Known gaps (required acknowledgement)
- Wrong-group human login untested.
- The 404 read proves routing, not a usable claim on a real approval.
- File delivery outlives the reading process; removal is operator hygiene.
## Rollback / revocation (CCR-2026-0019 lifecycle)
- Deactivate: detach policy `workload-kv-read-secrets-engine-approval-client` from
role `secrets-engine-approval-client-workload-kv-read`; disable the ops-warden
catalog entry. The KeyCape verifier lane is unaffected.
- Compromise: KeyCape disables the `secrets-engine-approval` registration first,
then the value is rotated (shared with CCR-2026-0017) and the policy detached.
## Not decided here
- CCR-2026-0018 retention or coordinated disablement (KeyCape + Approval Engine
+ Platform). T06 stays open until both owners confirm that sequence.
- Any rotation, reseed, `approval:consume` grant, or CCR-2026-0020 (cancelled).
## Must not
- Display or paste the client secret
- Re-run the proof as a substitute for this acceptance
- Treat acceptance as authority for any other lane in the D1 window

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{
"kind": "informed-decision-sitting",
"id": "infd-sitting-2026-10-03-provisioning-window",
"review_group": "net-kingdom-admins",
"principal": "pending-human-session",
"status": "draft-unsigned",
"hub_decision": "62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483",
"batches": [
"infd-batch-2026-10-03-provisioning-window"
],
"memo_count": 1,
"excluded_count": 4,
"bind_path": "create approval (attended), Flex Auth exact-record admission, load store, human accept",
"note": "Unsigned draft. Live bind substitutes pending-human-session with the authenticated key-cape subject."
}