Implement KeyCape provider and service identity contracts

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a02e3f-7301-7622-9be1-12e5f352881c

Makefile

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ IMAGE_REPO     ?= coulomb/key-cape
 IMAGE_TAG      ?= latest
 IMAGE          := $(IMAGE_REGISTRY)/$(IMAGE_REPO):$(IMAGE_TAG)
 
-.PHONY: dev seed build test lint image push image-tag
+.PHONY: dev seed build test lint contract-test image push image-tag
+
+PLAYBOOK_VALIDATOR ?= ../net-kingdom/tools/playbook-capability-contract/playbook_contract_validator.py
 
 dev:
 	docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up
@@ -20,6 +22,9 @@ test:
 lint:
 	cd src && go vet ./...
 
+contract-test:
+	python3 $(PLAYBOOK_VALIDATOR) capabilities/playbooks/*.yaml
+
 image:
 	docker build -t $(IMAGE) .
 

README.md

@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ clients:
 
 Config is validated at startup — the server exits 1 with validation errors if config is invalid.
 
+Confidential `client_credentials` registrations may set a per-client
+`tokenLifetime` from 1 minute through 1 hour. This overrides the server default
+for that client and lets machine-login consumers carry an explicit maximum TTL.
+See `config/service-clients.example.yaml` and
+`docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md` for the non-secret OpenBao service
+identity contracts. Client secret values remain outside Git and are resolved
+only from the registered `env:` reference at startup.
+
 `browserBaseURL` is used only for the human browser redirect to Authelia.
 `tokenBaseURL` is used for server-side code exchange. If either is omitted,
 KeyCape falls back to `baseURL`.

WORK-RECORDS.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 | workplan | KEY-WP-0006 | finished | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0006-client-credentials-service-tokens.md |
 | workplan | KEY-WP-0007 | finished | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0007-user-engine-portal-oidc-client.md |
 | workplan | KEY-WP-0008 | finished | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0008-registration-handoff-and-client-mfa-policy.md |
+| workplan | KEY-WP-0009 | active | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md |
 | task | KEY-WP-0001-T01 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0001-keycape-implementation.md |
 | task | KEY-WP-0001-T02 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0001-keycape-implementation.md |
 | task | KEY-WP-0001-T03 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0001-keycape-implementation.md |
@@ -72,3 +73,7 @@
 | task | KEY-WP-0008-T02 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0008-registration-handoff-and-client-mfa-policy.md |
 | task | KEY-WP-0008-T03 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0008-registration-handoff-and-client-mfa-policy.md |
 | task | KEY-WP-0008-T04 | done | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0008-registration-handoff-and-client-mfa-policy.md |
+| task | KEY-WP-0009-T01 | progress | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md |
+| task | KEY-WP-0009-T02 | todo | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md |
+| task | KEY-WP-0009-T03 | todo | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md |
+| task | KEY-WP-0009-T04 | todo | — | workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md |

capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+apiVersion: netkingdom.io/playbook-capability/v0.1
+kind: PlaybookCapabilityDeclaration
+metadata:
+  id: key-cape.lightweight-sso
+  name: KeyCape lightweight SSO runtime
+  owner: key-cape
+  repo: key-cape
+  domain: infotech
+  contract_version: "0.1"
+  source_links:
+    - label: Container entry point
+      path: Dockerfile
+    - label: OIDC server
+      path: src/cmd/keycape/main.go
+spec:
+  playbook:
+    path: Dockerfile
+    type: containerized-go-service
+    invocation: /keycape --config /etc/keycape/config.yaml
+    description: Start the profile-constrained KeyCape OIDC issuer and its static client registry.
+  capabilities:
+    - id: c1.lightweight-sso
+      tier: C1
+      resource_kinds:
+        - identities
+        - roles_scopes_policies
+        - secrets_credentials
+      description: Provide the lightweight NetKingdom IAM Profile issuer with OIDC authorization code plus PKCE and bounded service-token issuance.
+  parameters:
+    - name: config_path
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: /etc/keycape/config.yaml
+      sensitivity: secret_reference
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Mounted KeyCape configuration path; secret values remain in the owning delivery system.
+    - name: issuer
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: https://kc.coulomb.social
+      constraints:
+        pattern: ^https://[^\n\r]+$
+      sensitivity: security_sensitive
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Exact issuer used in discovery and every signed token.
+    - name: default_token_lifetime
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: 15m
+      constraints:
+        pattern: ^[1-9][0-9]*[smh]$
+      sensitivity: security_sensitive
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Server default token lifetime; confidential clients may declare a shorter bounded lifetime.
+    - name: signing_key_path
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: /etc/keycape/key.pem
+      sensitivity: secret_reference
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Mounted RS256 signing-key path; the declaration never carries key material.
+  responsibilities:
+    - resource_kind: identities
+      owner: key-cape
+      resources:
+        - oidc:issuer
+        - oidc:static-clients
+        - iam-profile:normalized-claims
+      repo_owns: OIDC protocol behavior, static registration, signed identity claims, token expiry, and profile conformance.
+      netkingdom_orchestrates: Select the C1 provider and supply approved non-secret issuer and client policy inputs.
+    - resource_kind: roles_scopes_policies
+      owner: key-cape
+      resources:
+        - iam-profile:client-scope-allowlists
+        - iam-profile:service-roles
+      repo_owns: Enforce registered scopes, client types, service subjects, tenant claims, and assurance claim shape.
+      netkingdom_orchestrates: Define scenario-required identity posture without changing KeyCape enforcement mechanics.
+    - resource_kind: secrets_credentials
+      owner: railiance-platform
+      resources:
+        - keycape:signing-key
+        - keycape:confidential-client-secrets
+      repo_owns: Custody, approved materialization, and rotation of KeyCape signing and confidential-client material; KeyCape consumes only mounted values.
+      netkingdom_orchestrates: Require approved custody and delivery before C1 readiness can be asserted.
+  trust:
+    requires:
+      - state: cluster_trust
+        readiness_checks: []
+      - state: runtime_secret_trust
+        readiness_checks: []
+    satisfies:
+      - state: runtime_identity_trust
+        readiness_checks:
+          - id: keycape-health
+            description: The selected KeyCape runtime reports healthy.
+            evidence: GET /healthz returns status ok and the expected deployed version.
+          - id: keycape-discovery-jwks
+            description: Discovery names the exact issuer and its JWKS verifies a freshly issued token.
+            evidence: /.well-known/openid-configuration and /jwks pass the owning deployment verifier.
+          - id: keycape-profile-conformance
+            description: Supported and rejected OIDC behavior matches the NetKingdom IAM Profile.
+            evidence: make test and the NetKingdom IAM Profile conformance suite exit zero for the selected runtime.
+  catalog:
+    publish: capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml
+    maturity: implemented
+    consumers:
+      - netkingdom-security-scenario-composer

capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+apiVersion: netkingdom.io/playbook-capability/v0.1
+kind: PlaybookCapabilityDeclaration
+metadata:
+  id: key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority
+  name: KeyCape privacyIDEA token-authority integration
+  owner: key-cape
+  repo: key-cape
+  domain: infotech
+  contract_version: "0.1"
+  source_links:
+    - label: Runtime adapter
+      path: src/internal/adapters/privacyidea/adapter.go
+    - label: MFA authorization flow
+      path: src/internal/server/oidc/authorize.go
+spec:
+  playbook:
+    path: src/internal/adapters/privacyidea/adapter.go
+    type: service-integration
+    invocation: POST /authorize/callback via /keycape --config /etc/keycape/config.yaml
+    description: Fail closed through privacyIDEA enrollment discovery and OTP validation, then emit verified AAL2 assurance through KeyCape.
+  capabilities:
+    - id: c2b.token-authority
+      tier: C2b
+      resource_kinds:
+        - identities
+        - secrets_credentials
+      description: Integrate the external privacyIDEA token authority into the KeyCape authorization flow without implementing or claiming C2a built-in factors.
+  parameters:
+    - name: privacyidea_base_url
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: http://privacyidea.sso.svc.cluster.local:80
+      constraints:
+        pattern: ^https?://[^\n\r]+$
+      sensitivity: security_sensitive
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Cluster-local privacyIDEA API endpoint selected by the deployment owner.
+    - name: privacyidea_admin_token_ref
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: kubernetes://sso/keycape-config#config.yaml
+      sensitivity: secret_reference
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Reference to the mounted KeyCape configuration carrying privacyIDEA API authentication; never a token value.
+    - name: realm
+      type: string
+      required: false
+      default: coulomb
+      constraints:
+        pattern: ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$
+      sensitivity: operational
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Exact privacyIDEA realm used for token lookup and validation.
+    - name: require_for_all
+      type: boolean
+      required: false
+      default: true
+      sensitivity: security_sensitive
+      tuning_authority: platform_only
+      description: Fail-closed bootstrap posture requiring MFA for upstream users while enrollment remains independently verified.
+  responsibilities:
+    - resource_kind: identities
+      owner: key-cape
+      resources:
+        - oidc:mfa-challenge
+        - iam-profile:assurance
+      repo_owns: Invoke the selected privacyIDEA realm, fail closed on provider errors, and emit AAL2 only after successful OTP verification.
+      netkingdom_orchestrates: Select C2b, require step-up for protected clients/actions, and consume assurance evidence from the profile.
+    - resource_kind: secrets_credentials
+      owner: privacyidea
+      resources:
+        - privacyidea:tokens
+        - privacyidea:enrollment-and-lifecycle
+        - privacyidea:custody-keys
+      repo_owns: Factor enrollment, token state, validation decisions, custody keys, and token lifecycle; KeyCape owns only the adapter and assurance mapping.
+      netkingdom_orchestrates: Require the external authority and its custody/readiness evidence without transferring token ownership to KeyCape.
+  trust:
+    requires:
+      - state: runtime_identity_trust
+        readiness_checks: []
+      - state: runtime_secret_trust
+        readiness_checks: []
+    satisfies:
+      - state: runtime_identity_trust
+        readiness_checks:
+          - id: privacyidea-adapter-fail-closed
+            description: Token lookup and validation errors cannot bypass MFA.
+            evidence: go test ./internal/adapters/privacyidea ./internal/server/oidc exits zero.
+          - id: privacyidea-aal2-proof
+            description: A selected enrolled identity completes OTP validation and receives AAL2/MFA assurance; an invalid OTP is denied.
+            evidence: The owning deployment's non-secret login verifier records positive AAL2 and negative invalid-factor outcomes.
+  catalog:
+    publish: capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml
+    maturity: implemented-integration
+    consumers:
+      - netkingdom-security-scenario-composer

config/service-clients.example.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Non-secret static registration fragments for KeyCape's bounded OpenBao JWT
+# consumers. Merge these entries into the deployment-owned KeyCape config.
+# The named environment variables must be materialized by an approved
+# out-of-repository custody path; this file never contains their values.
+clients:
+  - clientId: "codex-railiance-platform"
+    displayName: "Railiance platform coding agent"
+    allowedScopes: ["openbao:login"]
+    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
+    clientType: "confidential"
+    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_CODEX_RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_CLIENT_SECRET"
+    serviceSubject: "service:codex:railiance-platform"
+    tenant: "tenant:coulomb"
+    roles: ["coding-agent"]
+    tokenLifetime: "15m"
+
+  - clientId: "secrets-engine-openbao"
+    displayName: "secrets-engine OpenBao login"
+    allowedScopes: ["openbao:login"]
+    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
+    clientType: "confidential"
+    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET"
+    serviceSubject: "service:secrets-engine"
+    tenant: "tenant:coulomb"
+    roles: ["secrets-engine"]
+    tokenLifetime: "15m"

docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# KeyCape service authentication for OpenBao
+
+Date: 2026-08-23  
+Status: accepted provider contract; live client provisioning remains a
+deployment and custody operation
+
+## Ownership boundary
+
+KeyCape owns static confidential-client registration, client authentication,
+JWT signing, IAM Profile service claims, expiry, and disabling future issuance.
+The OpenBao platform owner owns JWT auth mounts, exact-bound roles, policies,
+OpenBao token TTL/use limits, and value-safe authorization evidence. The
+consumer owns renewal and fail-closed use. OpenBao or its approved delivery
+path owns confidential-client secret custody.
+
+KeyCape accepts the `codex-railiance-platform` issuance identity and the
+`secrets-engine-openbao` service identity under this contract. It does not own
+the resulting OpenBao identity token or policy. ops-warden remains the SSH
+certificate issuer only, and user-engine is not in the machine-principal path.
+
+## Exchange and claims
+
+The consumer sends `POST /token` with `grant_type=client_credentials`, HTTP
+Basic client authentication, and the allow-listed `scope=openbao:login`.
+KeyCape returns an RS256 access token and no ID token or refresh token.
+
+Every issued service token contains:
+
+| Claim | Contract |
+| --- | --- |
+| `iss` | the configured KeyCape issuer |
+| `sub` | the registration's exact `serviceSubject` |
+| `aud` | the exact `clientId` |
+| `iat`, `exp` | issue and expiry time; maximum per-client lifetime below |
+| `principal_type` | `service` |
+| `tenant` | the registration's exact tenant |
+| `roles` | the registration's allow-listed roles |
+| `groups` | an empty array |
+| `scope` | only requested scopes from the registration allow-list |
+| `assurance` | AAL1, `client_secret`, non-MFA, source `key-cape` |
+
+OpenBao JWT roles must bind the exact issuer, audience, subject,
+`principal_type`, tenant, and required role. A consumer must reject an issuer
+or claim mismatch before attempting OpenBao login.
+
+## Accepted registrations
+
+The source-of-truth non-secret fragments are in
+`config/service-clients.example.yaml`.
+
+| Client | Subject | Role | Scope | Maximum JWT lifetime |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `codex-railiance-platform` | `service:codex:railiance-platform` | `coding-agent` | `openbao:login` | 15 minutes |
+| `secrets-engine-openbao` | `service:secrets-engine` | `secrets-engine` | `openbao:login` | 15 minutes |
+
+The confidential secret is referenced as an environment variable in KeyCape
+configuration and must be materialized without entering Git, State Hub, chat,
+process arguments, or normal logs. Registering or rotating the live value is a
+separate approved custody action.
+
+## Renewal, expiry, and revocation
+
+- There is no refresh token. Obtain a new KeyCape JWT with a new
+  `client_credentials` exchange when no more than three minutes remain.
+- A consumer may retry a transient exchange failure with bounded backoff only
+  while its current JWT is still valid. It must stop the privileged operation
+  at expiry.
+- KeyCape JWTs are self-contained and cannot be recalled after issue. Disabling
+  the client or rotating its secret stops new issuance; the residual exposure
+  is bounded by the 15-minute JWT lifetime and the OpenBao token's independent
+  TTL/use limits.
+- After OpenBao login, the consumer must explicitly revoke the OpenBao token in
+  its cleanup path. A cleanup failure is actionable evidence and must not print
+  a JWT, OpenBao token, client secret, or token accessor.
+
+## Failure semantics
+
+Authentication, scope, claim, signature, issuer, expiry, OpenBao login, and
+cleanup failures are fail-closed. Steady-state consumers must not implicitly
+fall back to bootstrap token files, an operator identity, a broader AppRole, or
+an unbound JWT role. Bootstrap files remain explicitly selected setup or
+break-glass providers and require their own authorization and evidence.
+
+Verification must inspect metadata and capabilities without reading a secret
+value. A coding-agent check must prove the `agent-high-risk-boundary` deny wins
+against any otherwise readable workload policy.

src/cmd/keycape/main.go

@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ func buildClientRegistry(cfgClients []config.ClientConfig) (map[string]*domain.C
 	for i := range cfgClients {
 		c := &cfgClients[i]
 		clientSecret := ""
+		var clientTokenLifetime time.Duration
 		if strings.HasPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:") {
 			envName := strings.TrimPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:")
 			clientSecret = os.Getenv(envName)
@@ -273,18 +274,26 @@ func buildClientRegistry(cfgClients []config.ClientConfig) (map[string]*domain.C
 				return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q secret environment variable %q is empty", c.ClientID, envName)
 			}
 		}
+		if c.TokenLifetime != "" {
+			parsedLifetime, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(c.TokenLifetime)
+			if parseErr != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q tokenLifetime is invalid: %w", c.ClientID, parseErr)
+			}
+			clientTokenLifetime = parsedLifetime
+		}
 		m[c.ClientID] = &domain.Client{
-			ClientID:       c.ClientID,
-			DisplayName:    c.DisplayName,
-			RedirectURIs:   c.RedirectURIs,
-			AllowedScopes:  c.AllowedScopes,
-			GrantTypes:     c.GrantTypes,
-			ClientType:     c.ClientType,
-			SecretRef:      c.SecretRef,
-			ClientSecret:   clientSecret,
-			ServiceSubject: c.ServiceSubject,
-			Tenant:         c.Tenant,
+			ClientID:        c.ClientID,
+			DisplayName:     c.DisplayName,
+			RedirectURIs:    c.RedirectURIs,
+			AllowedScopes:   c.AllowedScopes,
+			GrantTypes:      c.GrantTypes,
+			ClientType:      c.ClientType,
+			SecretRef:       c.SecretRef,
+			ClientSecret:    clientSecret,
+			ServiceSubject:  c.ServiceSubject,
+			Tenant:          c.Tenant,
 			Roles:           c.Roles,
+			TokenLifetime:   clientTokenLifetime,
 			MFARequired:     c.MFARequired,
 			RegistrationURL: c.RegistrationURL,
 			EnrollmentURL:   c.EnrollmentURL,

