KEY-WP-0008: honor per-client mfaRequired and acr_values step-up
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Allow coulomb-social ordinary login at AAL1 via mfaRequired: false while
keeping provider requireForAll for clients without an override. Preserve
explicit acr_values=aal2 for step-up.
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-09 22:42:51 +02:00
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---
id: KEY-WP-0008
type: workplan
title: "Registration handoff and client-aware MFA policy"
domain: infotech
repo: key-cape
status: active
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-08-09"
updated: "2026-08-09"
depends_on:
- NK-WP-0025
state_hub_workstream_id: "70b78f21-be6d-4d6c-a537-037c38b2884a"
---
# KEY-WP-0008 - registration handoff and client-aware MFA
Let a registered OIDC client offer NetKingdom signup and request step-up
without making KeyCape an account store or weakening high-assurance clients.
## T01 - Add a safe registration handoff
```task
id: KEY-WP-0008-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "31627b02-4300-4f11-a8bb-8ff2bebb9566"
```
Define an allow-listed registration URL for eligible clients and preserve
client ID, redirect URI, PKCE intent, tenant hint, and return context in a
signed, expiring state envelope. Registration completion must restart the
normal authorization flow and must not mint a token directly.
Done when unknown users can choose signup from an eligible authorization flow
without open redirect, client substitution, or state replay.
## T02 - Replace global MFA with client-aware minimum assurance
```task
id: KEY-WP-0008-T02
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c2b56182-e717-4ca3-84e3-0963b69ce32f"
```
Replace the single require-for-all switch with policy that combines client
minimum assurance, requested ACR/step-up, tenant policy, protected action, and
current session assurance. Preserve mandatory MFA for platform/admin clients.
Allow coulomb-social ordinary login at password assurance when no stronger
rule applies.
Done when one low-assurance client cannot suppress MFA for another client or
reuse an under-assured session for a high-assurance request.
Implemented with nullable per-client `mfaRequired`: an explicit client value
overrides the provider default only for that client. Absent values preserve
the existing provider-driven policy.
## T03 - Support explicit step-up and fresh authentication
```task
id: KEY-WP-0008-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "bfa56396-1b94-4404-a4d5-fc5b4ae2b8e8"
```
Implement supported ACR/max-age or equivalent IAM Profile parameters, invoke
privacyIDEA only when policy requires it, and return verifiable assurance
claims. Handle users without an enrolled factor through a safe enrollment
handoff rather than an authorization bypass.
Done when coulomb.social can request MFA for a profile/action and verify the
result from token claims.
Implemented `acr_values` preservation and AAL2/MFA forcing through the
privacyIDEA challenge. The existing token `assurance` claim reports `aal2`
and `mfa: true` only after successful verification.
## T04 - Prove policy isolation and compatibility
```task
id: KEY-WP-0008-T04
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d4208f77-f4a6-4f2e-a436-de4f779cfaca"
```
Test known and unknown users, registration link eligibility, state expiry and
replay, password-only coulomb-social login, profile/action step-up, no-factor
enrollment, OpenBao mandatory MFA, cross-client session reuse, and logout.
Keep static client registration and exact redirect rules unchanged.
Done when existing high-assurance clients pass unchanged and the new
coulomb-social journey passes live.