Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
a8e227851e Promote schema and canonicalizer out of history; add EvidenceModel (T06)
Verified the three published hashes reproduce byte for byte before promoting
anything, then moved the schema, canonicalizer and vectors into governed assets.
history/20260909-initial-exploration/ is untouched and stays the provenance
record.

- schemas/, informed_decision/, tests/vectors/ populated; the reference
  canonicalizer's ad-hoc __main__ block replaced by a real
  `python -m informed_decision` entry point.
- tests/test_canonicalize.py — 20 tests, all green. Published vectors, all four
  isolation properties, canonical-form round-trip, key sorting, and a provenance
  test asserting the governed fixtures have not drifted from history/.
- docs/specs/EvidenceModel.md — the two hashes, the split and why it exists, the
  four isolation properties, the presentation record, the bundle, and the
  relationship to audit-core.
- pyproject.toml, Makefile.

One test of mine was wrong on first run: it scanned for ", " to assert no
insignificant whitespace, which fires on prose inside a brief. Replaced with a
canonical round-trip comparison, which is the property actually meant. The
canonicalizer was correct.

EvidenceModel leads with what the model does NOT claim — no proof of
comprehension, no proof of reading (deliberately, since the alternative is
surveillance), no survival of a compromised surface, and audit-core's inherited
bound that a hash chain cannot prove a record was never sent.

T06 stays progress: the SCOPE.md rewrite is gated on the T02 ruling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
2026-09-09 14:16:28 +02:00
b78c15a7ef Add PRD and Use Case Catalog; file the gate-house request (T02-T04)
T02 — intake INFD-IN-0001 filed with gate-house and messages sent to gate-house,
key-cape and approval-engine. Status progress; it now waits on an external
ruling. key-cape was told explicitly why T07 is not answering KEY-WP-0013-T02
yet — a placeholder callback URI would either fail closed or register an origin
no component owns — and given the token shape to check now rather than at T07.

T03 — ProductRequirementsDocument.md. 30 requirements, each traced to a GOAL.md
DoD item, an INTENT principle or wrongness condition, a state-transition guard,
or a named external contract, and each with an observable pass condition.
Anti-requirements are stated as testable absences: no dwell timers, no attention
analytics, no dark patterns, no auto-approval, no approval-state caching, no
authorization endpoint. Four limitations are recorded up front, including that
escalate without a mandate graph is forwarding and that view_hash is computed by
the renderer.

T04 — UseCaseCatalog.md. L0-L5 with counterparties, plus ten negative cases
bound to guards and isolation vectors. Each case records the constraint it
places on the shared schema, so scale invariance is testable rather than
asserted. Closes with the four changes that would fork the object.

T05 and T07 remain gated on the ruling. T06 is independent and is next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
2026-09-09 14:11:36 +02:00
ebd35b59cf Raise INFD-IN-0001: layer placement and approver-UI ownership
File the gate-house decision request that gates INFD-WP-0001-T02, before any
architecture is written, so the ruling constrains the design rather than being
retrofitted to it.

Three rulings requested: layer and role (proposed PEP-shaped, §6.4/companion
§5); whether a presentation attestation also makes this a PIP or must reach
consumers only through audit-core; and the relationship between view_hash and
approval-engine's binding digest.

The third is the highest risk and the reason this is filed first. Both digests
claim to canonicalize "the binding" but cover different material — the approval
digest exists without a human in the loop, view_hash covers the brief, packet,
highlights, locale and UI release. Three candidate rulings are set out with what
each costs; the proposal is distinct attestations with an explicit authority
rule, but any of the three is implementable. The outcome to avoid is both
shipping with no stated relationship.

The self-dealing objection is argued against ourselves rather than left for
review, and the residual is stated plainly: a compromised surface can present X
and attest Y, structurally the same residual approval-engine names for
adversarial omission at a compromised source. No claim is made to close it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
2026-09-09 14:07:13 +02:00