key-cape/src/cmd/keycape/main.go
tegwick d568b79223
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Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits
Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server
called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of
in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments
rather than anywhere an operator would look.

/readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and
probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency
health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a
restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the
condition it reacts to.

LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked
service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what
readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the
failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream
error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are
cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded
upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung
dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it.

SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write
timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL.

docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits
easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for
consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and
/logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here
benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08
allows.

Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while
/healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40
requests succeeding across a SIGTERM.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 09:43:49 +02:00

425 lines
14 KiB
Go

// keycape is the main server binary for the KeyCape IAM profile service.
// It orchestrates Authelia, LLDAP, and privacyIDEA to implement the
// NetKingdom IAM Profile (OIDC/PKCE Authorization Code Flow).
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"flag"
"fmt"
"keycape/internal/server/readiness"
"net/http"
"os"
"os/signal"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/rs/zerolog"
"keycape/internal/adapters/authelia"
"keycape/internal/adapters/lldap"
"keycape/internal/adapters/privacyidea"
"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
"keycape/internal/authclient"
"keycape/internal/config"
"keycape/internal/domain"
servererrors "keycape/internal/server/errors"
"keycape/internal/server/oidc"
"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
)
const version = "0.1.0"
func main() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && (os.Args[1] == "login" || os.Args[1] == "service-token") {
if err := authclient.Run(context.Background(), os.Args[1:], os.Stderr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
return
}
log := zerolog.New(os.Stdout).With().Timestamp().Logger()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 1. Parse flags and load config.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
var cfgPath string
flag.StringVar(&cfgPath, "config", "", "path to YAML config file (env: KEYCAPE_CONFIG)")
flag.Parse()
cfg, err := config.Load(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to load config")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 2. Validate config.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg)
if len(errs) > 0 {
log.Error().Strs("errors", errs).Msg("config validation failed")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 3. Load RSA private key.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
privateKey, err := loadPrivateKey(cfg.PrivateKeyPEM)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("path", cfg.PrivateKeyPEM).Msg("failed to load private key")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 4. Build JWKS from public key.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
ks := oidc.NewKeySet()
ks.AddKey("key-1", &privateKey.PublicKey)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 5. Build client registry.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
clients, err := buildClientRegistry(cfg.Clients)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to build client registry")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 6. Create adapters.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
lldapAdapter := lldap.New(cfg.LLDAP)
autheliaAdapter := authelia.New(cfg.Authelia, nil)
privacyIDEAAdapter := privacyidea.New(cfg.PrivacyIDEA, nil)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 7. Create telemetry emitter.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
emitter := telemetry.NewLogEmitter(log)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 8. Create enforcement registry.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
enforcement := servererrors.DefaultRegistry()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 9. Create session store.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 10. Parse token lifetime.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
tokenLifetime := 15 * time.Minute
if cfg.TokenLifetime != "" {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.TokenLifetime)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("tokenLifetime", cfg.TokenLifetime).Msg("invalid tokenLifetime")
os.Exit(1)
}
tokenLifetime = d
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 11. Build issuer base URL.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
issuer := strings.TrimRight(cfg.Issuer, "/")
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 12. Register HTTP handlers.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
mux := http.NewServeMux()
// Discovery.
mux.Handle("/.well-known/openid-configuration", oidc.NewDiscoveryHandler(oidc.DiscoveryConfig{
Issuer: issuer,
AuthorizationEndpoint: issuer + "/authorize",
TokenEndpoint: issuer + "/token",
JWKSUri: issuer + "/jwks",
UserinfoEndpoint: issuer + "/userinfo",
EndSessionEndpoint: issuer + "/logout",
Clients: clients,
}))
// JWKS.
mux.Handle("/jwks", oidc.NewJWKSHandler(ks))
// Authorize handler (with enforcement middleware).
logins := oidc.NewLoginSessionStore()
authorizeHandler := &oidc.AuthorizeHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Auth: autheliaAdapter,
MFA: privacyIDEAAdapter,
Sessions: sessions,
Logins: logins,
Handoffs: oidc.NewHandoffStore(),
Issuer: issuer,
Emitter: emitter,
}
mux.Handle("/authorize", enforcement.Middleware(authorizeHandler))
mux.Handle("/authorize/callback", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/authorize/return", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/authorize/register", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/logout", &oidc.LogoutHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Logins: logins,
SecureCookie: strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(issuer), "https://"),
})
// Token handler (with enforcement middleware).
tokenHandler := &oidc.TokenHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Sessions: sessions,
Users: lldapAdapter,
SigningKey: privateKey,
Issuer: issuer,
TokenLifetime: tokenLifetime,
Emitter: emitter,
