--- id: KEY-WP-0004 type: workplan title: "Binky Hedgehog GmbH as first NetKingdom tenant + qonto-assistant workload identity" domain: infotech repo: key-cape status: ready owner: codex topic_slug: netkingdom created: "2026-07-23" updated: "2026-07-23" --- # Binky Hedgehog GmbH as first NetKingdom tenant + qonto-assistant workload identity Binky Hedgehog GmbH ("binky") becomes the **first real tenant** provisioned in the NetKingdom IAM stack, per the NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.2's tenant claim model (`net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md` §"Tenant Claim") — distinct from `tenant:platform` (control plane) and `tenant:coulomb` (the ecosystem-development tenant this workstation already operates under). This closes **Gap #1** flagged in `qonto-assistant`'s `workplans/QONTO-WP-0003-mcp-surface.md` closure: no OIDC issuer existed anywhere in the fleet, so `qonto-assistant`'s MCP surface shipped with an interim shared-secret bearer token instead of real workload identity. `key-cape` is "Implementation complete (v0.1)" and already implements the profile's `client_credentials`/workload-identity grant for service accounts — it's the component that should close this gap, not `user-engine` (downstream user/profile data layer, not an identity provider) or `identity-canon` (terminology research only). **Depends on:** `key-cape` v0.1 (done, `KEY-WP-0001`), NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.2 tenant + service-account claim rules (already ratified canon — no new profile work needed, this is provisioning against an existing contract). **Downstream, not in this workplan:** once T03/T04 land, `qonto-assistant` needs its own follow-up workplan to swap `mcp_auth.BearerTokenAuthMiddleware` for `FastMCP`'s built-in `TokenVerifier` + `AuthSettings(issuer_url=)` against the client registered here. Tracked as a pointer only — not created by this workplan, since it's a different repo's scope and code change. ## Task: Confirm tenant identifier and provision the tenant plane ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T01 status: todo priority: high ``` The IAM profile's tenant identifiers (`tenant:platform`, `tenant:coulomb`, `tenant:sandbox:`, `tenant:customer:`) are documented as *suggested*, not exhaustive — but `tenant:customer:` is the closest fit for the first real operating/customer-plane tenant, distinct from the `tenant:coulomb` ecosystem-development plane. **Recommended default, to confirm before implementing:** `tenant:customer:binky` — matching the slug already live in production OpenBao paths (`tenants/binky/qonto-api`, used by `qonto-assistant` today) rather than `tenant:customer:binky-hedgehog`, to avoid a slug mismatch between the new IAM tenant claim and the existing secret-custody path convention. Flag to Bernd for explicit confirmation before provisioning — tenant identifiers are expensive to rename once tokens and downstream config reference them. Provision whatever tenant/org-unit boundary key-cape's current backend (LLDAP/Authelia) needs so tokens issued for subjects under this tenant correctly carry `tenant:customer:binky` and nothing implies platform-root authority for it (profile rule: tenant administration for a tenant must never imply platform-root authority). Done when: tenant identifier confirmed and recorded (decision record or canon note); a test-subject token carries the correct `tenant` claim. ## Task: Provision bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com as tenant-admin ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T02 status: todo priority: high ``` Create the user in key-cape's current backend, enroll MFA per profile requirements (`assurance` claim, `net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.2.md`), and assign a tenant-admin role/group scoped to `tenant:customer:binky` only. **Prerequisite outside this repo's control:** the `binky-hedgehog.com` mailbox for `bernd.worsch@` must exist and be reachable for account verification and MFA enrollment. Flag to Bernd before starting — this task cannot complete without it. Done when: `bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com` completes OIDC/PKCE + MFA login and receives a token carrying `tenant:customer:binky` and a tenant-admin role claim; the same token does **not** grant access to `tenant:platform` or any other tenant. ## Task: Register a workload-identity OIDC client for qonto-assistant callers ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T03 status: todo priority: high ``` Register an OIDC client per the profile's service-account/workload-identity