key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0030-tenant-precondition-guard.md

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Make the static-registration precondition a checked condition informed-decision asked for the caveat under which a registration-bound human tenant is safe to be a condition of the capability rather than reasoning in a message, so a future change to registration policy has to confront it. They were right that it was only prose: the contract stated it, a separate test asserted registration_endpoint is absent, and nothing connected the two -- so a session adding dynamic registration would have seen a test about discovery metadata, not a warning about relabelling users. The test asserts both halves together: that a client-declared tenant is issued, and that dynamic registration is not advertised. Whichever is removed first, the failure points at the other. The message carries the reasoning rather than the observation -- anyone able to register a client could relabel the users who log in through it -- and names the two ways out. Verified in both directions rather than assumed: advertising a registration_endpoint fails it with the escalation message, and neutering humanTenant fails it with the message saying to remove the guard along with the capability it protects. This is not a vote on the tenant question. It makes one option's precondition checkable; if option 1 lands, the capability and this guard are removed together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-09 23:23:48 +02:00
---
id: KEY-WP-0030
type: workplan
title: "Make the static-registration precondition a checked condition"
domain: infotech
repo: key-cape
status: finished
owner: claude
topic_slug: tenant-precondition-guard
created: "2026-09-09"
updated: "2026-09-09"
Carry the tenant claim's provenance, and correct a guard the ruling voided GH-DEC-2026-013 §5 is a finding nobody asked for and ours to implement: tenant is a bare string, so a consumer cannot tell a zone the directory asserted about the person from one a registration supplied about the client they came through. approval-engine exact-matches that string while its contract reads as though it relies on the first -- the check is sound and the property a reader infers from it is absent. gate-house named the property and left the mechanism to us. Every token now carries tenant_source beside tenant: directory, registration or default. Advertised in claims_supported, and asserted at the token level on both grants rather than only in the resolution function, since the claim a consumer reads is the thing under obligation. Three values where the ruling names two, which is the judgement here. Labelling an unasserted profile default as directory would reproduce the same defect one level down -- a consumer reading an assertion the identity layer never made. The ruling cites GH-DEC-2026-011 §3 on unknown versus absent for the case it examined; the same rule applies to our own fallback. The agreement case resolves to directory deliberately: if a registration declares the zone the directory also assigned, the directory did assert it, and reporting the weaker source would understate what is known. Also corrects the guard shipped in 5f516a0. Its failure message offered two ways out of adding dynamic registration, and condition (b) voids the second: admitting dynamic registration voids the registration-bound shape that day, whatever state the adapter is in. The message named an inadmissible resolution in the exact place someone would read it while making that change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-10 07:58:29 +02:00
state_hub_workstream_id: "9ed8f851-080a-5d15-8642-f799c2e3295c"
Make the static-registration precondition a checked condition informed-decision asked for the caveat under which a registration-bound human tenant is safe to be a condition of the capability rather than reasoning in a message, so a future change to registration policy has to confront it. They were right that it was only prose: the contract stated it, a separate test asserted registration_endpoint is absent, and nothing connected the two -- so a session adding dynamic registration would have seen a test about discovery metadata, not a warning about relabelling users. The test asserts both halves together: that a client-declared tenant is issued, and that dynamic registration is not advertised. Whichever is removed first, the failure points at the other. The message carries the reasoning rather than the observation -- anyone able to register a client could relabel the users who log in through it -- and names the two ways out. Verified in both directions rather than assumed: advertising a registration_endpoint fails it with the escalation message, and neutering humanTenant fails it with the message saying to remove the guard along with the capability it protects. This is not a vote on the tenant question. It makes one option's precondition checkable; if option 1 lands, the capability and this guard are removed together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-09 23:23:48 +02:00
---
`informed-decision` replied on KEY-WP-0013-T05 and asked for one thing that is
ours to do: the caveat under which a registration-bound human tenant is safe
should be "a condition of the capability, so a future change to registration
policy has to confront it", not reasoning left in a message.
They are right that it was only prose. `docs/tenant-claim-contract.md` states it,
and a separate test asserted `registration_endpoint` is absent — but nothing
connected the two, so a future session adding dynamic registration would see a
test about discovery metadata, not a warning about relabelling users.
