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|---|---|---|
| deploy | ||
| docs | ||
| history/20260909-initial-exploration | ||
| informed_decision | ||
| intakes | ||
| schemas | ||
| tests | ||
| tools | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| Containerfile | ||
| Containerfile.fresh-auth | ||
| Containerfile.fresh-auth.dockerignore | ||
| Containerfile.memo-input | ||
| Containerfile.memo-input.dockerignore | ||
| GOAL.md | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pep-stance.yaml | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| requirements.lock | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| uv.lock | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
informed-decision
User interface for executive decisions, modelled as a sign-and-return book — the German Umlaufmappe / Zeichnungsbuch, made cryptographic.
A Decision Memo carries a question, the context needed to answer it, the requested act, and a binding between identity, what was shown, and what was bound. The promise is not "the file was signed" but "this person, in this role, was shown this view, and bound this act."
One object model from a ten-second login (L0) to a multi-party instrument (L5).
Where to start
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
INTENT.md |
Why this repository exists and what it must never become |
GOAL.md |
The current stage, its invariants, and its definition of done |
workplans/ |
Current work |
history/20260909-initial-exploration/ |
Founding exploration — schema, state transitions, canonicalization, vectors |
Stage 1
Own the browser-facing approver UI that approval-engine deliberately does
not contain, and answer in writing who owns it. approval-engine is a
bearer-token resource server with no browser client; key-cape
(KEY-WP-0013-T02) is waiting on a client_id and callback URI that no
component has claimed. This repository claims them.
See GOAL.md.
Boundaries
This repository renders questions and records answers. It does not decide
(access-engine), does not own the approval object (approval-engine), does
not author approval doctrine (gate-house), does not authenticate anyone
(key-cape), and does not archive the trail (audit-core).