---
id: KEY-WP-0004
type: workplan
title: "Binky Hedgehog GmbH as first NetKingdom tenant + qonto runtime workload identity"
domain: infotech
repo: key-cape
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-07-23"
updated: "2026-07-29"
state_hub_workstream_id: "817709be-5756-5ef7-9ccd-dcb84b6b9c64"
---

# Binky Hedgehog GmbH as first NetKingdom tenant + qonto runtime workload identity

Binky Hedgehog GmbH ("binky") becomes the **first real tenant** provisioned in
the NetKingdom IAM stack, per the NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.2's tenant claim
model (`net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md` §"Tenant Claim") —
distinct from `tenant:platform` (control plane) and `tenant:coulomb` (the
ecosystem-development tenant this workstation already operates under).

This closes **Gap #1** flagged in `qonto-assistant`'s
`workplans/QONTO-WP-0003-mcp-surface.md` closure: no OIDC issuer existed
anywhere in the fleet, so `qonto-assistant`'s MCP surface shipped with an
interim shared-secret bearer token instead of real workload identity.
`key-cape` is "Implementation complete (v0.1)" and already implements the
profile's `client_credentials`/workload-identity grant for service accounts
— it's the component that should close this gap, not `user-engine`
(downstream user/profile data layer, not an identity provider) or
`identity-canon` (terminology research only).

**Depends on:** `key-cape` v0.1 (done, `KEY-WP-0001`), NetKingdom IAM Profile
v0.2 tenant + service-account claim rules (already ratified canon — no new
profile work needed, this is provisioning against an existing contract), and
the cross-repo runtime direction now tracked in
`railiance-master/workplans/RMASTER-WP-0019-knative-qonto-runtime-on-reef-railiance.md`.

This workplan no longer targets a permanent direct `qonto-assistant`
deployment shape. Its workload-identity lane is intended for the future
`rapp-qonto` runtime on `rail-knative` hosted by `reef-railiance`, with
current `qonto-assistant` consumption allowed only as a migration bridge until
that package/rail path exists.

## Task: Confirm tenant identifier and provision the tenant plane

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c3bdbdb6-6b3f-51b5-8521-d67f113f1c3d"
```

**Decided 2026-07-23 (Bernd):** the IAM profile's `tenant:customer:<name>` /
`tenant:sandbox:<name>` suggested identifiers name a tenant by **capability
role** (customer, vendor, ...) — but tenants already known to hold multiple
roles at once (see `net-kingdom/docs/princedom-isolation-exploration.md`'s
unratified `PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS` role model; Binky itself is both `CUS`
and, later, `VEN`). Using a role word as the tenant *grouping* would collide
with that separate role dimension. Decision: classify tenants by an
onboarding-risk / entity-shape **grouping**, orthogonal to capability role:

```text
trial        — test/trial/showcase tenants only
friendly     — known, easily reached, tolerant of experimentation/instability
single       — one-person business entities (freelance consultants)
small        — up to 10 employees at time of onboarding (attoo)
medium       — up to 100 employees (attoo)
large        — up to 1000 employees (attoo)
enterprise   — 1001+ employees (attoo)
consumer     — private individuals
family       — a legal family
community    — a non-legal group of people
association  — a legal association of people
agentic      — financially enabled AI entities
```

`tenant:<grouping>:<name>` replaces `tenant:customer:<name>` /
`tenant:sandbox:<name>` as the identifier shape. **Binky maps to `friendly`**
— known, reachable, tolerant of early instability — giving
**`tenant:friendly:binky`** (slug matches the OpenBao path already in
production, `tenants/binky/qonto-api`).

**Open question, not yet resolved by this decision:** this grouping list
classifies tenants as external-shaped entities: it has no obvious slot for
`tenant:coulomb` itself (the platform's own internal/reference tenant,
ADR-0006) — none of `trial`/`friendly`/`single`/.../`agentic` fit "the
platform building itself." Confirm with Bernd whether `tenant:coulomb` stays
an ungrouped special case (alongside `tenant:platform`) or gets folded into
this scheme somehow, before treating the grouping list as complete.

**Also open:** this is a fleet-wide vocabulary decision — the ratified
`net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md` "Tenant Claim" section
still documents the old `customer`/`sandbox` suggested identifiers, and
NetKingdom owns that canon per ADR-0011. Recording this grouping list only
in this key-cape workplan lets it drift from canon. Recommend a follow-up:
either a decision record or an ADR in `net-kingdom` adopting this grouping
list as the tenant-identifier standard, superseding the old suggested
identifiers. Not drafted here — flagging so it isn't lost.

Provision whatever tenant/org-unit boundary key-cape's current backend
(LLDAP/Authelia) needs so tokens issued for subjects under this tenant
correctly carry `tenant:friendly:binky` and nothing implies platform-root
authority for it (profile rule: tenant administration for a tenant must
never imply platform-root authority).

Done when: `tenant:coulomb`'s place in the grouping scheme is resolved; the
`net-kingdom` canon-update question above is answered (drafted or explicitly
deferred); a test-subject token carries the `tenant:friendly:binky` claim.

2026-07-27: IAM Profile v0.2 now preserves `tenant:platform` and
`tenant:coulomb` as reserved ungrouped tenants and ratifies the external
grouping vocabulary. The live service-token proof carries
`tenant:friendly:binky` without platform authority.

## Task: Provision bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com as tenant-admin

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "202c419e-838f-5c2f-8a52-9b1c36a6d6b9"
```