flow (`client_credentials` or the documented workload-token-exchange equivalent — §"Service Account Flow"), scoped to `tenant:customer:binky`, with the minimum role/scope `qonto-assistant`'s MCP and REST surfaces actually need. No interactive login for this client — it's for agent-harness sessions and other automated callers, not humans. The resulting `client_secret` must never be pasted into chat, Git, this workplan, or a State Hub message or progress event — hand-off happens only through T04's secrets-engine/OpenBao lane. Done when: a `client_credentials` token exchange against key-cape succeeds for this client and produces a short-lived service token carrying `tenant:customer:binky`; the `client_id` and granted scopes are documented here; no secret material appears anywhere in this repo's history. ## Task: Route client_secret custody through secrets-engine + OpenBao ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T04 status: todo priority: high ``` Coordinate with `secrets-engine` to create a scoped OpenBao lane for this `client_secret`, mirroring the existing `tenants/binky/qonto-api` pattern already in production use for the Qonto bank credential itself — so `qonto-assistant`'s runtime fetches this the same way it already fetches the Qonto API key, via its own dedicated runtime role (`qonto-assistant-runtime`, per `qonto-assistant/specs/ArchitectureBlueprint.md` §4.7), not a shared or ad hoc role. Done when: `qonto-assistant`'s runtime role can fetch the `client_secret` via `secrets-engine`/OpenBao; Bernd never handles the raw value at any point in this flow. ## Task: Register the credential lane with ops-warden ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T05 status: todo priority: high ``` This is the task that directly minimizes Bernd's ongoing engagement: add an entry to ops-warden's routing catalog (`registry/routing/catalog.yaml`) pointing at this new OIDC client / login lane, following the pattern already documented in `ops-warden/SCOPE.md`'s "Issue vs route" table ("Login / OIDC / MFA → key-cape / Keycloak → Assist — route; proxy `login` lane when `exec_capable`"). ops-warden does not mint tokens or take custody here — it routes/assists, same as every other credential lane it fronts. Once the OpenBao lane from T04 exists, run ops-warden's workload security posture conformance checker (`ops-warden/scripts/check_secret_posture_conformance.py`) against the new `qonto-assistant` workload to confirm it meets the expected maturity tier (dev/test/prod posture, M0–M3 workload maturity) before this goes live with real credentials, and record the result (pass or documented exception). Done when: `warden route show` (or equivalent) resolves this lane correctly; posture conformance check passes or exceptions are explicitly recorded; from this point on, discovering and using this credential lane needs `warden access`, not direct key-cape/OpenBao admin knowledge. ## Task: automation@binky-hedgehog.com service identity (deferred) ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T06 status: todo priority: low ``` Forward-looking per Bernd's framing ("I guess it will later be helpful") — **do not provision until a concrete automation workflow actually needs its own identity** distinct from the `qonto-assistant` workload client from T03. Dormant service-account credentials are themselves a posture risk (unused attack surface, nothing to rotate against), so this stays parked rather than front-loaded. When a real consuming workflow exists: same pattern as T02 but scoped to an automation-appropriate role (not tenant-admin), likely paired with its own `client_credentials` registration for whichever agent/service authenticates as it, following T03/T04/T05's pattern rather than inventing a new one. Done when: explicitly triggered by a named consuming workflow — until then this task stays `todo` and does not block closing the rest of this workplan. ## Task: Closure review ```task id: KEY-WP-0004-T07 status: todo priority: low ``` Mark workplan finished when T01–T05 are done (T06 may legitimately remain `todo`/parked by design — see its own task note). Confirm end to end: a human token (bernd.worsch@binky-hedgehog.com, tenant-admin) and a service token (qonto-assistant workload client) both resolve to `tenant:customer:binky` and nothing else; the credential lane is discoverable via `warden access` without Bernd touching key-cape/OpenBao admin surfaces directly. Note the `qonto-assistant`-side follow-up workplan (swap bearer token for `TokenVerifier`) as the next step, out of this workplan's scope. Run `statehub fix-consistency`.