src/internal/config/config.go

@@ -29,16 +29,17 @@ type Config struct {
 
 // ClientConfig is a static OIDC client registration.
 type ClientConfig struct {
-	ClientID       string   `yaml:"clientId"`
-	DisplayName    string   `yaml:"displayName"`
-	RedirectURIs   []string `yaml:"redirectUris"`
-	AllowedScopes  []string `yaml:"allowedScopes"`
-	GrantTypes     []string `yaml:"grantTypes"`
-	ClientType     string   `yaml:"clientType"` // "confidential" | "public"
-	SecretRef      string   `yaml:"secretRef,omitempty"`
-	ServiceSubject string   `yaml:"serviceSubject,omitempty"`
-	Tenant         string   `yaml:"tenant,omitempty"`
+	ClientID        string   `yaml:"clientId"`
+	DisplayName     string   `yaml:"displayName"`
+	RedirectURIs    []string `yaml:"redirectUris"`
+	AllowedScopes   []string `yaml:"allowedScopes"`
+	GrantTypes      []string `yaml:"grantTypes"`
+	ClientType      string   `yaml:"clientType"` // "confidential" | "public"
+	SecretRef       string   `yaml:"secretRef,omitempty"`
+	ServiceSubject  string   `yaml:"serviceSubject,omitempty"`
+	Tenant          string   `yaml:"tenant,omitempty"`
 	Roles           []string `yaml:"roles,omitempty"`
+	TokenLifetime   string   `yaml:"tokenLifetime,omitempty"`
 	MFARequired     *bool    `yaml:"mfaRequired,omitempty"`
 	RegistrationURL string   `yaml:"registrationUrl,omitempty"`
 	EnrollmentURL   string   `yaml:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty"`

src/internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -337,6 +337,78 @@ func TestValidate_MissingPrivateKeyPEM(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestValidate_ClientCredentialsTokenLifetime(t *testing.T) {
+	keyPath := writeTempFile(t, "key")
+	cfg := validConfig(keyPath)
+	cfg.Clients[0] = config.ClientConfig{
+		ClientID:       "service-client",
+		ClientType:     "confidential",
+		GrantTypes:     []string{"client_credentials"},
+		AllowedScopes:  []string{"openbao:login"},
+		SecretRef:      "env:SERVICE_CLIENT_SECRET",
+		ServiceSubject: "service:test",
+		Tenant:         "tenant:coulomb",
+		TokenLifetime:  "15m",
+	}
+	if errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg); len(errs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("valid per-client token lifetime rejected: %v", errs)
+	}
+
+	cfg.Clients[0].TokenLifetime = "90m"
+	if errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg); !containsErr(errs, "between 1m and 1h") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected bounded tokenLifetime error, got %v", errs)
+	}
+
+	cfg.Clients[0].TokenLifetime = "not-a-duration"
+	if errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg); !containsErr(errs, "valid duration") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected invalid tokenLifetime error, got %v", errs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidate_PublicClientRejectsTokenLifetime(t *testing.T) {
+	keyPath := writeTempFile(t, "key")
+	cfg := validConfig(keyPath)
+	cfg.Clients[0].TokenLifetime = "15m"
+	if errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg); !containsErr(errs, "only supported for client_credentials") {
+		t.Fatalf("expected public-client tokenLifetime error, got %v", errs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServiceClientExampleContracts(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := config.Load(filepath.Join("..", "..", "..", "config", "service-clients.example.yaml"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load service client examples: %v", err)
+	}
+	cfg.Issuer = "https://kc.coulomb.social"
+	cfg.Port = 8080
+	cfg.PrivateKeyPEM = writeTempFile(t, "key")
+	if errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg); len(errs) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("service client examples must validate: %v", errs)
+	}
+	if len(cfg.Clients) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("service client examples: want 2, got %d", len(cfg.Clients))
+	}
+
+	codingAgent := cfg.Clients[0]
+	if codingAgent.ClientID != "codex-railiance-platform" ||
+		codingAgent.ServiceSubject != "service:codex:railiance-platform" ||
+		codingAgent.Tenant != "tenant:coulomb" ||
+		codingAgent.TokenLifetime != "15m" {
+		t.Fatalf("coding-agent contract drifted: %+v", codingAgent)
+	}
+	if len(codingAgent.Roles) != 1 || codingAgent.Roles[0] != "coding-agent" ||
+		len(codingAgent.AllowedScopes) != 1 || codingAgent.AllowedScopes[0] != "openbao:login" {
+		t.Fatalf("coding-agent authorization contract drifted: %+v", codingAgent)
+	}
+
+	secretsEngine := cfg.Clients[1]
+	if secretsEngine.ClientID != "secrets-engine-openbao" ||
+		secretsEngine.ServiceSubject != "service:secrets-engine" ||
+		secretsEngine.TokenLifetime != "15m" {
+		t.Fatalf("secrets-engine contract drifted: %+v", secretsEngine)
+	}
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Env var loading test
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

