Record what the consolidated verifier's tests actually establish
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KEY-WP-0019-T05 rested on "existing tests pass unchanged", which shows the move
onto internal/jose preserved behaviour but not that the behaviour is checked.
Disabling the RSA comparison in jose.Verify fails both callers' suites, so the
shared verifier is load-bearing on each path.

Correct the comment on the caller-side cases added with the move. It claimed the
existing tamper case fails on the signature segment's shape before any key is
used; it does not — appending eight characters leaves a decodable segment, so
that case does reach and does check the signature. The two new cases are still
worth their place for what a byte-level tamper cannot reach: a structurally valid
token signed by an unpublished key under a published kid tests that key selection
is bound to the key set, and an undersized modulus in the published set tests
that ParseJWKS strictness denies rather than falling through to the claims.

Record both in the workplan and in G01's status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 867844@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3d45905e-0016-4b49-b828-231406881f7b
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-07 09:05:16 +02:00
parent 2be6c73d99
commit 8707d375a2
3 changed files with 26 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -143,3 +143,13 @@ Also added direct tests for `internal/jose` (17 cases). It is now the single
verifier behind both paths, so testing it only through its callers would leave
its edges — duplicate key ids, `crit`, even exponents, undersized moduli — to be
covered by accident.
Follow-on evidence for the same task: "existing tests pass unchanged" shows the
move preserved behaviour, not that the behaviour is checked, so the check was
made explicit. Disabling the RSA comparison in `jose.Verify` fails both callers'
suites, which establishes the shared verifier is load-bearing on each path.
Added two caller-side cases the existing tamper case cannot reach, since it
alters signature bytes for a key that is legitimately published: a structurally
valid token signed by an unpublished key under a published kid, which fails only
if key selection is bound to the key set, and an undersized modulus in the
published set, which must deny rather than fall through to the claims.