# SCOPE > Implemented-and-first-cut boundary for agents and contributors. Aspirational > direction belongs in `INTENT.md`; the current stage belongs in `GOAL.md`; > current work and gates belong in `workplans/`. ## Status — 2026-09-09 **Specification and declaration are complete; no service is deployed.** What exists and is tested: the layer and stance declarations (`layer.yaml`, `pep-stance.yaml`, `informed_decision/stance.py`), the governed canonicalizer and schema, and the four specs under `docs/specs/`. 46 tests pass. What does not exist: any HTTP surface, any storage, any UI, any deployment. The walking skeleton is `INFD-WP-0001-T08` and is gated on an external decision (§"Open" below). ## One-liner informed-decision is the presentation and binding surface for decisions: it renders a Decision Memo to the human who holds the mandate, records what was shown, and binds their identity to the act — and owns the browser-facing approver UI that `approval-engine` deliberately does not contain. ## Layer **PEP-shaped**, ruled by `GH-DEC-2026-012`. Not an Engine. Companion §5 owed, statute §6.4 in full. Declared in `layer.yaml` in this repository's own voice. It emits one PIP-like fact — *what was presented* — as a claim, under three limits that are the substance of the permission rather than caveats on it: 1. the claim carries presentation and nothing else, and must never carry, restate, summarise or imply a decision or verdict; 2. the claim must never be an input to the decision it presents for; 3. the evidence copy reaches `audit-core` **independently** of this repository. Limit 2 is load-bearing: the argument that a renderer attesting its own rendering is not self-dealing was accepted *because* that limit holds. ## Core Idea A decision surface is not a workflow engine and not a decision point. This repository owns the Decision Memo object, the presentation record, the canonicalization producing `view_hash` / `awareness_hash`, the disposition vocabulary, and the evidence bundle export. It does not evaluate whether an act is permitted, does not hold approval current-state, and does not archive the trail. ## In Scope — first cut (Stage 1) **Built and tested:** - Canonicalization of the binding and awareness documents, with the three published vectors reproducing byte for byte and all four isolation properties pinned (`tests/test_canonicalize.py`). - The Decision Memo schema and worked examples, governed under `schemas/`. - The unreachable-engine stance map, built to v0.8 obligation 3, with published-equals-shipped asserted by test (`tests/test_layer_conformance.py`). **Specified, not built:** - The presentation record: what was rendered, to whom, when, in which locale and UI release. - Required-highlight acknowledgment as a precondition of binding. - The disposition vocabulary and its legality tables. Only `accept` reaches `approval-engine`; `return`, `discuss`, `escalate` and the rest are memo-level. - The browser-facing OIDC client: authorization-code + S256 PKCE against `key-cape`, scopes `[openid, approval:read, approval:approve]`. - An L3 approver surface calling `approval-engine`'s approval-entry mutation. - The evidence bundle as an offline-verifiable export. ## Out of Scope - Authorization decisions — `access-engine`, always and only (statute §6). - The approval object, its state machine, validity and consumption — `approval-engine`. Never cached, never inferred, never `approval:consume`. - Approval doctrine — `gate-house`. - Identity and authentication — `key-cape`. Imported, never invented. The `assurance` shape is `key-cape`'s and is cited, not restated. - The evidence archive — `audit-core`. - Credentials materialized after a decision — `secrets-engine`. - Notification transport, ticketing, general workflow. - **An approvals inbox.** Foreclosed upstream as well as here: `approval-engine` exposes get-by-id only and will not add a list. - L4/L5, QES, QTSP, qualified archival retention. - The mandate graph — so a Stage 1 `escalate` is an assertion, not a verified claim. ## What this repository does not claim Stated here because a scope file that only lists capabilities overstates them. - **The decision path is not validated.** `GH-DEC-2026-010` requires a decision be attributable to `access-engine`; no consumer can satisfy that today because the envelope is unsigned (`FLEX-WP-0024`). This surface records `decision_attributable: false` and must not describe validation as complete. - **The residual is open.** A compromised surface can present X and attest Y. `GH-DEC-2026-012` states it is not closed and does not credit this repository with closing it. - **`view_hash` is not inside the approval entry.** `POST /entries` discards its body by design. Correlation is `(approval_id, subject, approved_at)`, so an auditor holding only the approval object cannot reach the presentation. - **Nothing is deployed**, so nothing is observed in production and nothing is contained automatically. ## Open - **Human token tenant** — blocks `T07`. A human access token cannot carry `tenant:platform` today. Registration-bound versus directory-sourced; not this repository's to decide alone. - **The independent evidence path** — mechanism unchosen; required by limit 3 before `T08` ships.