# Sitting requester — create-only client (requested, not applied) **Workplan task:** `INFD-WP-0002-T03` **For:** `key-cape` (same registration shape as `secrets-engine-requester`) **Copied to:** `approval-engine` (`docs/keycape-service-registrations.md` — “no requester identity has been settled for `approval:create`”) **Status:** requested 2026-09-14. **Not registered. Not in OpenBao. No secret is in this repository.** Custody request (no CCR id): `docs/sitting-requester-custody-request.md`. This is the missing presenter for compact Decision Memo sittings whose protected side effect is a **work-record update** (`INFD-WP-0002-T04`), not a PEP consume. ## Why a second client `informed-decision-approver` is the **human** browser client (`approval:read` + `approval:approve`). Humans cannot `POST /v1/approvals`. `secrets-engine-requester` is create-only with `sub=secrets-engine` and must not draft WSL2 retirement, clock ownership, or mason plan accepts — `binding.actor` has to match the authenticated subject. This client names the presenter for *this* sitting. ## The strings | Field | Value | | --- | --- | | `client_id` | `informed-decision-sitting-requester` | | Grant | `client_credentials` | | Client type | confidential | | Audience | `approval-engine` (resource server, never the OAuth client id) | | Scopes | `approval:create` **only** | | `serviceSubject` / token `sub` | `informed-decision` | | `tenant` | `tenant:platform` (exact) | | `principal_type` | `service` | | Role | `informed-decision-sitting-requester` | | Token lifetime | 15m | | Redirect URI | **none** — this is not a browser client | Machine-readable copy: `keycape-sitting-requester-registration.json`. `secretRef` is a custody *name*. It is not a credential. ## Anti-requirements - **No** `approval:approve`. That stays on the human PKCE client. - **No** `approval:consume`. Consumption belongs to a PEP. This sitting's T04 path is repo files + `fix-consistency`. - **No** `approval:read` on this client. The human already has read. - Do **not** reuse `approval-engine-operator` (cancelled bundle, too wide). - Do **not** reuse `secrets-engine-requester` for unrelated acts. - Do **not** register this client until `key-cape` owns the row and `railiance-platform` owns attended secret custody. This document is not admission. ## Binding rules at create time `POST /v1/approvals` requires `binding.actor ==` the token `sub`, so actor is always `informed-decision`. | Binding field | Value for this sitting | | --- | --- | | `actor` | `informed-decision` | | `principal` | owning system of the work record (not the human, not this client by default) | | `action` / `purpose` / `target` | one memo, one act — see `docs/batches/2026-09-14/approval-create-intents.json` | | `human_control` | `true` | | `pdp_path` | `false` — no consume PEP on T04 | | `required_count` | 1 | `infd-20260914-c01` (SECRETS-WP-0010 native delivery) may belong on `secrets-engine-requester` instead if a later consume is in-scope. It is marked undecided in the intents file. Do not POST it on this client until that is stated. ## What this does not do It does not bind. It does not admit Flex Auth. It does not load the review store. After KeyCape registers the row and platform materializes custody, an attended create can mint the eight (or seven) objects; then `tools/attach_compact_bindings.py` with the operator's live KeyCape `sub`.