KEY-WP-0005-T02-T03: cached tenant_roles claim, close workplan

New internal/adapters/tenantengine package, mirroring
internal/adapters/{lldap,privacyidea,authelia}'s shape: Client.Roles()
calls tenant-engine's cache-read endpoint. Fails open by construction --
unreachable, non-200, malformed body, or a nil *Client all return
(nil, false), never an error to specially handle. Wired into
TokenHandler.TenantEngine (nil by default, existing tests unaffected);
token.go stamps tenant_roles only when ok.

7 adapter tests plus 3 TokenHandler-level tests proving the actual
required behavior end-to-end: present when reachable, token issuance still
200 with every other core claim intact when unreachable (tenant_roles
simply absent -- the literal done-criteria), absent when not configured.

Real bug found and fixed at the source, not worked around: the first live
cross-process check (real flex-auth, real tenant-engine, this adapter)
returned tenant_not_found for a tenant that existed -- tenant-engine's read
endpoint was keyed by its internal tenant_id, but key-cape only ever has
the tenant's profile identifier. Fixed in tenant-engine
(ADHOC-2026-07-24), re-verified with the same live three-process chain --
roles=[IAM] ok=true.

Workplan closed: T01-T03 done. Explicitly still open: client_credentials /
service-token issuance -- no such flow exists in token.go at all, a
materially larger separate piece of work than either task here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/internal/adapters/tenantengine/adapter.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// Package tenantengine calls tenant-engine's cache-read endpoint at
+// token-issuance time to source the optional tenant_roles claim
+// (net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md, "Tenant Roles").
+//
+// This is the cache-read direction only, and it fails OPEN -- the opposite
+// of flex-auth's live-lookup adapter (flex-auth/internal/adapters/tenantengine),
+// which must fail closed. tenant_roles is documented as a cache callers
+// must never trust for privileged decisions (flex-auth re-validates live
+// before authorizing aal2-class actions); losing this claim at issuance
+// time is a performance regression, not a security one. Blocking login
+// because a cache source is briefly down would be the wrong trade.
+package tenantengine
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Client fetches cached capability roles for a tenant.
+type Client struct {
+	BaseURL string
+	HTTP    *http.Client
+}
+
+// New returns a tenant-engine cache-read client. A nil httpClient gets a
+// short default timeout -- this call sits on the synchronous token-issuance
+// path and must not turn a cache miss into a slow login.
+func New(baseURL string, httpClient *http.Client) *Client {
+	if httpClient == nil {
+		httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second}
+	}
+	return &Client{BaseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"), HTTP: httpClient}
+}
+
+// Roles fetches GET /tenants/{tenantID}/roles.
+//
+// Returns (nil, false) -- not an error -- on any failure: unreachable
+// tenant-engine, non-200 response, or a malformed body. Callers must treat
+// false as "omit the tenant_roles claim entirely", never as "emit an empty
+// or stale role list".
+func (c *Client) Roles(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]string, bool) {
+	if c == nil || c.BaseURL == "" {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	url := fmt.Sprintf("%s/tenants/%s/roles", c.BaseURL, tenantID)
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	resp, err := c.HTTP.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	var body struct {
+		Roles []string `json:"roles"`
+	}
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	return body.Roles, true
+}

src/internal/adapters/tenantengine/adapter_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+package tenantengine_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
+)
+
+func TestRolesReturnsRolesOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/tenants/tenant:friendly:binky/roles" {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected path %s", r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"tenant_id":"tenant:friendly:binky","roles":["CUS","VEN"]}`))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	client := tenantengine.New(server.URL, nil)
+	roles, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = true")
+	}
+	if len(roles) != 2 || roles[0] != "CUS" || roles[1] != "VEN" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected roles: %v", roles)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnNon200(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	client := tenantengine.New(server.URL, nil)
+	roles, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = false on a 503")
+	}
+	if roles != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected nil roles, got %v", roles)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnMalformedBody(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		w.Write([]byte("not json"))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	client := tenantengine.New(server.URL, nil)
+	_, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = false on malformed body")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnConnectionFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	client := tenantengine.New("http://127.0.0.1:1", nil)
+	_, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = false on connection failure")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnTimeout(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"roles":[]}`))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	client := tenantengine.New(server.URL, &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Millisecond})
+	_, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = false on timeout")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnNilClient(t *testing.T) {
+	var client *tenantengine.Client
+	roles, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok || roles != nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected a nil *Client to fail open safely, not panic")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRolesFailsOpenOnEmptyBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
+	client := tenantengine.New("", nil)
+	_, ok := client.Roles(context.Background(), "tenant:friendly:binky")
+
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected ok = false with an empty base URL")
+	}
+}

src/internal/server/oidc/token.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
 	"keycape/internal/domain"
 	profileerrors "keycape/internal/errors"
 	"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
@@ -25,6 +26,9 @@ type TokenHandler struct {
 	Issuer        string
 	TokenLifetime time.Duration
 	Emitter       telemetry.Emitter
+	// TenantEngine sources the optional tenant_roles claim (KEY-WP-0005-T02).
+	// Nil disables it entirely -- token issuance never depends on it.
+	TenantEngine *tenantengine.Client
 }
 
