# KeyCape scope against intent — 2026-09-05

Assessment timestamp: **2026-09-05 01:17:26 CEST (+02:00)**.  
Source baseline: **b989de4e90248ff0782a3e99bc12a6d0c01487a4**.  
Inputs: [INTENT](../INTENT.md), the previous SCOPE, implementation, tests,
build/operational scaffolding, and open workplans. Result: updated
[SCOPE](../SCOPE.md). INTENT is unchanged.

## Assessment

KeyCape substantially implements its identity-tooling purpose: it is a real
issuer with browser and service authentication, identity adapters, MFA policy
handling and caller commands. Its ownership boundary is consistent with INTENT:
it produces identity claims and delegates resource authorization and custody.

The stronger maturity claims are not established. “Strict” complete profile
conformance, stable identity through replacement, “seamless migration,” and
interchangeability without application changes exceed current implementation and
proof. The original 23-task workplan's completion is historical delivery evidence,
not evidence that every current contract, migration path or operational need is
complete. The accurate posture is **an implemented lightweight authentication
subset with tested local behavior and significant conformance, migration and
operational gaps**.

## Method and evidence limits

This is a source and documentation assessment, not a new live security audit or
migration rehearsal. The preceding implementation session at this baseline passed
`make test`, `make lint`, `make build` and `make contract-test`. No code changed in
this assessment and those checks were not rerun solely for wording changes.
Links and source claims were checked directly. Passing tests describe the covered
behavior; they do not establish the missing properties below.

Deployment observations in KEY-WP-0013 are earlier, explicitly dated evidence;
no fresh rollout, secret read, production token exchange or Keycloak migration
was performed here. Native caller behavior was tested locally, not certified as
a completed live consumer handoff. Findings marked as static risks need focused
regression tests before claiming exploitability or remediation.

## Alignment with INTENT

| INTENT commitment | Assessment | Evidence and limit |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Lightweight authentication Tooling | Substantially implemented | [Server composition](../src/cmd/keycape/main.go), [OIDC handlers](../src/internal/server/oidc/) and [adapters](../src/internal/adapters/). KeyCape signs its own tokens; it is more than a packaged reverse proxy. |
| Versioned, implementation-independent contract | Partial | Runtime supports newer service/audience policy than the v0.1 machine model and discovery metadata describe (G02). |
| Strong constraints and explicit rejection | Partial | Exact redirects, PKCE, scope checks, client-secret validation and [enforcement middleware](../src/internal/server/errors/enforcement.go) exist. Important validation and code-consumption boundaries remain incomplete (G01). |
| Canonical identity normalization | Partial | LDAP identities and group-derived tenant/roles are mapped. Directory portability, complete export and schema enforcement remain limited (G03/G05/G06). |
| Complete migration and interchangeable modes | Not demonstrated | Basic transforms and fixture tests exist. Current identity/client policy is not preserved end to end and live replacement harnesses are incomplete (G03/G04). |
| Deterministic, testable behavior | Strong local coverage; operational limits | Handler and CLI tests exercise actual local protocol code. Shared state, dependency readiness, complete exports and live backend replacement are not demonstrated (G04/G05/G08). |
| Minimal, secure, operationally efficient deployment | Partial | Small Go/container implementation exists; no resource benchmark or production-readiness certification was established. Bootstrap scaffolding and custody lifecycle need work (G08/G09/G10). |
| Authentication without resource authorization ownership | Aligned in scope | Claim issuance and local client/MFA rules are authentication policy; resource decisions remain with access-engine/consumers. This does not prove that every estate caller follows the engine-only integration rule. |

## Gaps and closure criteria

### G01 — Protocol trust and authorization-code consumption need hardening

**Priority: high. Kind: implementation gap / static security risk.**

[TokenHandler](../src/internal/server/oidc/token.go) validates PKCE, client ID and
scopes, but the authorization-code path does not authenticate confidential
clients or compare the submitted redirect URI with the stored one. Grant-type
eligibility is explicitly enforced on the service path, not equivalently on the
browser path. [SessionStore](../src/internal/server/oidc/session.go) retrieves a
code and deletes it in separate operations after signing; simultaneous requests
can reach the same session before deletion. This is not atomic single-use
consumption.