src/internal/config/validate.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 )
 
 // ValidateConfig validates a loaded Config and returns a list of human-readable
@@ -56,6 +57,16 @@ func ValidateConfig(cfg *Config) []string {
 			if c.ServiceSubject == "" || c.Tenant == "" {
 				errs = append(errs, prefix+": client_credentials requires serviceSubject and tenant")
 			}
+			if c.TokenLifetime != "" {
+				lifetime, err := time.ParseDuration(c.TokenLifetime)
+				if err != nil {
+					errs = append(errs, prefix+": tokenLifetime must be a valid duration")
+				} else if lifetime < time.Minute || lifetime > time.Hour {
+					errs = append(errs, prefix+": tokenLifetime must be between 1m and 1h")
+				}
+			}
+		} else if c.TokenLifetime != "" {
+			errs = append(errs, prefix+": tokenLifetime is only supported for client_credentials clients")
 		}
 		// Warn about wildcard redirect URIs (they are blocked at runtime anyway).
 		for _, uri := range c.RedirectURIs {

src/internal/domain/model.go

@@ -52,10 +52,13 @@ type Client struct {
 	ClientSecret   string   `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
 	ServiceSubject string   `yaml:"serviceSubject,omitempty" json:"serviceSubject,omitempty"`
 	Tenant         string   `yaml:"tenant,omitempty" json:"tenant,omitempty"`
-	Roles           []string `yaml:"roles,omitempty" json:"roles,omitempty"`
-	MFARequired     *bool    `yaml:"mfaRequired,omitempty" json:"mfaRequired,omitempty"`
-	RegistrationURL string   `yaml:"registrationUrl,omitempty" json:"registrationUrl,omitempty"`
-	EnrollmentURL   string   `yaml:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty" json:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty"`
+	Roles          []string `yaml:"roles,omitempty" json:"roles,omitempty"`
+	// TokenLifetime overrides the server default for this confidential client.
+	// It is internal runtime policy, not identity data serialized into tokens.
+	TokenLifetime   time.Duration `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
+	MFARequired     *bool         `yaml:"mfaRequired,omitempty" json:"mfaRequired,omitempty"`
+	RegistrationURL string        `yaml:"registrationUrl,omitempty" json:"registrationUrl,omitempty"`
+	EnrollmentURL   string        `yaml:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty" json:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // Membership links a user to a group.

src/internal/server/oidc/token.go

@@ -232,11 +232,15 @@ func (h *TokenHandler) serveClientCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 	}
 
 	now := time.Now()
+	tokenLifetime := h.TokenLifetime
+	if client.TokenLifetime > 0 {
+		tokenLifetime = client.TokenLifetime
+	}
 	claims := map[string]interface{}{
 		"iss":            h.Issuer,
 		"sub":            client.ServiceSubject,
 		"aud":            clientID,
-		"exp":            now.Add(h.TokenLifetime).Unix(),
+		"exp":            now.Add(tokenLifetime).Unix(),
 		"iat":            now.Unix(),
 		"tenant":         client.Tenant,
 		"principal_type": "service",
@@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ func (h *TokenHandler) serveClientCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(tokenResponse{
 		AccessToken: jwtToken, TokenType: "Bearer",
-		ExpiresIn: int(h.TokenLifetime.Seconds()),
+		ExpiresIn: int(tokenLifetime.Seconds()),
 	})
 }
 

src/internal/server/oidc/token_test.go

@@ -291,6 +291,30 @@ func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_ReturnsScopedServiceToken(t *testing.T)
 	}
 }
 
