Apply GH-DEC-2026-013 and GH-DEC-2026-014; close INFD-IN-0002

Two rulings landed and both corrected something.

GH-DEC-2026-013 accepted our binding-versus-awareness argument, wrote it into
the record as its §6, and did not change the outcome — it sharpened the defect.
Two different facts share one field named tenant: the act-scope, a property of
the act that our binding slice commits, and the principal's membership, a
property of the person that approval-engine exact-matches. Gate House's
correction stands: a binding slice that must commit the scope being entered
should commit that scope, not borrow a membership claim to stand in for it. Our
schema already does — binding.target IS the act-scope and is inside view_hash —
so no field was added, only a statement (PR-08) and a provenance record (PR-09),
since key-cape emits tenant as a bare string.

key-cape had already implemented registration-bound tenancy on 2026-09-09,
correct under both candidate rulings, so the fail-closed-at-first-use risk that
made us withhold the client strings was already retired. IN-0002 closed. The one
remaining input to T07 is the deployed origin.

GH-DEC-2026-014 granted commitment-only evidence and bounded it. It satisfies
non-alteration and NOT reconstructability, and must not be described otherwise
anywhere. It also corrected our wording of the gap: we wrote that it leaves us
able to erase the content, which understates it. Commitment-only moves integrity
out of our control and leaves availability entirely inside it — the party that
can withhold the content is the party the evidence is about. Limit 3's condition
reduced, not removed.

The grant carries a condition we did not propose and would not have thought of:
the path must assert that committed content exists and where custody sits, so
non-production is a finding attributable to the custodian rather than an
unremarkable blank. A commitment with no assertion that something is being
committed to is indistinguishable from a commitment to nothing. Booked as PR-53,
and marked not-a-reversal-candidate.

Recorded the meta-rule Gate House named, now in its third setting here: unknown
versus absent in the stance map, directory-asserted versus registration-supplied
in the tenant claim, erased versus never held in the evidence path. Wherever a
system reaches one appearance by two routes, the record must say which route.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568

docs/specs/EvidenceModel.md

@@ -236,6 +236,105 @@ by reading that field. Never infer it from the shape of `subject_id` — a namin
 convention is not a verified claim. Entries written before v4 are `null` and
 must not be read as `human`.
 
+## 8c. Act-scope is not membership — `GH-DEC-2026-013` §5
+
+Gate House made the sharpest observation anyone has made about this object
+model, and it is worth carrying in full because it changes what we record even
+though it changes no field.
+
+Two different facts are being asked to travel in one claim named `tenant`:
+
+| Fact | Property of | Who needs it |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Which scope is this act being entered into | the **act** | this repository's binding slice |
+| Which tenant is this person a member of | the **principal** | `approval-engine`'s exact-match admission |
+
+> *"A binding slice that must commit the scope being entered should commit THAT
+> SCOPE, not borrow a membership claim to stand in for it."*
+
+**Our schema already does the right thing.** `binding.target` is the act-scope:
+the tenant, environment and system being entered, committed in the binding
+document and therefore inside `view_hash`. It is not derived from, and must
+never be replaced by, the token's `tenant` claim.
+
+What was missing is not a field but a **statement and a record**:
+
+- `binding.target` is the authoritative act-scope commitment. The `tenant` claim
+  is a membership fact about the principal and is **not** the act-scope.
+- The two must never be collapsed. Where they agree, that agreement is itself a
+  fact worth recording; where they disagree, issuance is refused upstream
+  (`key-cape` `329e48f`) and this surface records the refusal rather than
+  choosing a winner.
+- **The `tenant` claim's provenance is recorded.** `key-cape` emits `tenant` as
+  a bare string, so a consumer cannot tell a tenant the *directory asserted about
+  the person* from one a *registration supplied about the client they came
+  through*. `GH-DEC-2026-013` §5 requires the claim to carry its provenance;
+  until it does, this surface records which route the value arrived by rather
+  than storing an undifferentiated string.
+
+This is the same rule as `unknown` versus `absent` in the stance map and
+`erased` versus `never held` in §8d: **wherever a system reaches one appearance
+by two routes, the record must say which route**, or the safer reading becomes
+unavailable to everyone.
+
+## 8d. What commitment-only does and does not establish — `GH-DEC-2026-014`
+
+Commitment-only emission is **granted for Stage 1**. It is granted on the test
+`GH-DEC-2026-013` set: its distinguishing case fails closed. A reviewer who
+cannot obtain the content gets **no** reconstruction rather than a **wrong** one.
+
+**It satisfies non-alteration. It does not satisfy reconstructability, and must
+not be described as doing so** — not here, not in `audit-core`'s documents, and
+not in any conformance claim.
+
+A commitment-only record is weaker than an archive in a specific way. An archive
+proves records were not altered or truncated after arrival, never that one was
+never sent (§2, E-04). A commitment additionally **does not carry what it commits
+to**. It establishes that the commitment was made when it says and has not
+changed. About *what was committed to* it establishes nothing — except
+conditionally: **if** a document is later produced, whether it is the one.
+
+### The gap, in the right words
+
+An earlier draft of ours said commitment-only "leaves us able to erase the
+content". That understates where the problem sits, and Gate House corrected it:
+
+> **Commitment-only moves *integrity* out of our control and leaves
+> *availability* entirely inside it. The party that can withhold the content is
+> the party the evidence is about.**
+
+That is the condition limit 3 exists to prevent, **reduced and not removed**. The
+reduction is real. It is not sufficient alone — which is why the grant carries
+the condition below.
+
+### The condition that makes the grant safe
+
+**Non-production must be detectable as a finding, not present as an absence.**
+
+If the independent path holds only a commitment, a reviewer who asks for content
+and gets nothing cannot distinguish *erased*, *withheld*, *lost*, and *never
+held*. The absence reads as an unremarkable blank.
+
+So the evidence path must carry, alongside the commitment:
+
+1. an assertion that committed content **exists**, and
+2. **where custody sits**,
+
+such that failure to produce at retrieval is a **conformance failure
+attributable to the custodian**.
+
+> *A commitment with no assertion that something is being committed to is
+> indistinguishable from a commitment to nothing.*
+
+This is **not a reversal candidate**. If it proves expensive, the answer is a
+cheaper mechanism for the same property, never removal of the property.
+
+### Residual, again
+
+Not closed, not credited. The existence assertion narrows the erasure gap — a
+detectable non-production tells a reviewer something is missing and who owed it.
+It does not produce the missing thing.
+
 ## 9. Signed attributes (L4+, horizon)
 
 When AES/QES arrives, the signed attributes carry `memo_id`, `memo_version`,