Send split-horizon origin headers on the discovery/JWKS fetch too

setPublicOriginHeaders (key-cape@3b0446e) annotated only the token
exchange with X-Forwarded-Proto/Host so Authelia can derive the public
issuer in a split-horizon deployment. idTokenVerifier's separate
provider-metadata/JWKS fetch never got the same treatment, so an
in-cluster discovery request reached Authelia unmarked and Authelia
4.38 failed closed on it ("invalid X-Forwarded-Proto header value
'http'"), breaking every login regardless of client.

Extracted setPublicOriginHeaders to a package-level function and gave
idTokenVerifier the same resolved public base URL so its discovery/JWKS
requests carry the same headers as the token exchange.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: sonnet
Assistant-Process: 169987@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 322ef1ef-9048-4021-8570-b6d6f6347999

src/internal/adapters/authelia/adapter.go

@@ -242,23 +242,30 @@ func (a *AutheliaAdapter) newTokenRequest(ctx context.Context, code string) (*ht
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
 	req.SetBasicAuth(a.cfg.ClientID, a.cfg.ClientSecret)
-	a.setPublicOriginHeaders(req)
+	setPublicOriginHeaders(req, a.authorizeBaseURL())
 	return req, nil
 }
 
-// setPublicOriginHeaders annotates a split-horizon token request. A public
+// setPublicOriginHeaders annotates a split-horizon server-side request to
-// origin that is not HTTPS is left unset: sending X-Forwarded-Proto: http is
+// Authelia with the origin the browser actually uses, so Authelia can derive
-// the value Authelia 4.39 refuses. Same-origin calls are left unset too.
+// the public issuer instead of the in-cluster one. Every server-side call
-func (a *AutheliaAdapter) setPublicOriginHeaders(req *http.Request) {
+// this package makes to Authelia (token exchange, provider-metadata/JWKS
-	public, err := url.Parse(a.authorizeBaseURL())
+// discovery) needs this, not only the token exchange — an unmarked in-cluster
+// request lets Authelia compute its own X-Forwarded-Proto from the literal
+// connection scheme, and Authelia 4.38/4.39 fail closed on that (KEY-WP-0033).
+// A public origin that is not HTTPS is left unset: sending
+// X-Forwarded-Proto: http is the value Authelia 4.39 refuses. Same-origin
+// calls are left unset too.
+func setPublicOriginHeaders(req *http.Request, publicBaseURL string) {
+	public, err := url.Parse(publicBaseURL)
 	if err != nil || public.Scheme != "https" || public.Host == "" {
 		return
 	}
-	token, err := url.Parse(req.URL.String())
+	target, err := url.Parse(req.URL.String())
-	if err != nil || token.Host == "" {
+	if err != nil || target.Host == "" {
 		return
 	}
-	if token.Scheme == public.Scheme && strings.EqualFold(token.Host, public.Host) {
+	if target.Scheme == public.Scheme && strings.EqualFold(target.Host, public.Host) {
 		return
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", public.Scheme)

src/internal/adapters/authelia/adapter_test.go

@@ -383,6 +383,76 @@ func TestTokenRequestOmitsForwardedHeadersForSameOriginAndPlainHTTP(t *testing.T
 	}
 }
 
+// Regression: the provider-metadata/JWKS discovery fetch used to verify the
+// upstream ID token is a separate server-side call from the token exchange,
+// and only the token exchange carried the split-horizon X-Forwarded-Proto/
+// Host headers. An in-cluster discovery request with no override header lets
+// Authelia compute its own (plain-http) proto and fail closed, breaking every
+// login even though the token exchange itself was correctly annotated.
+func TestDiscoveryFetch_CarriesPublicOriginHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	var discoveryReq, jwksReq *http.Request
+	client := &discoveryCapturingClient{
+		onDiscovery: func(req *http.Request) { discoveryReq = req },
+		onJWKS:      func(req *http.Request) { jwksReq = req },
+		tokenBody: buildTokenResponse(map[string]interface{}{
+			"sub":                "user-uuid-123",
+			"preferred_username": "alice",
+		}),
+	}
+
+	cfg := testConfig()
+	cfg.BaseURL = "http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091"
+	cfg.BrowserBaseURL = "https://auth.coulomb.social"
+	cfg.TokenBaseURL = "http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091"
+
+	adapter := authelia.New(cfg, client)
+	if _, err := adapter.HandleCallback(context.Background(), domain.CallbackParams{Code: "code"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if discoveryReq == nil {
+		t.Fatal("discovery endpoint was not called")
+	}
+	if got := discoveryReq.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); got != "https" {
+		t.Errorf("discovery X-Forwarded-Proto: got %q, want https", got)
+	}
+	if got := discoveryReq.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); got != "auth.coulomb.social" {
+		t.Errorf("discovery X-Forwarded-Host: got %q, want auth.coulomb.social", got)
+	}
+	if jwksReq == nil {
+		t.Fatal("jwks endpoint was not called")
+	}
+	if got := jwksReq.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); got != "https" {
+		t.Errorf("jwks X-Forwarded-Proto: got %q, want https", got)
+	}
+	if got := jwksReq.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); got != "auth.coulomb.social" {
+		t.Errorf("jwks X-Forwarded-Host: got %q, want auth.coulomb.social", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// discoveryCapturingClient serves discovery/jwks/token itself (unlike
+// mockHTTPClient, which serves discovery/jwks with a fixed response before a
+// test ever sees the request) so a test can inspect the headers on those
+// specific requests.
+type discoveryCapturingClient struct {
+	onDiscovery func(*http.Request)
+	onJWKS      func(*http.Request)
+	tokenBody   string
+}
+
+func (c *discoveryCapturingClient) Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	switch {
+	case strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/.well-known/openid-configuration"):
+		c.onDiscovery(req)
+		return jsonResponse(fmt.Sprintf(`{"issuer":%q,"jwks_uri":%q}`,
+			testIssuer, testIssuer+"/jwks.json")), nil
+	case strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/jwks.json"):
+		c.onJWKS(req)
+		return jsonResponse(testJWKS(nil)), nil
+	default:
+		return jsonResponse(c.tokenBody), nil
+	}
+}
+
 func TestHandleCallback_Success_FallsBackToSub(t *testing.T) {
 	tokenBody := buildTokenResponse(map[string]interface{}{
 		"sub": "user-uuid-456",

