Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits
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Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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SCOPE.md
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SCOPE.md
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@ -93,7 +93,11 @@ Keycloak interchangeability are not established.
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can establish it. Subject continuity is explicitly not preserved: the canonical
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ID survives as an attribute while Keycloak mints its own `sub`.
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- The server listens on HTTP; HTTPS termination is deployment-owned.
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`/healthz` reports process status without probing dependencies. Development
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`/healthz` is liveness and probes nothing; `/readyz` probes LLDAP, Authelia and
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privacyIDEA and gates traffic. `SIGTERM` drains in-flight requests for 15s.
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The supported topology is a single replica, since login and authorization state
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is process-local — see [operations](docs/operations.md) for that and for the
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key-rotation, client-removal and logout limits. Development
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Compose needs configuration/key material absent from the checkout. Production
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deployment and custody are external; a source implementation or example client
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fragment does not prove live registration or consumer cutover.
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