[UserInfo](../src/internal/server/oidc/userinfo.go) verifies an RSA signature and
expiry, but its `Issuer` field is unused in verification and the helper does not
validate the JOSE header algorithm, audience or token purpose. It cannot claim
the same verification contract as the new caller CLI.

The [Authelia adapter](../src/internal/adapters/authelia/adapter.go) deliberately
decodes upstream ID-token claims without signature verification and does not
validate their issuer/audience/expiry. Its comment assumes a trusted TLS service
boundary; the configuration permits internal HTTP endpoints. This is an explicit
trust assumption, not independent provider-token verification.

**Close when:** the accepted profile defines these bindings and trust boundaries;
implementation enforces them; negative tests cover confidential clients,
redirect/grant mismatch, issuer/token-purpose mismatch and concurrent code reuse.
Validate upstream provider tokens or explicitly establish and test the chosen
transport/trust contract. This assessment does not claim a demonstrated attack.

**Status 2026-09-06 (KEY-WP-0016): partially closed.** The local protocol
surface is now enforced and covered by negative tests — redirect-URI binding,
grant-type eligibility on the browser path, confidential-client authentication
with a constant-time comparison, atomic single-use code consumption (the
Get/Delete race was reproduced first: 9 of 16 concurrent exchanges succeeded
before the fix), and UserInfo algorithm, issuer and access-token-purpose checks.
Still open: the Authelia adapter's unverified upstream ID-token claims and its
transport-trust assumption, which is a trust-contract decision rather than a
local binding. G01 is not fully closed until that is settled, and none of this
establishes complete profile conformance.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0019): closed.** Upstream ID tokens are now verified
before any claim is trusted — RS256 signature against Authelia's published keys,
the issuer Authelia advertises, KeyCape's own client ID in the audience, and a
sane validity window — failing closed when the key set is unavailable or
unparseable. Provider key rotation is picked up on one refresh without a restart.

The operator decision (2026-09-07) was to verify the token rather than enforce
the transport: the hop is to be HTTPS as defence in depth, but KeyCape does not
monitor, check or gate on that, because a transport check helps only when it is
configured correctly, which is the assumption it was meant to remove.
Verification holds regardless of how the token arrived, so the absence of HTTPS
validation here is a choice, not an oversight.

Both verification paths — the upstream adapter and the caller-side
`authclient` — now run on one implementation in `internal/jose`, so the strict
RS256/JWKS rules cannot drift apart or be fixed in only one copy. Claim policy
stays with each caller, whose issuer, audience and nonce bindings genuinely
differ.

Verified the tests catch the original defect: with the unverified parse restored,
all thirteen rejection cases plus the algorithm and rotation cases fail, and with
the shared signature check disabled both callers' suites fail. Complete profile
conformance is still not claimed.

### G02 — Machine-readable contract and discovery lag the runtime

**Priority: high. Kind: contract drift.**

[spec/canonical-model.yaml](../spec/canonical-model.yaml) restricts grants to
`authorization_code`, requires redirect URIs for every client, and omits newer
service subject, tenant, audience, lifetime and MFA/handoff policy fields present
in [domain/model.go](../src/internal/domain/model.go) and
[config.go](../src/internal/config/config.go). Both the YAML and Go comments claim
to be the source of truth, without a demonstrated generation/conformance link.

[Discovery](../src/internal/server/oidc/discovery.go) advertises both grants but
uses a fixed basic scope/claim list that omits newer core claims and configured
resource scopes. It is not a complete inventory of the current profile surface.