 // tokenResponse is the JSON body returned on a successful token exchange.
@@ -130,12 +134,20 @@ func (h *TokenHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Core claims required by net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md
 	// for every production token -- not scope-gated, unlike the recommended
 	// human claims above (KEY-WP-0005-T01).
-	claims["tenant"] = effectiveTenant(user)
+	tenant := effectiveTenant(user)
+	claims["tenant"] = tenant
 	claims["principal_type"] = "human"
 	claims["groups"] = nonNilStrings(user.Groups)
 	claims["roles"] = nonNilStrings(user.Roles)
 	claims["assurance"] = assuranceClaim(sess.MFAVerified, now)
 
+	// Optional cached tenant_roles claim (KEY-WP-0005-T02). Fails open --
+	// see internal/adapters/tenantengine's package doc for why this is the
+	// one place in the whole tenant_roles design where that's correct.
+	if roles, ok := h.TenantEngine.Roles(ctx, tenant); ok {
+		claims["tenant_roles"] = roles
+	}
+
 	// 7. Sign JWT with RSA-SHA256.
 	kid := "key-1" // static kid for v0.1
 	jwtToken, err := buildJWT(claims, kid, h.SigningKey)

src/internal/server/oidc/token_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
 	"keycape/internal/domain"
 	profileerrors "keycape/internal/errors"
 	"keycape/internal/server/oidc"
@@ -507,3 +508,117 @@ func TestTokenHandler_CodeDeletedAfterUse(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("second use: expected 400 (code replay), got %d", w2.Code)
 	}
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// KEY-WP-0005-T02: cached tenant_roles claim
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_PresentWhenTenantEngineReachable(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"tenant_id":"tenant:coulomb","roles":["IAM","VEN"]}`))
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
+	users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
+	h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
+	h.TenantEngine = tenantengine.New(server.URL, nil)
+
+	verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+	code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
+
+	params := url.Values{
+		"grant_type":    []string{"authorization_code"},
+		"code":          []string{code},
+		"client_id":     []string{"test-client"},
+		"redirect_uri":  []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
+		"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
+	}
+	req := tokenRequest(params)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
+	claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
+
+	roles, ok := claims["tenant_roles"].([]interface{})
+	if !ok || len(roles) != 2 || roles[0] != "IAM" || roles[1] != "VEN" {
+		t.Errorf("tenant_roles: want [IAM VEN], got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_OmittedButIssuanceSucceedsWhenUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
+	sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
+	users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
+	h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
+	// Unreachable: nothing listens on this port.
+	h.TenantEngine = tenantengine.New("http://127.0.0.1:1", nil)
+
+	verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+	code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
+
+	params := url.Values{
+		"grant_type":    []string{"authorization_code"},
+		"code":          []string{code},
+		"client_id":     []string{"test-client"},
+		"redirect_uri":  []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
+		"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
+	}
+	req := tokenRequest(params)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	// Token issuance itself must not fail just because the cache source is
+	// down -- this is the literal point of KEY-WP-0005-T02's fail-open rule.
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200 even with tenant-engine unreachable, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
+	claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
+
+	if _, present := claims["tenant_roles"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("tenant_roles must be omitted (not null, not []), got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
+	}
+	// Every other core claim must still be present -- one missing optional
+	// claim must not cascade into missing required ones.
+	for _, c := range []string{"tenant", "principal_type", "groups", "roles", "assurance"} {
+		if _, ok := claims[c]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("required claim %q missing even though only tenant_roles should be affected", c)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_OmittedWhenTenantEngineNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
+	sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
+	users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
+	h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
+	// h.TenantEngine left nil -- must not panic, must simply omit the claim.
+
+	verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
+	code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
+
+	params := url.Values{
+		"grant_type":    []string{"authorization_code"},
+		"code":          []string{code},
+		"client_id":     []string{"test-client"},
+		"redirect_uri":  []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
+		"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
+	}
+	req := tokenRequest(params)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
+	claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
+
+	if _, present := claims["tenant_roles"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("tenant_roles must be omitted when TenantEngine is nil, got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
+	}
+}