tegwick
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KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay blocked on custody and on ops-warden, but each contains a KeyCape-owned piece that had been left as prose. T02 requires proving "live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values"; T04 step 4 requires verifying a rotated secret, refusing its predecessor and refusing excess scope. Both were describable and neither was runnable, so the proof would have been improvised by hand against production at the moment custody lands -- the worst possible time for it. keycape verify-client does it in one command. Per registration it checks discovery origin, the client_credentials exchange and its RS256 signature against the deployed JWKS, exact sub/tenant/roles/principal_type, that every -deny-scope is refused, and that the token carries no scope that was not requested. That last check is a real gap: the caller commands prove every requested scope was granted, never that nothing extra came back. -previous-secret-env additionally requires the predecessor to be refused, and treats an unchanged secret as a rotation that did not happen. Nothing is written to disk and no value is printed. Failures name the claim, not the observed value, so running this against production cannot turn a verification into a disclosure. Every check runs before it reports, so one failure does not hide the rest. The exact invocation for each approval client is recorded in the verification block of the provisioning packet, so custody admission hands back a command rather than a description. Tests cover the passing case, an over-broad registration, a live predecessor, an identical rotation and output non-disclosure; neutering mustFail makes the suite fail, so the checks have teeth. Also recorded in KEY-WP-0014: read from ops-warden's catalog rather than waiting for a reply, key-cape-oidc-login is asked-and-waiting on us since 2026-08-28 and is a pointer lane with no programmatic consumers, and the rapp-qonto-keycape-client blocker citing an absent native exchange command went stale when service-token shipped on 2026-09-05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1182213@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 966597b9-ae61-46a4-8b9e-1594ab3ec4ad
68 lines
3.5 KiB
YAML
68 lines
3.5 KiB
YAML
# Proposed non-secret admission packet. This is not executable authorization.
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# Tenant for both requests is tenant:platform per decision
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# 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6 (landlord zone). Exact spelling required
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# across the approval store, these JWT claims and the lifecycle CheckRequest;
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# no alias to platform or tenant:coulomb.
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status: awaiting-custody-admission
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owner: key-cape
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resource_audience: approval-engine
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issuer: https://kc.coulomb.social
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registration_source: config/service-clients.example.yaml
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requests:
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- client_id: secrets-engine-approval
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subject: service:secrets-engine
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tenant: tenant:platform
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scopes: [approval:read, approval:consume]
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lifetime: 15m
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proposed_openbao_path: platform/workloads/secrets-engine/approval-client
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field: client_secret
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proposed_kubernetes_secret: sso/keycape-secrets-engine-approval-client
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kubernetes_key: client-secret
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keycape_environment: KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET
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custody_owner: railiance-platform
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consumer: secrets-engine
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- client_id: approval-engine-operator
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subject: service:approval-engine-operator
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tenant: tenant:platform
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scopes: [approval:create, approval:read, approval:approve, approval:revoke, approval:supersede, approval:observe, approval:emit]
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lifetime: 15m
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proposed_openbao_path: platform/workloads/approval-engine/operator-client
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field: client_secret
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proposed_kubernetes_secret: sso/keycape-approval-engine-operator-client
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kubernetes_key: client-secret
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keycape_environment: KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET
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custody_owner: railiance-platform
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consumer: approval-engine-operator
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human_registration:
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status: awaiting-exact-callback
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scopes: [openid, approval:approve]
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mfa_required: true
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client_type: public
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verification:
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# The first two lines are now one runnable command per client; see
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# docs/native-authentication.md, "Verifying a live registration". It writes
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# nothing and prints no value, so it is safe to run against production.
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- command: |
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keycape verify-client -issuer https://kc.coulomb.social
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-client-id secrets-engine-approval -audience approval-engine
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-scope "approval:read approval:consume"
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-secret-env KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET
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-expect-subject service:secrets-engine -expect-tenant tenant:platform
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-expect-roles secrets-engine
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-deny-scope "approval:approve approval:revoke approval:supersede"
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- command: |
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keycape verify-client -issuer https://kc.coulomb.social
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-client-id approval-engine-operator -audience approval-engine
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-scope "approval:create approval:read approval:approve approval:revoke approval:supersede approval:observe approval:emit"
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-secret-env KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET
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-expect-subject service:approval-engine-operator -expect-tenant tenant:platform
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-expect-roles approval-operator
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-deny-scope "approval:consume"
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- Check KeyCape and consumer readiness without emitting secrets or tokens.
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- Preserve existing registrations and signing key; record versions and image digest.
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- Human consume denial is approval-engine's to verify at its resource; KeyCape
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proves only that the human client is never issued a consume grant.
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blockers:
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- Admit exact custody paths, field delivery, consumer identities and lifecycle authority.
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- Resolve attended first-provision authority through the custody owner.
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- Supply exact human client ID and callback URI.
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