src/internal/adapters/authelia/verify.go

@@ -25,9 +25,10 @@ import (
 // precisely the assumption it was supposed to remove. Verification holds whether
 // or not the transport is what we believe it is.
 type idTokenVerifier struct {
-	client       HTTPClient
+	client        HTTPClient
-	tokenBaseURL string
+	tokenBaseURL  string
-	clientID     string
+	publicBaseURL string
+	clientID      string
 
 	// issuerOverride and jwksOverride pin metadata for deployments where it
 	// cannot be inferred from the token base URL. Empty means "discover".
@@ -95,9 +96,14 @@ func FailureReason(err error) string {
 const leeway = 30 * time.Second
 
 func newIDTokenVerifier(cfg Config, client HTTPClient, tokenBaseURL string) *idTokenVerifier {
+	publicBaseURL := cfg.BrowserBaseURL
+	if publicBaseURL == "" {
+		publicBaseURL = cfg.BaseURL
+	}
 	return &idTokenVerifier{
 		client:         client,
 		tokenBaseURL:   strings.TrimRight(tokenBaseURL, "/"),
+		publicBaseURL:  publicBaseURL,
 		clientID:       cfg.ClientID,
 		issuerOverride: cfg.Issuer,
 		jwksOverride:   cfg.JWKSURL,
@@ -237,6 +243,7 @@ func (v *idTokenVerifier) get(ctx context.Context, target string) ([]byte, error
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	setPublicOriginHeaders(req, v.publicBaseURL)
 	resp, err := v.client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

workplans/ADHOC-2026-09-27.md

@@ -63,3 +63,38 @@ Does not touch flex-auth (its 900s window is correct; it was consuming a bad
 timestamp) or informed-decision (correctly refuses to interpret the PDP's
 denial). `INFD-IN-0005` can close once informed-decision confirms platform-root
 can approve after a fresh sign-in against this build.
+
+## Discovery/JWKS fetch was missing the split-horizon origin headers
+
+```task
+id: ADHOC-2026-09-27-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Rolling out T01 (image digest `sha256:248e449a...`) broke every KeyCape login,
+including unrelated clients (`user-engine-portal`), with `auth_failure` /
+`provider_metadata_unavailable` at `/api/oidc/token` on the KeyCape side and
+Authelia logging `invalid X-Forwarded-Proto header value 'http'` on
+`GET /.well-known/openid-configuration` from KeyCape's pod IP.
+
+Root cause, unrelated to T01's change: `AutheliaAdapter.setPublicOriginHeaders`
+(the NK-WP-0041-T02/path-B fix, key-cape@3b0446e) annotates only the token
+exchange (`newTokenRequest`) with `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`X-Forwarded-Host` so
+Authelia can derive the public issuer for a split-horizon (in-cluster HTTP,
+public HTTPS) deployment. `idTokenVerifier.get` in `verify.go` — used for the
+provider-metadata and JWKS fetches that verify every upstream ID token — never
+got the same treatment; it built a bare request with only an `Accept` header.
+Authelia 4.38 fails closed on the resulting unmarked in-cluster request. This
+gap predates today's session (present since 3b0446e); it surfaced now because
+this was the first login attempted since that image went live.
+
+Fix: extracted `setPublicOriginHeaders` from an `AutheliaAdapter` method to a
+package-level function taking the target public base URL explicitly, and gave
+`idTokenVerifier` its own resolved `publicBaseURL` (same
+`BrowserBaseURL`-else-`BaseURL` fallback as the adapter) so `get()` applies
+the same headers. Added `TestDiscoveryFetch_CarriesPublicOriginHeaders`
+(confirmed it fails without the fix, passes with it). Full suite green.
+
+New image `key-cape@<pending>` still needs a rollout to `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml`
+before platform-root can sign in again.