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Record the rotation authority answer and why it was not scheduled

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The Qonto rotation blocker is narrowed from an open question to a schedulable
act: railiance-platform named the executor, transport and authority, and will
prepare the CCR if KeyCape asks. Not asked -- requesting a production credential
rotation with a restart window is the operator's decision, so it was put to him.

Established first that this rotation has no incident driver. The 2026-08-23
exposure covered credentials embedded in config.yaml and the signing key; the
rapp-qonto secret is an env: secretRef in a separate Secret and was not in that
payload. Lifecycle hygiene, not remediation -- which changes what a reasonable
window looks like, and means nobody should be carrying it as leftover incident
work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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tegwick 2026-09-10 08:10:34 +02:00
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workplans/KEY-WP-0014-native-credential-lane-handoff.md
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@ -61,6 +61,36 @@ credentials. Integration tests exercise the real token/JWKS handlers and browser
callback, including forged state, tampering, excess scope and unsafe output. callback, including forged state, tampering, excess scope and unsafe output.
See docs/native-authentication.md for invocation and ownership boundaries. See docs/native-authentication.md for invocation and ownership boundaries.
2026-09-10. The authority question is answered and the blocker is narrowed to a
schedulable act. railiance-platform named the executor (platform operator,
attended founder session; explicitly not ops-warden, not secrets-engine
autonomously, and no unattended agent), the transport (the governed
`openbao-platform-admin-login` lane via `warden access ... --exec`), and the
authority (founder_required attended OIDC, role=platform-admin). What is missing
is a rotation CCR, which they will prepare *if KeyCape asks* — a two-custodian
CAS rotation with a service restart being a distinct version-guarded operation
rather than an implementation detail of an existing lane.
**Not asked, deliberately.** Requesting a production credential rotation with a
restart window is the operator's decision, not this repository's, so it was put
to him rather than answered here (ops-warden msg 10fcc8af).
Established before recommending anything either way: **this rotation has no
incident driver.** KEY-WP-0011 recovered a real exposure on 2026-08-23, and the
coordinated rotation that followed replaced the RS256 signing key, the LLDAP bind
credential, the Authelia client credential and the privacyIDEA admin token. The
`rapp-qonto` client secret was not in that payload — it is an `env:` secretRef
resolved from a separate Kubernetes Secret, never inline in `config.yaml`, which
config validation enforces. So this is lifecycle hygiene, not remediation, and
nobody should be carrying it as leftover incident work. Hygiene can wait for a
chosen window; remediation could not.
Also recorded: `warden route`/`warden plan` previously returned a generic match
that read as authorization, and offered read transports against a write need.
This repository declined to act on it; railiance-platform independently called it
a defect; fixed under WARDEN-WP-0038.
## Admit rotation and verify consumer handoff ## Admit rotation and verify consumer handoff
```task ```task