approval-engine met the condition. Verified here rather than taken on report:
their docs/approval-claim.md carries "Presentation exclusion — GH-DEC-2026-015
§4" in normative language, and I ran
tests/test_claim_contract.py::test_presentation_changes_cannot_change_the_approved_act
myself — 1 passed. That test pins the digest input set from BOTH sides, and the
narrowing half is what makes it real: without it a digest over four fields, or
over a constant, would pass the widening half perfectly.
view_hash now carries binding.digest and the act-scope is no longer
independently canonicalized here, so the act has exactly one canonicalization
computed by the layer that owns it. approval_binding_digest is validated for
shape and refused without its approval id — it is carried, never computed.
The three published vectors are unchanged: they do not carry the new key, so
pick omits it. Asserted, not assumed.
The cycle condition did not disappear, its protection moved — from refusing
nesting to approval-engine's normative exclusion. layer.yaml carries it as
cycle_condition with a test, so a future widening meets a rule rather than
silence.
One thing not assumed. Both gate-house and approval-engine said our binding
slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of their five fields. target
plainly is act material and is now dropped. But their principal is the party ON
WHOSE BEHALF the approval was issued, while ours is the person being BOUND — the
approver. Different roles, and dropping ours would remove who was shown this
from view_hash and gut the promise. Kept it, declared principal_role_overlap
open in layer.yaml, tested that changing the approver still moves view_hash, and
raised it rather than silently resolving it either way.
L0/L2 are unaffected: with no approval there is no digest to defer to, and
test_act_scope_still_binds_when_there_is_no_carried_digest pins that.
100 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Origin and evidence path both landed today.
T07 origin: railiance-apps deployed decisions.coulomb.social and corrected the
hostname in this repo — not the decide.coulomb.social this workplan proposed.
Verified here rather than taken on report: both paths 200, TLS verify 0, Let's
Encrypt cert valid to 2026-12-09.
T08: audit-core registered the source with every field as proposed and landed
the detection half. INFD-IN-0003 closed. Their refinements booked — reconciliation
on the high-volume class too, since rate detects a stream stopping but never a
stream missing the particular renders that mattered, which is exactly our threat
model; and PR-12, the custody locator must be a stable non-secret identifier
because redact scans data and an existence declaration arriving without its
pointer looks complete while being useless.
INFD-IN-0004 ruled as GH-DEC-2026-015: gate-house reversed itself and nesting is
permitted for this pair. The decisive ground was not the cycle argument we led
with — our binding slice canonicalizes principal and target, two of the five
digest fields, so co-reference left us performing a partial recomputation of one
act in a second vocabulary, closer to the translation R3 forbade than nesting
is. Our ordering objection was withdrawn as mistaken.
The permission is conditioned and NOT ACTIVE until approval-engine states its
presentation exclusion as normative and tested. layer.yaml is deliberately
unchanged and carries nesting_permission_active false — we do not activate on
our own initiative.
GH-DEC-2026-016 ruled NC-03. Its §5 is live rather than hypothetical and is
booked as PR-11: principal_type: human is a property of the client registration,
structurally the same shape as the gap-route tenant, so a human-in-the-loop
control must not be discharged on it as verified humanity.
T07 stays progress: the submission to key-cape is written but unsent, blocked by
the local permission classifier rather than by any repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR
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approval-engine answered R3 and recommends exactly the option GH-DEC-2026-012
refused: that our binding document carry their binding.digest as a field rather
than re-canonicalize action/actor/principal/purpose/target ourselves. We cannot
comply with both, so this is raised as a finding rather than resolved.
It is not a wording difference. Our binding slice canonicalizes principal and
target, two of the five fields in their digest, so co-reference by identifier
alone leaves two independent canonicalizations of one act linked by a shared id.
GH-DEC-2026-012 manages that with an authority rule; approval-engine's proposal
removes it. Both are coherent and they are not the same design.
New information the refusal may not have had: their digest covers exactly five
act fields, and they state that widening it to cover presentation would be a
defect since a new UI release would invalidate every prior approval. The
GH-DEC-2026-008 cycle condition is mutual containment, so if their digest
structurally cannot contain view_hash the containment is one-directional. Not
asserted as settling it — that cycle was found by two engines independently
within hours, and "the cycle cannot arise here" is the belief such failures
punish.
Deliberately not adopted, despite coming from the layer that owns the digest and
despite our having offered to let them settle R3. Gate House was right that a
bilateral agreement produces agreement rather than an authority rule, and that
applies to this one too. layer.yaml is unchanged and carries a
linkage_under_review marker rather than a silent edit.
Also carries the smaller doctrine question approval-engine handed on: whether
approver evidence should be human-only at the engine, since
entries[].principal_type is auditable after the fact and stops nothing, and
there is no upstream backstop for humans-bind-agents-draft.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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