**Close when:** select a canonical version, reconcile schema/runtime/discovery,
and add executable compatibility checks for human and service registrations.
Distinguish required profile claims from optional discovery metadata rather than
assuming every omission has the same protocol impact.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0017): closed for client registration and
discovery.** The Go model is now stated as the runtime authority and the
canonical model as the reviewed contract, with a two-way conformance test
holding them together — it rejects a runtime field with no spec entry and a spec
field the runtime does not read, the latter unless marked `runtime: false`. The
check found drift beyond the assessment's list on its first run (`User.tenant`
was undeclared), which is the argument for the check over the one-time edit. The
`Client` entity gained the audience, service-subject, tenant, role, MFA and
handoff fields, `grantTypes` gained `client_credentials`, and `redirectUris` is
no longer required of service-only clients. Discovery now advertises the core
profile claims and derives `scopes_supported` from the registered clients.
Still open: this covers the client-registration and discovery surface, not
schema enforcement in general, which remains G06.

### G03 — Migration does not preserve the current authentication contract

**Priority: high. Kind: implementation gap.**

The [Keycloak CLI](../src/cmd/keycape-to-keycloak/main.go) calls `Transform`, which
passes no clients. Only the library's `TransformWithClients` accepts them.
The [transformer](../src/internal/migration/tokeycloak/transformer.go) leaves realm
roles and client-scope definitions empty, always enables standard flow, and lacks
mapping for service-account issuance, resource audiences, tenant/role claims,
per-client lifetime, MFA policy and secret references. Its user mapping omits the
canonical ID, tenant and roles; retaining the same `sub` is not established.
LLDAP uses a DN as the canonical user ID, so directory relocation itself requires
an explicit identity continuity strategy. Passwords and MFA credentials are not
migrated; absence of MFA data is not proof that no re-enrollment is needed.

**Close when:** the CLI accepts the required complete snapshot/registrations,
transforms preserve or explicitly reject every relevant policy/identity field,
and migration proof demonstrates subject continuity, claims, MFA and client
behavior. Until then, call these artifact generators rather than full migration.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0020): semantic preservation closed; proof remains
G04.** The CLI takes `-clients` and reaches `TransformWithClients`, so the realm
carries the registration contract instead of an empty array. Flows are derived
from the declared grants rather than hardcoded — the previous mapping enabled the
browser flow on every service-only client, widening it during migration. The
audience, tenant, service subject and roles ride as protocol mappers, per-client
lifetime and handoff URLs as attributes, and the secret *reference* as an
attribute, never a value; a test asserts no resolved secret can appear in the
JSON. Realm roles and client scopes are derived from the identities and
registrations present, replacing empty containers that made a realm dropping
every role look like one that had none.

What cannot be carried is now named rather than dropped, which was the real
defect: `UnpreservedReport` is deliberately separate from `ValidationReport`, so
"the realm matches the snapshot" and "the migration is complete" stay distinct
questions. It names the unmigrated secret, the unenforceable MFA policy,
passwords and factor enrolment, and subject continuity — Keycloak mints its own
`sub`, so relying parties keyed on it will not recognise migrated users. An
incomplete transform emits `partial` telemetry, matching KEY-WP-0018.

Not closed: this is preservation and honest reporting, not proof. Whether an
imported realm actually issues profile-conformant tokens is G04, and password and
MFA credential migration remains out of scope.

### G04 — The replacement test harness does not prove a live provider swap

**Priority: high. Kind: verification and tooling gap.**

[Scenario B](../scripts/test-scenario-b.sh) and
[Scenario C](../scripts/test-scenario-c.sh) reference absent
`docker-compose.scenario-b.yml` / `docker-compose.scenario-c.yml`. They expect
`src/bin/`, while [src/Makefile](../src/Makefile) builds into root `bin/`, and invoke
a workstation-specific Go path from outside the Go module. Scenario C passes
`--base-dn` to a generator whose flag is `--basedn`.

Both scripts set `KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER`, but the
[profile suite](../src/tests/profile/profile_test.go) constructs its own
`httptest` server and does not consume that variable. The
[migration suites](../src/tests/migration/) validate generated structures with
fixtures. Thus even repairing the shell prerequisites would not make those
profile tests exercise the external Keycloak issuer.

