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Author SHA1 Message Date
83849b75d4 Connect policy-gated browser review and audit runtime
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
2026-09-11 00:31:03 +02:00
4e103f62a0 Activate nesting per GH-DEC-2026-015: view_hash carries binding.digest
approval-engine met the condition. Verified here rather than taken on report:
their docs/approval-claim.md carries "Presentation exclusion — GH-DEC-2026-015
§4" in normative language, and I ran
tests/test_claim_contract.py::test_presentation_changes_cannot_change_the_approved_act
myself — 1 passed. That test pins the digest input set from BOTH sides, and the
narrowing half is what makes it real: without it a digest over four fields, or
over a constant, would pass the widening half perfectly.

view_hash now carries binding.digest and the act-scope is no longer
independently canonicalized here, so the act has exactly one canonicalization
computed by the layer that owns it. approval_binding_digest is validated for
shape and refused without its approval id — it is carried, never computed.

The three published vectors are unchanged: they do not carry the new key, so
pick omits it. Asserted, not assumed.

The cycle condition did not disappear, its protection moved — from refusing
nesting to approval-engine's normative exclusion. layer.yaml carries it as
cycle_condition with a test, so a future widening meets a rule rather than
silence.

One thing not assumed. Both gate-house and approval-engine said our binding
slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of their five fields. target
plainly is act material and is now dropped. But their principal is the party ON
WHOSE BEHALF the approval was issued, while ours is the person being BOUND — the
approver. Different roles, and dropping ours would remove who was shown this
from view_hash and gut the promise. Kept it, declared principal_role_overlap
open in layer.yaml, tested that changing the approver still moves view_hash, and
raised it rather than silently resolving it either way.

L0/L2 are unaffected: with no approval there is no digest to defer to, and
test_act_scope_still_binds_when_there_is_no_carried_digest pins that.

100 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
2026-09-10 20:58:22 +02:00
9e1f77e32b Build the T08 domain core with the engine behind a seam
approval-engine APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01 is still progress and its namespace has no
pods, so the live end-to-end proof cannot run. Built everything that does not
depend on it, with the engine behind a Protocol plus a fake carrying its real
refusal semantics, so its arrival is a wiring change rather than a build.

- memo.py: the Decision Memo, versions, binding document. Principal, Scope,
  Awareness and Hat are dataclasses rather than dicts because the canonicalizer
  requires a shape and a missing key should fail at construction rather than
  deep inside hashing — which is exactly how it failed twice while building
  this. Field names follow the governed canonicalizer (item_id, severity,
  locator): the published vectors are the contract, so the object was aligned to
  them rather than the reverse.
- presentation.py: the sole writer of view_hash. One writer, one canonicalizer,
  one place to audit. Acknowledgment is an explicit method call and nothing
  infers it from scroll, dwell or focus.
- disposition.py: verbs and guards G_NOAGENT, G_STEP, G_PRES, G_ACK, G_REASONS,
  G_SEALED. accept is ABSENT from weak steps rather than present-and-disabled,
  because a greyed-out accept still teaches the wrong model. Only accept reaches
  the engine; a memo return is not represented there at all.
- provenance.py: claim routes per A-16. assert_human_control_dischargeable
  refuses a registration-supplied human, so PR-11's limitation fires at the
  point of use instead of sitting in a document.
- evidence.py: local outbox, commitment-only records carrying the
  GH-DEC-2026-014 §4 existence assertion, per-class reconciliation counts, and a
  custody-locator guard that rejects credentialed URLs (PR-12).
- approval_client.py: 409 duplicate_approver is success, 409 conflict terminal,
  503 fail-closed, approval:consume refused before a token is requested.

87 tests pass, including every negative case in the Use Case Catalog and that a
fail-closed outcome is recorded as a stance application with no verb field —
never as a decline, because the human did not make one.

T08 stays progress: the live proof is the remainder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
2026-09-10 20:38:20 +02:00