Origin and evidence path both landed today.
T07 origin: railiance-apps deployed decisions.coulomb.social and corrected the
hostname in this repo — not the decide.coulomb.social this workplan proposed.
Verified here rather than taken on report: both paths 200, TLS verify 0, Let's
Encrypt cert valid to 2026-12-09.
T08: audit-core registered the source with every field as proposed and landed
the detection half. INFD-IN-0003 closed. Their refinements booked — reconciliation
on the high-volume class too, since rate detects a stream stopping but never a
stream missing the particular renders that mattered, which is exactly our threat
model; and PR-12, the custody locator must be a stable non-secret identifier
because redact scans data and an existence declaration arriving without its
pointer looks complete while being useless.
INFD-IN-0004 ruled as GH-DEC-2026-015: gate-house reversed itself and nesting is
permitted for this pair. The decisive ground was not the cycle argument we led
with — our binding slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of the five
digest fields, so co-reference left us performing a partial recomputation of one
act in a second vocabulary, closer to the translation R3 forbade than nesting
is. Our ordering objection was withdrawn as mistaken.
The permission is conditioned and NOT ACTIVE until approval-engine states its
presentation exclusion as normative and tested. layer.yaml is deliberately
unchanged and carries nesting_permission_active false — we do not activate on
our own initiative.
GH-DEC-2026-016 ruled NC-03. Its §5 is live rather than hypothetical and is
booked as PR-11: principal_type: human is a property of the client registration,
structurally the same shape as the gap-route tenant, so a human-in-the-loop
control must not be discharged on it as verified humanity.
T07 stays progress: the submission to key-cape is written but unsent, blocked by
the local permission classifier rather than by any repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two rulings landed and both corrected something.
GH-DEC-2026-013 accepted our binding-versus-awareness argument, wrote it into
the record as its §6, and did not change the outcome — it sharpened the defect.
Two different facts share one field named tenant: the act-scope, a property of
the act that our binding slice commits, and the principal's membership, a
property of the person that approval-engine exact-matches. Gate House's
correction stands: a binding slice that must commit the scope being entered
should commit that scope, not borrow a membership claim to stand in for it. Our
schema already does — binding.target IS the act-scope and is inside view_hash —
so no field was added, only a statement (PR-08) and a provenance record (PR-09),
since key-cape emits tenant as a bare string.
key-cape had already implemented registration-bound tenancy on 2026-09-09,
correct under both candidate rulings, so the fail-closed-at-first-use risk that
made us withhold the client strings was already retired. IN-0002 closed. The one
remaining input to T07 is the deployed origin.
GH-DEC-2026-014 granted commitment-only evidence and bounded it. It satisfies
non-alteration and NOT reconstructability, and must not be described otherwise
anywhere. It also corrected our wording of the gap: we wrote that it leaves us
able to erase the content, which understates it. Commitment-only moves integrity
out of our control and leaves availability entirely inside it — the party that
can withhold the content is the party the evidence is about. Limit 3's condition
reduced, not removed.
The grant carries a condition we did not propose and would not have thought of:
the path must assert that committed content exists and where custody sits, so
non-production is a finding attributable to the custodian rather than an
unremarkable blank. A commitment with no assertion that something is being
committed to is indistinguishable from a commitment to nothing. Booked as PR-53,
and marked not-a-reversal-candidate.
Recorded the meta-rule Gate House named, now in its third setting here: unknown
versus absent in the stance map, directory-asserted versus registration-supplied
in the tenant claim, erased versus never held in the evidence path. Wherever a
system reaches one appearance by two routes, the record must say which route.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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approval-engine replied to INFD-IN-0001 with docs/approver-surface-requirements.md
(31da1af, 5203f46) and two corrections. Several of my requirements were wrong or
incomplete; revised rather than appended to.
Corrected:
- PR-02 listed only approval:approve. Wrong — the surface also needs
approval:read to fetch what it renders. As drafted it would have shipped a
client able to submit an entry it could never display. That changes a
registration key-cape has already implemented, so it is their call (open
question A).
- NC-03 implied approval-engine refuses non-human approver entries. It does not;
only /consume is principal-restricted, and the operator service client holds
approval:approve. Enforcement of "humans bind, agents draft" is therefore ours
alone, and is auditable via schema v4's entries[].principal_type — never from
the shape of subject_id.
Added:
- PR-04 assurance shape. approval-engine persists it verbatim and accepts an
empty object, so it is the only place MFA survives into the approval record.
Needs auth method, acr/amr, auth_time, agreed with key-cape.
- PR-05 entitlement. A 200 from the engine is not permission to view; we owe
access-engine a check before rendering. Consuming a decision, not making one.
- PR-06 response mapping, including 409 duplicate_approver rendered as SUCCESS
(a browser double-submit is routine and the first entry stands) and 503 as
fail-closed.
- PR-07 and a matching INTENT wrongness condition: never render `approved` as
permission to act. That is a PDP in the browser wearing UI copy.
- L-05, L-06 and EvidenceModel 8b: view_hash cannot ride into the entry — the
POST discards its body by design — so Stage 1 correlates by (approval_id,
subject, approved_at). DoD-3 is satisfied by the triple, not by a stored hash.
PRD open question 1 is answered by construction: there is no inbox endpoint and
there will not be one, so the approvals-inbox shape is foreclosed upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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T02 — intake INFD-IN-0001 filed with gate-house and messages sent to gate-house,
key-cape and approval-engine. Status progress; it now waits on an external
ruling. key-cape was told explicitly why T07 is not answering KEY-WP-0013-T02
yet — a placeholder callback URI would either fail closed or register an origin
no component owns — and given the token shape to check now rather than at T07.
T03 — ProductRequirementsDocument.md. 30 requirements, each traced to a GOAL.md
DoD item, an INTENT principle or wrongness condition, a state-transition guard,
or a named external contract, and each with an observable pass condition.
Anti-requirements are stated as testable absences: no dwell timers, no attention
analytics, no dark patterns, no auto-approval, no approval-state caching, no
authorization endpoint. Four limitations are recorded up front, including that
escalate without a mandate graph is forwarding and that view_hash is computed by
the renderer.
T04 — UseCaseCatalog.md. L0-L5 with counterparties, plus ten negative cases
bound to guards and isolation vectors. Each case records the constraint it
places on the shared schema, so scale invariance is testable rather than
asserted. Closes with the four changes that would fork the object.
T05 and T07 remain gated on the ruling. T06 is independent and is next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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