**Close when:** reproducible stacks and an externally targeted conformance suite
exercise actual replacement providers, directory migration, claims and MFA;
record unchanged relying-party behavior and explicit migration limitations.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0022): partially closed.** The harness now runs. The
shell prerequisites are fixed (root `bin/`, `--basedn`, module-relative `go -C
src`, prerequisite checks before anything starts), the two missing compose files
exist and pass `docker compose config`, and `src/tests/conformance` reads
`KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER` and exercises a running issuer over HTTP — discovery,
profile authorization surface, published keys parsed under the runtime's own
rules, and, with credentials, a real token exchange verified against those keys.
It skips when the variable is unset, so `make test` is unchanged.

It was run against an actual Keycloak 26.0, not only asserted to work: discovery,
authorization surface and key checks passed, and a `client_credentials` exchange
against a created service client produced a token that verified against
Keycloak's published JWKS through `internal/jose`.

**Finding that bears on the replacement claim:** stock Keycloak fails
`TestExcludedGrantsAreNotAdvertised`. Its discovery advertises `implicit` and
`password` alongside the profile's grants, and those are server capabilities in
Keycloak rather than per-client toggles, so no realm configuration removes them.
A migrated Keycloak therefore presents a wider grant surface than KeyCape does.
This substantiates with evidence what SCOPE already said was unestablished, and
means Scenario B legitimately reports a failure today rather than a green run.

**Status 2026-09-08 (KEY-WP-0023): substantially closed.** Directory migration is
now proved end to end into a real directory: LLDAP -> export -> validate -> LDIF
-> ldapadd into OpenLDAP 1.5.0, every entry added without error and every member
value in the loaded directory resolving to an entry that exists. The migrated
Keycloak realm built from that same live export imported cleanly and served
discovery, with the migrated user carrying keycape.canonicalId. Both sides of the
swap are measured: KeyCape passes 5/5 conformance checks, a migrated Keycloak
passes 4/5, failing only the excluded-grant check.

Running it found four defects that the full unit suite passed over:

1. `Config.userOU()` defaulted to `ou=users` while LLDAP stores users under
   `ou=people`, and nothing set `UserOU`. LookupUser, ListUsers and
   ValidatePassword all derive from it, so every user search against a stock
   LLDAP silently found nothing — human login included. Exposed by an export that
   returned zero users while emitting a membership referencing uid=admin.
2. `raw_attributes_well_formed`, added in KEY-WP-0021, rejected the adapter's own
   `_validation_warning` annotation, so the exporter's output failed its own
   validation. Tooling annotations are now exempt and documented.
3. LDIF members kept their source DNs while entries were written to the target
   branch, so migrated groups referenced entries the target directory does not
   contain.
4. `groupOfNames` requires a member, so every empty group aborted the load. Empty
   groups — preserved deliberately since KEY-WP-0018 — now reference a placeholder
   entry the LDIF creates.

A fifth was a harness defect: `bitnami/openldap:2.6` does not exist, so the
compose file added in KEY-WP-0022 passed `docker compose config` and could not
start. That is the distance between a file that parses and a stack that runs.

Still open: no browser login was performed against the migrated realm, so
unchanged relying-party behaviour is not established, and MFA was not exercised.
Credential and MFA migration is a scope exclusion rather than a test gap — it is
not supplied, so no harness can demonstrate it. Subject continuity is explicitly
not preserved, which keycape-to-keycloak already reports.

### G05 — Directory export can omit data without reporting it

**Priority: medium. Kind: implementation gap.**

The [exporter](../src/internal/migration/lldapexport/exporter.go) discovers groups
through each user's memberships. Empty/unreferenced groups are not enumerated.
Group lookup errors are skipped even though a comment says they are recorded in
the incompatibility report. The emitted success event and report therefore do
not establish a complete export. Iterating the group map also leaves group order
unspecified.