// Opt-in: nil unless tenantEngine.baseURL is configured, which is what
// leaves tenant_roles off the stock server (KEY-WP-0024). The adapter
// fails open, so a configured-but-unreachable cache omits the claim
// rather than failing issuance.
TenantEngine: buildTenantEngine(cfg.TenantEngine),
}
mux.Handle("/token", enforcement.Middleware(tokenHandler))
// Userinfo handler.
mux.Handle("/userinfo", &oidc.UserinfoHandler{
Users: lldapAdapter,
SigningKey: &privateKey.PublicKey,
Issuer: issuer,
Emitter: emitter,
})
// Healthz.
// /readyz gates traffic on the dependencies a login needs; /healthz stays a
// liveness signal (KEY-WP-0025). Restarting KeyCape because LLDAP blinked
// would convert a dependency blip into an outage of our own, so the two must
// not be the same endpoint.
mux.Handle("/readyz", readiness.New(2*time.Second, 3*time.Second,
readiness.Check{Name: "lldap", Probe: func(ctx context.Context) error {
return lldapAdapter.Ping(ctx)
}},
readiness.Check{Name: "authelia", Probe: httpReachable(cfg.Authelia.TokenBaseURL, cfg.Authelia.BaseURL)},
readiness.Check{Name: "privacyidea", Probe: httpReachable(cfg.PrivacyIDEA.BaseURL)},
))
// Liveness only: this says the process is up, and deliberately probes
// nothing. See /readyz.
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
"status": "ok",
"version": version,
})
})
// Inject emitter into request context.
handler := withEmitter(mux, emitter)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 13. Start HTTP server.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", cfg.Port)
if cfg.Port == 0 {
addr = ":8080"
}
log.Info().
Str("issuer", issuer).
Str("addr", addr).
Str("environment", cfg.Environment).
Str("version", version).
Msg("starting keycape server")
srv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: handler,
ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
}
// Serve in the background so shutdown can be driven by a signal. Without
// this the process died on SIGTERM mid-request, so every rolling restart
// returned errors to whoever was logging in at that moment.
serveErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
serveErr <- err
return
}
serveErr <- nil
}()
signals := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(signals, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
select {
case err := <-serveErr:
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("server error")
os.Exit(1)
}
case sig := <-signals:
log.Info().Str("signal", sig.String()).Msg("shutting down")
// In-flight requests get a bounded window to finish. In-memory login and
// authorization state does not survive this and is not meant to: a
// browser mid-login must start again after a restart. That is a
// documented limit of the single-replica topology, not a bug to paper
// over here -- see docs/operations.md.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), shutdownGrace)
defer cancel()
if err := srv.Shutdown(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("graceful shutdown failed; exiting anyway")
os.Exit(1)
}
log.Info().Msg("shutdown complete")
}
}
// shutdownGrace bounds how long in-flight requests may finish after a signal.
// Kept under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the
// window an orchestrator typically allows before sending SIGKILL.
const shutdownGrace = 15 * time.Second
// httpReachable probes the first non-empty URL with a GET, reporting whether the
// dependency answered at all. It is a reachability check, not a functional one:
// any HTTP response means something is listening and speaking HTTP there.
func httpReachable(candidates ...string) func(context.Context) error {
target := ""
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if candidate != "" {
target = candidate
break
}
}
return func(ctx context.Context) error {
if target == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no endpoint configured")
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, target, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
return nil
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// loadPrivateKey reads a PEM file and parses the RSA private key.
// Supports both PKCS#1 ("RSA PRIVATE KEY") and PKCS#8 ("PRIVATE KEY") PEM blocks.
func loadPrivateKey(path string) (*rsa.PrivateKey, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read key file: %w", err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no PEM block found in %q", path)
}
switch block.Type {
case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse PKCS1 private key: %w", err)
}
return key, nil
case "PRIVATE KEY":
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse PKCS8 private key: %w", err)
}
rsaKey, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("private key is not an RSA key")
}
return rsaKey, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected PEM block type %q; expected RSA PRIVATE KEY or PRIVATE KEY", block.Type)
}
}
// buildClientRegistry converts []ClientConfig into the map used by handlers.
func buildClientRegistry(cfgClients []config.ClientConfig) (map[string]*domain.Client, error) {
m := make(map[string]*domain.Client, len(cfgClients))
for i := range cfgClients {
c := &cfgClients[i]
clientSecret := ""
var clientTokenLifetime time.Duration
if strings.HasPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:") {
envName := strings.TrimPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:")
clientSecret = os.Getenv(envName)
if clientSecret == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q secret environment variable %q is empty", c.ClientID, envName)
}
}
if c.TokenLifetime != "" {
parsedLifetime, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(c.TokenLifetime)
if parseErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q tokenLifetime is invalid: %w", c.ClientID, parseErr)
}
clientTokenLifetime = parsedLifetime
}
m[c.ClientID] = &domain.Client{
ClientID: c.ClientID,
DisplayName: c.DisplayName,
RedirectURIs: c.RedirectURIs,
AllowedScopes: c.AllowedScopes,
GrantTypes: c.GrantTypes,
ClientType: c.ClientType,
SecretRef: c.SecretRef,
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
Audience: c.Audience,
ServiceSubject: c.ServiceSubject,
Tenant: c.Tenant,
Roles: c.Roles,
TokenLifetime: clientTokenLifetime,
MFARequired: c.MFARequired,
RegistrationURL: c.RegistrationURL,
EnrollmentURL: c.EnrollmentURL,
}
}
return m, nil
}
// withEmitter wraps a handler to inject the telemetry emitter into every request context.
func withEmitter(next http.Handler, e telemetry.Emitter) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := telemetry.WithEmitter(context.Background(), e)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// buildTenantEngine returns the tenant_roles cache client, or nil when the
// claim is not configured. Validation has already accepted the URL and timeout.
func buildTenantEngine(cfg config.TenantEngineConfig) *tenantengine.Client {
if cfg.BaseURL == "" {
return nil
}
var httpClient *http.Client
if cfg.Timeout != "" {
if timeout, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Timeout); err == nil {
httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
}
}
return tenantengine.New(cfg.BaseURL, httpClient)
}