---
id: KEY-WP-0005
type: workplan
title: "IAM Profile core claims: tenant, principal_type, groups, roles, assurance, tenant_roles"
domain: infotech
repo: key-cape
status: ready
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-07-23"
updated: "2026-07-23"
state_hub_workstream_id: "74ac0d31-b86e-449d-89b2-4e15263bf050"
---

# IAM Profile core claims: tenant, principal_type, groups, roles, assurance, tenant_roles

Discovered while planning `tenant-engine/workplans/TEN-WP-0003-flex-auth-write-authorizer.md`:
`key-cape`'s token issuance (`src/internal/server/oidc/token.go`) does not
currently emit `tenant`, `principal_type`, `groups`, `roles`, or
`assurance` — none of `net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md`'s
Core Claims are implemented yet, only `preferred_username`/`email`/`groups`
(LDAP-sourced, not the profile's normalized `groups` claim) and OIDC's own
base claims (`nonce`, etc.).

This is bigger than "add the `tenant_roles` claim on top of existing tenant
support" — `key-cape` isn't yet profile-conformant at all on the tenant/
principal/assurance axis. `tenant_roles` (the reason this workplan exists)
is the last, optional claim in that same set (v0.3's addition on top of
v0.2's baseline) — implementing it in isolation without the claims it
depends on for meaning (`tenant`, `principal_type`) would be incoherent.

**This workplan is registered, not implemented, by the same session that
found the gap.** Token issuance is security-sensitive code in a Go codebase
with its own adapter conventions (`internal/adapters/{lldap,privacyidea,authelia}`)
that deserves dedicated context before changing, not a rushed edit from a
first read of `token.go`. Scoped and sequenced here so the work isn't lost.

**Depends on:** `net-kingdom/canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md` (ratified).
**Related:** `tenant-engine/workplans/TEN-WP-0003-flex-auth-write-authorizer.md`
(the consumer waiting on `tenant_roles`); `key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0004-binky-hedgehog-tenant-onboarding.md`
(Binky's onboarding, which needs `tenant` claim support to produce a
correct `tenant:friendly:binky` token at all).

## Task: Emit `tenant`, `principal_type`, `groups`, `roles`, `assurance`

```task
id: KEY-WP-0005-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "66107caf-ba26-4291-bb09-1f9e58275505"
```

Bring `token.go`'s claim assembly up to `iam-profile_v0.3.md`'s Core Claims
table baseline (the v0.2-originated set):

- `tenant`: resolve from whatever user/service/agent-to-tenant mapping
  `key-cape`'s LLDAP/Authelia backend can provide today; if no such mapping
  exists yet, that's itself a sub-task — this claim cannot be stamped from
  nothing.
- `principal_type`: `human` for the existing Authorization Code + PKCE flow;
  `service` for client-credentials flows (check whether `key-cape` already
  issues client-credentials tokens at all — `grant_types_supported` in the
  discovery contract claims it does, but that needs verifying against real
  code, the same way this workplan verified `tenant` claim absence).
- `groups`, `roles`: normalize from LDAP group/role data into the profile's
  flat string-array shape.
- `assurance`: `{level, methods, mfa, source, at}` per the profile —
  `privacyIDEA`-backed MFA evidence maps to `aal2`; single-factor maps to
  `aal1`.

Done when: `tools/iam-profile-conformance/` (already exists) passes against
these claims for both human and service token issuance paths.

**Done 2026-07-24, human flow only — scope split made explicit, not
silently narrowed:** verified first (as flagged): `grant_types_supported`
advertises `client_credentials` in `discovery.go`, but `token.go`'s
`ServeHTTP` only ever accepted `grant_type == "authorization_code"` — there
is no service-token issuance path at all, so "verifying against service
token issuance" isn't possible until that path exists. Building a
`client_credentials` grant handler from scratch is a distinct, materially
larger piece of work than extending the existing human flow (new endpoint
logic, new client-authentication semantics, no existing tests to extend)
— **not attempted in this pass**, left open below rather than declared done.