**Close when:** enumerate all groups independently, report or fail on incomplete
reads, define ordering, and test empty groups and backend failures. Preserve
completeness evidence before claiming deterministic full snapshots.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0018): closed.** `LDAPAdapter` gained a
`ListGroups` enumeration over the group subtree, offered to the exporter through
an optional `domain.GroupLister` rather than by widening `UserRepository`, so
groups with no members are in the snapshot and `Group.Members` is populated from
the directory. Reading the adapter to write it surfaced a defect the assessment
had not listed: `LookupGroups` never set `Members`, and the exporter built every
membership from that field, so a real export's `memberships` block was always
empty while the fixture-backed tests passed. Each result now carries
`groupEnumeration` (`directory` or `membership-derived`) and a `Complete()`
predicate; a failed enumeration aborts instead of writing a smaller snapshot, a
failed per-user lookup on the fallback path is reported rather than dropped, an
incomplete run emits `partial` telemetry, and the CLI names the mode. Users,
groups and memberships are sorted on stable keys. Tests cover the empty group,
the enumeration failure, the fallback lookup failure and repeat-run determinism.
This is completeness evidence for the user/group/membership surface only —
credential migration remains out of scope under G03.

### G06 — The validator is narrower than schema enforcement

**Priority: medium. Kind: implementation/claim gap.**

[validator.go](../src/internal/validator/validator.go) implements useful structural
and semantic checks. However, `checkNoUnknownAttributes` is a placeholder that
rejects blank keys rather than enforcing an attribute allow-list; group
membership validation checks nonempty member IDs rather than complete referenced
identity existence. It does not derive its checks from the YAML schema.

**Close when:** implement the intended allow-list/reference constraints or narrow
the normative contract to the actual checks; add invalid-snapshot cases that
prove each stated rule. SCOPE now calls this limited snapshot validation.

**Status 2026-09-07 (KEY-WP-0021): closed.** The placeholder is replaced by
`raw_attributes_well_formed`, which requires each key to be a valid LDAP
attribute descriptor (RFC 4512 descr or numeric OID), forbids shadowing a
mapping the canonical model owns (uid, cn, mail) in any casing, and rejects two
keys differing only by case. `spec/ldap-schema.yaml` carries the same wording, so
the rule's name no longer overpromises. Invalid-snapshot cases cover every
constraint plus accepting legitimate raw attributes; neutering the rule fails
four of them.

Two corrections to this gap's own description. First, an allow-list of permitted
attribute names is not derivable: `ldapAttributes` is defined as the attributes
the canonical model does *not* cover, so the schema cannot enumerate what may
appear there — the constraints above are what is actually checkable. Second, the
reference constraint was already implemented: `checkValidGroupMemberships` does
only check emptiness, but the semantic rule `checkReferencedUsersExist` resolves
every member against the user set and fails on an unknown one. The rule existed
in a different function than the one this assessment examined.

Still not claimed: validation of attribute *values* against a directory schema.

### G07 — Optional tenant-role support is not wired into the server

**Priority: medium. Kind: integration gap.**

The [tenant-engine client](../src/internal/adapters/tenantengine/adapter.go) and
`TokenHandler.TenantEngine` are implemented and tested, including omission on
failure. [main.go](../src/cmd/keycape/main.go) supplies no such client and exposes
no configuration for it. The stock server therefore leaves it nil and omits
`tenant_roles`.

**Close when:** wire an explicit opt-in configuration and verify the built
executable, or document this as library-only support. It is an optional cache
claim, so absence is not itself a resource authorization failure.

**Status 2026-09-08 (KEY-WP-0024): closed.** A `tenantEngine` block with
`baseURL` and optional `timeout` now wires the client; an empty `baseURL` leaves
the stock server's behaviour unchanged. Verified in the built executable rather
than at the wiring: with a stub source a real token carries `tenant_roles`, with
no block the claim is absent, and with the source down issuance succeeds without
it — the documented fail-open path, confirmed end to end. Validation rejects an
unusable URL, an out-of-range timeout, and a timeout set without a base URL.