Create the user in key-cape's current backend, enroll MFA per profile
requirements (`assurance` claim, `net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md`),
and assign a tenant-admin role/group scoped to `tenant:friendly:binky` only.

2026-07-27 direction update: do not complete this through a one-shot operator
script. `USER-WP-0020` and `NK-WP-0023` now own a reusable self-service and
administration portal plus NetKingdom provisioning adapters. This task is
their first production acceptance case.

The `binky-hedgehog.com` mailbox must exist and be reachable for account
verification, but mailbox availability is now an input to the reusable
registration flow rather than a manual provisioning procedure.

Done when: `bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com` completes OIDC/PKCE + MFA login
and receives a token carrying `tenant:friendly:binky` and a tenant-admin role
claim; the same token does **not** grant access to `tenant:platform` or any
other tenant.

2026-07-28: user-engine's deployed portal API created the tenant-admin
membership and provisioned/linked the LLDAP identity through the reusable
NetKingdom adapter. The identity is intentionally in
`password_setup_required`; LLDAP has no SMTP configuration for its native
reset delivery. First-password handoff, MFA enrollment, and final human-token
claim/denial evidence remain. No operator-set password or raw credential was
used as a shortcut.

2026-07-28 update: the reusable password handoff is now live at the canonical
KeyCape host and is issued/renewed through the user-engine administration UI.
Links are opaque, expire after 15 minutes, are single use, and older links are
revoked on renewal. A disposable-user live test proved password registration,
directory login, replay denial, and cleanup. This task now awaits only the
Binky user's own password choice, MFA enrollment, and final scoped-token
acceptance.

2026-07-29: the first portal attempt correctly denied cross-tenant access
because KeyCape had not projected the established `net-kingdom-admins` group
to the new platform-operator role. Commit `90a2078` adds and tests the explicit
`tenant:platform` / `platform-operator` compatibility mapping and is deployed
Ready. The operator must start a fresh OIDC session so the corrected claims
are minted.

2026-07-29 human acceptance: the Binky administrator completed the reusable
password setup, enrolled a privacyIDEA TOTP factor, and successfully signed in
through KeyCape with password plus OTP. Enrollment revealed that privacyIDEA's
default QR label exposed only the token serial. The live
`coulomb-friendly-token-labels` enrollment policy now emits issuer `Coulomb`
and label `{user}@{realm}` for future tokens; existing authenticator entries
must be renamed locally because wallets do not accept remote label updates.
The live token then carried `tenant:friendly:binky`, roles `user` and
`tenant-admin`, only the Binky users/admins groups, and AAL2 assurance with
`pwd` + `otp` and `mfa: true`. The same session was denied access to both
`tenant:platform` and `tenant:coulomb` administration. Acceptance complete.

## Task: Register a workload-identity OIDC client for the qonto runtime

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0d3ccd35-bad5-5c30-95a3-61fce584425d"
```

Register an OIDC client per the profile's service-account/workload-identity
flow (`client_credentials` or the documented workload-token-exchange
equivalent — §"Service Account Flow"), scoped to `tenant:friendly:binky`,
with the minimum role/scope the qonto runtime surface actually needs. The
intended steady-state consumer is the future `rapp-qonto` runtime on
`rail-knative`; current `qonto-assistant` callers may use the same lane only
as a documented migration bridge until that package split exists. No
interactive login for this client — it's for agent-harness sessions and other
automated callers, not humans.

The resulting `client_secret` must never be pasted into chat, Git, this
workplan, or a State Hub message or progress event — hand-off happens only
through T04's secrets-engine/OpenBao lane.

Done when: a `client_credentials` token exchange against key-cape succeeds
for this client and produces a short-lived service token carrying
`tenant:friendly:binky`; the `client_id`, granted scopes, and intended future
binding to `rapp-qonto` are documented here; no secret material appears
anywhere in this repo's history.

2026-07-26: Added `docs/qonto-runtime-identity-contract.md` with stable
principal/client names, least-privilege claims, non-secret evidence, and the
automation/custody boundary. Actual client issuance remains open.

2026-07-27: `KEY-WP-0006` delivered `rapp-qonto-client`. Live exchange
produced only the documented tenant, role, and `qonto:read` scope; wrong
secret and excessive scope were denied.

## Task: Route client_secret custody through secrets-engine + OpenBao

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "9cb09dbf-1fd0-55c5-9c45-b3b7296ecd91"
```

Coordinate with `secrets-engine` to create a scoped OpenBao lane for this
`client_secret`, mirroring the existing `tenants/binky/qonto-api` pattern
already in production use for the Qonto bank credential itself. The steady
target is a dedicated future runtime role for `rapp-qonto`; if a temporary
bridge via the current `qonto-assistant` runtime role is needed before the
package split lands, it must be recorded as temporary rather than treated as
the final contract.