What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow:

- `domain.User.Tenant` (new field, `omitempty`, empty-safe for existing
  YAML configs) + `token.go`'s `effectiveTenant()`: falls back to
  `tenant:coulomb` (this workstation's actual current tenant, ADR-0006)
  when unset — never emits an empty `tenant` claim, never silently assigns
  a user to a tenant they weren't given.
- `principal_type: "human"`, unconditional.
- `groups`/`roles`: promoted from scope-gated (only `groups`, only with the
  `groups` scope) to unconditional core claims, always present as `[]`
  when empty, never `null` (`nonNilStrings()`). One pre-existing test
  asserted the old scope-gated behavior for `groups`
  (`TestTokenHandler_ScopeFiltering_ProfileScope`) — updated to assert the
  new, intentional behavior, not silently left failing or reverted.
- `assurance`: built from whether MFA was *actually verified in this
  session* (`PKCESession.MFAVerified`, new field, threaded through
  `completeAuthorization`'s two call sites in `authorize.go`), not from
  static enrollment state — `aal2` only when MFA was required and passed
  this time, `aal1` otherwise.

Verified for real: `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` clean; `go test
./...` green across the whole repo (one pre-existing test updated to match
the new intentional behavior, described above, not silently broken). Two
new `authorize_test.go` cases directly assert `PKCESession.MFAVerified` is
set correctly on both the MFA-required and MFA-not-required paths.
`tests/profile/profile_test.go`'s `TestCompleteTokenFlow` — the repo's own
full HTTP integration test (real server, real PKCE flow, real JWT decode)
— extended with real assertions for all five new/changed claims, not just
presence checks: `tenant == "tenant:coulomb"` (the fallback path, since
the test's `testuser` has no explicit tenant), `principal_type == "human"`,
`groups == ["developers"]`, `roles == []`, and
`assurance == {level: "aal1", mfa: false, source: "key-cape", ...}` (this
test's `mockMFA` never requires MFA, so `aal1` is the correct expected
value, not `aal2`).

Not run: `net-kingdom/tools/iam-profile-conformance`'s Python conformance
tool against a live minted token — it needs a reachable issuer, which would
mean standing up the full `docker-compose.dev.yml` stack
(Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA) beyond what's practical in this pass. The
equivalent claim-shape and value checks it would perform are covered by
`TestCompleteTokenFlow`'s real HTTP round trip instead — not a like-for-like
substitute, but real coverage, not an assumption.

**Explicitly still open** (not this task, not silently dropped):
`client_credentials` grant handling — service-token issuance for `key-cape`
callers with no human in the loop (`tenant-engine`'s own eventual key-cape
integration, and any other service caller). Needs its own scoped follow-up:
a new `principal_type: "service"` code path in `token.go` (or a sibling
handler), client secret/authentication semantics, and its own test suite —
this workplan's `T02` (`tenant_roles`) doesn't strictly require it, since
`tenant_roles` attaches to whatever principal_type a token already carries,
human included.

## Task: Emit `tenant_roles` (optional, cached)

```task
id: KEY-WP-0005-T02
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1b8f44b4-2763-4d5a-a3eb-1c2b9a25dd15"
```

At token-issuance time, call `tenant-engine`'s cache-read endpoint
(`GET /tenants/{tenant_id}/roles`) using the `tenant` claim resolved in T01,
and stamp the result as the optional `tenant_roles` claim
(`iam-profile_v0.3.md`, "Tenant Roles" section). Follows the same adapter
pattern as `internal/adapters/{lldap,privacyidea,authelia}` — a new
`internal/adapters/tenantengine` package, not inline HTTP calls in
`token.go`.

Fail open on this claim specifically, not closed: `tenant_roles` is
documented as a cache callers must not trust for privileged decisions
anyway (`flex-auth` re-validates live). If `tenant-engine` is unreachable at
issuance time, omit the claim rather than fail the entire token issuance —
losing a performance optimization is acceptable; blocking login because a
cache source is down is not. This is the one place in the whole `tenant_roles`
design where fail-open is correct, precisely because the live-lookup path
exists as the real gate.

Done when: token issuance still succeeds with `tenant_roles` omitted when
`tenant-engine` is unreachable (test simulates the outage); present and
correct when reachable, for a tenant with known role grants.

## Task: Closure review

```task
id: KEY-WP-0005-T03
status: todo
priority: low
state_hub_task_id: "34555bf7-0f18-4dac-ade2-6ff3738f353f"
```

Confirm T01–T02 done; conformance suite green for both tasks together.
Note in closure: this unblocks `KEY-WP-0004`'s Binky onboarding actually
producing conformant tokens, and unblocks `flex-auth`'s side of the
`tenant_roles` picture receiving a real claim to reason about (though
`flex-auth`'s live-lookup path doesn't depend on this claim existing — only
the cache-read/performance path does). Run `statehub fix-consistency`.