### G08 — Runtime lifecycle and readiness are intentionally minimal

**Priority: medium. Kind: operational maturity gap.**

[Authorization state](../src/internal/server/oidc/authorize.go),
[code sessions](../src/internal/server/oidc/session.go),
[login sessions](../src/internal/server/oidc/login_session.go) and
[handoffs](../src/internal/server/oidc/handoff.go) reside in memory. Restart loses
in-flight and login state; multi-replica behavior is not supported by a shared
store. `/healthz` in [main.go](../src/cmd/keycape/main.go) returns a constant process
response without testing dependencies. The server uses `ListenAndServe`; TLS
termination is external. The signing key and registrations load
at startup; a fixed `key-1` identifier is used by token issuance.

[Logout](../src/internal/server/oidc/logout.go) clears the local login session;
it is not upstream logout or JWT revocation. No general refresh/introspection/
revocation or automatic rotation service is exposed. These need explicit
operational limits rather than an unqualified “high stability” label.

**Close when:** document/test the supported deployment topology, readiness and
restart behavior, and coordinate key/client lifecycle and consumer refresh.
Shared storage or refresh tokens need not be added if the accepted profile
explicitly excludes them. Benchmark before asserting resource-efficiency bounds.

**Status 2026-09-08 (KEY-WP-0025): closed.** `/readyz` probes LLDAP (by bind, so
a revoked service password is caught), Authelia and privacyIDEA, with results
cached 2s and each probe bounded at 3s; `/healthz` stays liveness and probes
nothing, so a dependency blip cannot trigger a restart that also discards every
in-flight login. Failures name the check but not the reason, since the endpoint is
unauthenticated. `SIGTERM`/`SIGINT` drain in-flight requests for 15s. Verified in
the running executable: 503 with all three failed while `/healthz` returned 200,
the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across
a SIGTERM.

`docs/operations.md` states the single-replica topology and why, restart
behaviour, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant `key-1` key ID makes
same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS; removing a client does not
revoke its issued tokens; `/logout` is local only. No throughput or resource
figures are asserted, since nothing benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and
refresh tokens remain deliberately excluded.

### G09 — Packaging/bootstrap and older CLI credential handling need reconciliation

**Priority: medium. Kind: operational/tooling gap.**

[Development Compose](../docker-compose.dev.yml) refers to `config/dev-key.pem`
and `config/authelia`, neither supplied in the checkout. It is a scaffold requiring
bootstrap material. The [Dockerfile](../Dockerfile) packages only `keycape`, not
the migration/validator binaries. Image publication still points at the older
registry address in [.gitea/workflows/image.yaml](../.gitea/workflows/image.yaml);
that requires reconciliation with the Forgejo image location recorded by the
live workplan, not an assumption that every push deployed the current source.

The older [LLDAP exporter CLI](../src/cmd/lldap-export/main.go) accepts the bind
password on argv, and the migration scripts use that path. This falls short of
the newer caller CLI's private credential transport posture. Snapshot and realm
output are written with mode 0644, so operators must also consider identity-data
handling even though credential secrets are not part of those exports.

**Close when:** supply a reproducible bootstrap procedure, correct executable/
artifact locations and release references, and adopt safe credential input and
appropriate export permissions. A documented external bootstrap may satisfy
scope without storing secrets in this repository.

**Status 2026-09-08 (KEY-WP-0026): closed, with one item an operator must
confirm.** `scripts/bootstrap-dev.sh` generates the key and Authelia material the
dev stack mounts, all git-ignored and created under a restrictive umask rather
than chmodded after. The image now ships all five binaries, verified by running
each inside a built image. `lldap-export` prefers `KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW` or
`--bind-pw-file` and warns on the deprecated `--bind-pw`, which stays working for
existing runbooks; both migration scripts pass the password by environment. The
export, LDIF and realm artifacts are written `0600`.