## Tie the exclusion to the capability it protects
```task
id: KEY-WP-0030-T01
status: done
priority: medium
Carry the tenant claim's provenance, and correct a guard the ruling voided GH-DEC-2026-013 §5 is a finding nobody asked for and ours to implement: tenant is a bare string, so a consumer cannot tell a zone the directory asserted about the person from one a registration supplied about the client they came through. approval-engine exact-matches that string while its contract reads as though it relies on the first -- the check is sound and the property a reader infers from it is absent. gate-house named the property and left the mechanism to us. Every token now carries tenant_source beside tenant: directory, registration or default. Advertised in claims_supported, and asserted at the token level on both grants rather than only in the resolution function, since the claim a consumer reads is the thing under obligation. Three values where the ruling names two, which is the judgement here. Labelling an unasserted profile default as directory would reproduce the same defect one level down -- a consumer reading an assertion the identity layer never made. The ruling cites GH-DEC-2026-011 §3 on unknown versus absent for the case it examined; the same rule applies to our own fallback. The agreement case resolves to directory deliberately: if a registration declares the zone the directory also assigned, the directory did assert it, and reporting the weaker source would understate what is known. Also corrects the guard shipped in 5f516a0. Its failure message offered two ways out of adding dynamic registration, and condition (b) voids the second: admitting dynamic registration voids the registration-bound shape that day, whatever state the adapter is in. The message named an inadmissible resolution in the exact place someone would read it while making that change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-10 07:58:29 +02:00
state_hub_task_id: "4729d591-39d4-5f33-bef8-db8057090913"
Make the static-registration precondition a checked condition informed-decision asked for the caveat under which a registration-bound human tenant is safe to be a condition of the capability rather than reasoning in a message, so a future change to registration policy has to confront it. They were right that it was only prose: the contract stated it, a separate test asserted registration_endpoint is absent, and nothing connected the two -- so a session adding dynamic registration would have seen a test about discovery metadata, not a warning about relabelling users. The test asserts both halves together: that a client-declared tenant is issued, and that dynamic registration is not advertised. Whichever is removed first, the failure points at the other. The message carries the reasoning rather than the observation -- anyone able to register a client could relabel the users who log in through it -- and names the two ways out. Verified in both directions rather than assumed: advertising a registration_endpoint fails it with the escalation message, and neutering humanTenant fails it with the message saying to remove the guard along with the capability it protects. This is not a vote on the tenant question. It makes one option's precondition checkable; if option 1 lands, the capability and this guard are removed together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-09 23:23:48 +02:00
```
`TestRegistrationBoundTenantRequiresStaticRegistration` asserts both halves
together: that a client-declared tenant is issued, and that dynamic client
registration is not advertised. Whichever is removed first, the failure points at
the other.
The failure message carries the reasoning rather than the observation. Adding
dynamic registration while a registration may declare its users' tenant means
anyone able to register a client can relabel the users who log in through it into
a zone of their choosing; the message says that and names the two ways out, drop
the capability or gate it to statically configured registrations.
Verified in both directions rather than assumed: advertising a
`registration_endpoint` fails it with the escalation message, and neutering
`humanTenant` fails it with the message saying to remove the guard along with the
capability it protects.
This is deliberately not a vote on the tenant question. It makes the precondition
of one option checkable; it does not choose between them, and if option 1 lands
the capability and this guard are removed together.
## What stays with the owners
```task
id: KEY-WP-0030-T02
status: done
priority: medium
Carry the tenant claim's provenance, and correct a guard the ruling voided GH-DEC-2026-013 §5 is a finding nobody asked for and ours to implement: tenant is a bare string, so a consumer cannot tell a zone the directory asserted about the person from one a registration supplied about the client they came through. approval-engine exact-matches that string while its contract reads as though it relies on the first -- the check is sound and the property a reader infers from it is absent. gate-house named the property and left the mechanism to us. Every token now carries tenant_source beside tenant: directory, registration or default. Advertised in claims_supported, and asserted at the token level on both grants rather than only in the resolution function, since the claim a consumer reads is the thing under obligation. Three values where the ruling names two, which is the judgement here. Labelling an unasserted profile default as directory would reproduce the same defect one level down -- a consumer reading an assertion the identity layer never made. The ruling cites GH-DEC-2026-011 §3 on unknown versus absent for the case it examined; the same rule applies to our own fallback. The agreement case resolves to directory deliberately: if a registration declares the zone the directory also assigned, the directory did assert it, and reporting the weaker source would understate what is known. Also corrects the guard shipped in 5f516a0. Its failure message offered two ways out of adding dynamic registration, and condition (b) voids the second: admitting dynamic registration voids the registration-bound shape that day, whatever state the adapter is in. The message named an inadmissible resolution in the exact place someone would read it while making that change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-10 07:58:29 +02:00
state_hub_task_id: "32b10327-f55d-5a0e-a4bc-be92929469dc"
Make the static-registration precondition a checked condition informed-decision asked for the caveat under which a registration-bound human tenant is safe to be a condition of the capability rather than reasoning in a message, so a future change to registration policy has to confront it. They were right that it was only prose: the contract stated it, a separate test asserted registration_endpoint is absent, and nothing connected the two -- so a session adding dynamic registration would have seen a test about discovery metadata, not a warning about relabelling users. The test asserts both halves together: that a client-declared tenant is issued, and that dynamic registration is not advertised. Whichever is removed first, the failure points at the other. The message carries the reasoning rather than the observation -- anyone able to register a client could relabel the users who log in through it -- and names the two ways out. Verified in both directions rather than assumed: advertising a registration_endpoint fails it with the escalation message, and neutering humanTenant fails it with the message saying to remove the guard along with the capability it protects. This is not a vote on the tenant question. It makes one option's precondition checkable; if option 1 lands, the capability and this guard are removed together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-09 23:23:48 +02:00
```
`informed-decision` prefers option 2 and explicitly declines to treat that as the
answer, flagging it to gate-house on GH-DEC-2026-012 and naming approval-engine's
stake. KeyCape leans the same way, which is a reason for more care rather than
less: the code already implements option 2 (`329e48f`), so the doctrine question
is being decided against a working implementation. That is worth saying out loud
to everyone waiting on it, and was.
Their scope set `[openid, approval:read, approval:approve]` is confirmed and
already published. `client_id` and callback follow at their T07, deliberately not
before the tenant question resolves — registering a client that fails closed at
first use is the failure this exchange existed to avoid.