Done when: the intended qonto runtime role can fetch the `client_secret` via
`secrets-engine`/OpenBao; any temporary `qonto-assistant` bridge is explicitly
marked transitional; Bernd never handles the raw value at any point in this
flow.

2026-07-26: `warden plan` classified first-time provisioning as one explicit
founder authority act through `warden desk`. No secret was requested or read.
All repeatable verification and revocation work is designated for sanctioned
agent execution and later functional automation.

2026-07-27: Custody is established at
`platform/workloads/rapp-qonto/keycape-client`, with runtime injection through
`sso/keycape-rapp-qonto-client`. No raw value entered evidence or human
handling.

## Task: Register the credential lane with ops-warden

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "39f1f803-732e-5905-97d9-c7493c66c8ee"
```

This is the task that directly minimizes Bernd's ongoing engagement: add an
entry to ops-warden's routing catalog (`registry/routing/catalog.yaml`)
pointing at this new OIDC client / login lane, following the pattern already
documented in `ops-warden/SCOPE.md`'s "Issue vs route" table ("Login / OIDC /
MFA → key-cape / Keycloak → Assist — route; proxy `login` lane when
`exec_capable`"). ops-warden does not mint tokens or take custody here — it
routes/assists, same as every other credential lane it fronts. The lane should
describe the future `rapp-qonto` runtime path on `rail-knative`, not only the
current source repo.

Once the OpenBao lane from T04 exists, run ops-warden's workload security
posture conformance checker
(`ops-warden/scripts/check_secret_posture_conformance.py`) against the qonto
runtime workload that will later become `rapp-qonto`; until the split lands,
`qonto-assistant` may be used as the migration subject if that temporary state
is recorded. Confirm it meets the expected maturity tier (dev/test/prod
posture, M0–M3 workload maturity) before this goes live with real
credentials, and record the result (pass or documented exception).

Done when: `warden route show` (or equivalent) resolves this lane correctly;
posture conformance check passes or exceptions are explicitly recorded; from
this point on, discovering and using this credential lane needs `warden
access`, not direct key-cape/OpenBao admin knowledge.

2026-07-26: Routing requirements and required conformance evidence are now
documented. Catalog publication waits for the real client and OpenBao role so
the route does not advertise an unusable lane.

2026-07-27: Published route `rapp-qonto-keycape-client`; route resolution and
the metadata-only M3/prod posture check both pass.

## Task: automation@binky-hedgehog.com service identity (deferred)

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T06
status: cancel
priority: low
state_hub_task_id: "fbee11fc-7a60-5dd7-8522-f80ddb4aea55"
```

Forward-looking per Bernd's framing ("I guess it will later be helpful") —
**do not provision until a concrete automation workflow actually needs its
own identity** distinct from the qonto runtime workload client from T03.
Dormant service-account credentials are themselves a posture risk (unused
attack surface, nothing to rotate against), so this stays parked rather than
front-loaded.

When a real consuming workflow exists: same pattern as T02 but scoped to an
automation-appropriate role (not tenant-admin), likely paired with its own
`client_credentials` registration for whichever agent/service authenticates
as it, following T03/T04/T05's pattern rather than inventing a new one.

Done when: explicitly triggered by a named consuming workflow — until then
this task stays `todo` and does not block closing the rest of this workplan.

## Task: Closure review

```task
id: KEY-WP-0004-T07
status: done
priority: low
state_hub_task_id: "77b0556f-62fd-5046-9ba1-718246151a6f"
```

Mark workplan finished when T01–T05 are done (T06 may legitimately remain
`todo`/parked by design — see its own task note). Confirm end to end: a
human token (bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com, tenant-admin) and a service
token (future qonto runtime client, with any temporary `qonto-assistant`
bridge explicitly recorded) both resolve to `tenant:friendly:binky` and
nothing else; the credential lane is discoverable via `warden access` without
Bernd touching key-cape/OpenBao admin surfaces directly. The runtime follow-up
then continues in `QONTO-WP-0004` and `RMASTER-WP-0019`. Run
`statehub fix-consistency`.

2026-07-29 closure: T01–T05 are complete, T06 is intentionally cancelled,
the human Binky flow passed AAL2 and tenant-isolation acceptance, and the qonto
workload client passed its positive-scope and negative credential/scope checks.