The publish workflow now defaults to `forgejo.coulomb.social` rather than
`92.205.130.254:32166`, overridable by a repository variable. **This is the one
part not verifiable from here:** whether the runner resolves that name and
whether the registry credentials are valid for it can only be established by a
publish. If it fails, set the `REGISTRY` variable back to the address.

### G10 — Source capability is ahead of live custody and consumer adoption

**Priority: high for rollout; medium for handoff hygiene. Kind: external dependency/proof gap.**

[KEY-WP-0013](../workplans/KEY-WP-0013-approval-engine-resource-audience.md) records
approval clients awaiting custody admission, exact human callback and live proof.
Its earlier deployment observation identifies `main-153258b`, not the assessed
source revision. The [provisioning packet](../docs/approval-engine-provisioning-request.yaml)
is proposed metadata, not executable authorization or a live registration.

[KEY-WP-0014](../workplans/KEY-WP-0014-native-credential-lane-handoff.md) records
native JWT commands as implemented, but coordinated Qonto rotation and consumer
handoff remain open. The existing ops-warden login route obtains an **OpenBao
token**, so replacing it with issuer-JWT output would change the consumer
contract. [KEY-WP-0009](../workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md)
was reopened because claimed handoff delivery lacks matching current receipts.

**Close when:** named custody/platform owners admit and provision exact lanes,
register the real callback, deploy and verify the new contracts, reconcile token
types at consumer boundaries, and retain handoff receipts. Repo-local source
changes cannot alone establish these outcomes.

**Status 2026-09-08 (KEY-WP-0027): still open, and correctly so.** The handoff
hygiene half is discharged: all seven messages are present in the hub with
receipt ids, verified independently rather than taken on trust, since this gap
was reopened once for exactly that reason. No replies yet.

Live state observed read-only rather than remembered: image `main-153258b`,
only the Qonto secret materialized (so the two approval clients remain
unprovisioned), four registered clients, no `tenantEngine` block. An earlier
claim of mine is corrected there: the deployed config sets `userOU: "ou=people"`
explicitly, so the KEY-WP-0023 default fix was never a production issue.

**Rollout precondition found in this repository's own work.** Upstream
verification (KEY-WP-0019) discovers the expected issuer from
`authelia.tokenBaseURL`, and the deployed Authelia derives its advertised issuer
from the request Host — in-cluster it advertises
`http://authelia.sso.svc.cluster.local:9091`, browser-facing
`http://auth.coulomb.social`. Verification fails closed, so a mismatch breaks
every human login and presents as a broken login rather than a misconfiguration.
Which value the token carries was not settled, because doing so needs a real
login against production. `docs/operations.md` documents pinning
`authelia.issuer`/`jwksUrl`, and the failure now reports a specific
`id_token_issuer_mismatch` reason so it is diagnosable in seconds.

The rest is owner work and stays open.

## Deliberate exclusions are not defects

INTENT excludes general-purpose IAM, weakened flows and expanded-mode operations.
Dynamic registration, implicit/password grants, wildcard redirects and arbitrary
brokering should stay excluded unless the accepted profile changes. Resource
policy decisions and secret custody likewise remain with their owners.

The meaningful gaps are incomplete delivery or proof of the repo's claimed
subset, plus unqualified maturity claims. Full Keycloak feature parity, building
an authorization engine, or taking over OpenBao is not the proposed remedy.

## Recommended order

1. Resolve G01 protocol bindings and G02 canonical contract drift before claiming
   complete profile conformance or widening rollout.
2. Treat G03–G06 as a migration workstream: completeness and semantic preservation
   first, then actual provider-replacement proof.
3. Decide G07 opt-in wiring and document/test the G08 supported topology.
4. Reconcile G09 bootstrap/release paths and complete G10 owner admissions and
   live proof. Do not confuse passing local tests with those handoffs.

The findings above are an assessment backlog, not completed fixes or newly
approved production changes. Existing workplan references are retained where
applicable; new engineering work needs scoped implementation plans. This task
changes documentation only.