+func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_UsesPerClientLifetime(t *testing.T) {
+	h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
+	h.ClientConfig["rapp-qonto"].TokenLifetime = 5 * time.Minute
+	req := tokenRequest(url.Values{
+		"grant_type": {"client_credentials"},
+		"scope":      {"finance.qonto.read"},
+	})
+	req.SetBasicAuth("rapp-qonto", "test-service-secret")
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
+	if got := int(resp["expires_in"].(float64)); got != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("expires_in: want 300, got %d", got)
+	}
+	claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["access_token"].(string))
+	ttl := int64(claims["exp"].(float64) - claims["iat"].(float64))
+	if ttl != 300 {
+		t.Fatalf("JWT lifetime: want 300 seconds, got %d", ttl)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_RejectsWrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
 	req := tokenRequest(url.Values{"grant_type": {"client_credentials"}})

workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+---
+id: KEY-WP-0009
+type: workplan
+title: "Provider capability declarations and bounded service identities"
+domain: infotech
+repo: key-cape
+status: finished
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+created: "2026-08-23"
+updated: "2026-08-23"
+depends_on:
+  - NK-WP-0030
+  - KEY-WP-0006
+---
+
+# KEY-WP-0009 — Provider capabilities and bounded service identities
+
+Publish KeyCape-owned security-scenario interfaces and make the existing
+service-token issuer precise enough for OpenBao machine-login consumers. This
+work accepts identity issuance ownership without taking over OpenBao roles,
+policies, secret custody, or privacyIDEA token lifecycle.
+
+## Publish C1 and C2b provider declarations
+
+```task
+id: KEY-WP-0009-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Publish Playbook Capability Contract v0.1 declarations for the KeyCape C1
+runtime and its privacyIDEA-backed C2b integration. Name exact entry points,
+parameter authority, resource ownership, trust requirements, and readiness
+evidence. Do not claim C2a or privacyIDEA-owned token lifecycle.
+
+Published `capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml` and
+`capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml`. The latter
+claims the KeyCape integration for C2b while leaving factor enrollment, token
+state, custody keys, validation decisions, and lifecycle with privacyIDEA.
+
+## Define bounded service-auth contracts
+
+```task
+id: KEY-WP-0009-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Define the KeyCape service-auth claims, renewal/expiry, failure, custody, and
+owner boundaries required by secrets-engine and OpenBao JWT roles. Add
+per-client access-token lifetimes so a bounded client contract does not depend
+on an unrelated global default.
+
+Added a validated 1m-1h per-client `tokenLifetime` override, applied it to JWT
+`exp` and `expires_in`, and documented claims, renewal, expiry, residual JWT
+validity, explicit OpenBao cleanup, and no-fallback failure semantics in
+`docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md`.
+
+## Accept coding-agent issuance ownership
+
+```task
+id: KEY-WP-0009-T03
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Publish the non-secret static registration for `codex-railiance-platform` with
+the exact audience, subject, tenant, role, scope, and 15-minute lifetime already
+accepted by railiance-platform. KeyCape owns JWT issuance and client disablement;
+railiance-platform owns the exact-bound OpenBao role and policy; OpenBao owns
+resulting token enforcement; secret values remain outside this repository.
+
+Accepted ownership through the exact non-secret registration in
+`config/service-clients.example.yaml`. Added the parallel reviewed
+`secrets-engine-openbao` contract. Live value generation/materialization,
+deployment merge, and OpenBao role/policy application remain with their named
+custody and platform owners and are not implied by this source registration.
+
+## Validate and hand off
+
+```task
+id: KEY-WP-0009-T04
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+Run the canonical declaration validator, Go formatting/build/vet/tests, and
+repository checks. Reply to NetKingdom, secrets-engine, ops-warden, and
+railiance-platform with revision-independent paths and exact ownership status.
+
+Both declarations pass NetKingdom's canonical validator. The full Go suite,
+vet, build, `gofmt`, YAML parsing, and `git diff --check` pass using an explicit
+Go 1.23 toolchain and writable local cache; the workstation's default Go cache
+is read-only and was not used. State Hub handoffs name only non-secret paths and
+ownership facts.