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G10 waits on custody and platform owners and cannot close from here. What was doable: verify the handoffs actually went out, replace a remembered live state with an observed one, and find out whether main is safe to deploy. The last question found a defect in this repository's own recent work. Handoffs verified independently rather than trusted: all seven messages are in the hub with receipt ids. This gap was reopened once for claimed-but-unsent delivery, so the claim deserved the same scrutiny. Live state read from the cluster read-only: image main-153258b, only the Qonto secret materialized so the approval clients remain unprovisioned, four registered clients, no tenantEngine block. That also corrects an earlier claim of mine -- the deployed config sets userOU explicitly, so the KEY-WP-0023 default fix was never a production issue. The precondition: KEY-WP-0019 discovers the expected issuer from authelia.tokenBaseURL, and the deployed Authelia derives its advertised issuer from the request Host, advertising the in-cluster address to KeyCape and the browser-facing one to browsers. Verification fails closed, so a mismatch breaks every human login and looks like a broken login rather than a misconfiguration. Which value the token carries needs a real login against production to settle and was not determined here. Two mitigations: docs/operations.md documents pinning authelia.issuer and jwksUrl, with the curl that reveals what the provider advertises for a given Host; and the authentication failure event now carries a specific reason, so id_token_issuer_mismatch is distinguishable from a signature failure or an unreachable key set. The browser still learns nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
234 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
234 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
package authelia
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"keycape/internal/domain"
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"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
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)
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// AutheliaAdapter implements domain.AuthProvider by delegating to Authelia's
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// OIDC endpoints. All Authelia tokens and cookies are confined to this package.
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type AutheliaAdapter struct {
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cfg Config
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client HTTPClient
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verifier *idTokenVerifier
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}
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// New returns a production-ready AutheliaAdapter.
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// If httpClient is nil the default net/http.Client is used.
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func New(cfg Config, httpClient HTTPClient) *AutheliaAdapter {
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if httpClient == nil {
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httpClient = defaultHTTPClient
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}
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a := &AutheliaAdapter{cfg: cfg, client: httpClient}
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a.verifier = newIDTokenVerifier(cfg, httpClient, a.tokenBaseURL())
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return a
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// domain.AuthProvider implementation
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// AuthorizeURL builds the Authelia OIDC authorization URL to which the user
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// should be redirected.
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//
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// KeyCape is a confidential OIDC client to Authelia. The adapter always uses
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// its own registered client_id and redirect_uri — NOT the downstream client's
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// values — and requests the full fixed scope set. PKCE is omitted because
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// the confidential client_secret authenticates the token exchange instead.
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func (a *AutheliaAdapter) AuthorizeURL(_ context.Context, req domain.AuthRequest) (string, error) {
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base := strings.TrimRight(a.authorizeBaseURL(), "/") + "/api/oidc/authorization"
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q := url.Values{}
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q.Set("client_id", a.cfg.ClientID)
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q.Set("redirect_uri", a.cfg.RedirectURI)
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q.Set("response_type", "code")
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q.Set("state", req.State)
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q.Set("scope", "openid profile email groups")
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return base + "?" + q.Encode(), nil
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}
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// HandleCallback exchanges the authorization code for tokens and extracts the
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// authenticated user identity. Authelia tokens are never returned — only the
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// normalized AuthResult is.
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func (a *AutheliaAdapter) HandleCallback(ctx context.Context, params domain.CallbackParams) (*domain.AuthResult, error) {
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emitter := telemetry.EmitterFromContext(ctx)
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// Surface callback-level errors from Authelia immediately.
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if params.Error != "" {
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emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
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Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
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EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
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Endpoint: "/api/oidc/token",
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Result: "failure",
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ErrorType: params.Error,
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})
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return nil, domain.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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// Exchange the authorization code for tokens.
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tokenResp, err := a.exchangeCode(ctx, params.Code)
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if err != nil {
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emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
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Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
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EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
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Endpoint: "/api/oidc/token",
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Result: "failure",
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ErrorType: "token_exchange_error",
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})
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return nil, domain.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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// Verify the ID token before trusting any claim in it: signature against
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// Authelia's published keys, expected issuer, our own client ID in the
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// audience, and a sane validity window (KEY-WP-0019). This fails closed --
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// an unreachable or unparseable key set denies the login rather than
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// falling back to unverified claims.
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claims, err := a.verifier.Verify(ctx, tokenResp.IDToken)
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if err != nil {
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emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
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Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
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EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
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Endpoint: "/api/oidc/token",
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Result: "failure",
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// Name which check failed: an issuer mismatch from a provider that
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// derives its issuer from the request Host is a misconfiguration,
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// not an attack, and is indistinguishable from one without this.
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ErrorType: FailureReason(err),
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})
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return nil, domain.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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// Extract username: prefer preferred_username, fall back to sub.
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username := stringClaim(claims, "preferred_username")
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if username == "" {
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username = stringClaim(claims, "sub")
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}
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if username == "" {
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emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
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Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
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EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
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Endpoint: "/api/oidc/token",
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Result: "failure",
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ErrorType: "missing_username_claim",
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})
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return nil, domain.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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// Security boundary: only the ID token claims are forwarded.
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// The access_token and refresh_token remain within this adapter.
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return &domain.AuthResult{
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Username: username,
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Claims: claims,
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}, nil
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Internal helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// tokenResponse is the subset of the Authelia token endpoint response that
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// this adapter needs. Fields beyond IDToken are intentionally not forwarded.
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type tokenResponse struct {
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IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
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}
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// exchangeCode sends a POST to Authelia's token endpoint and returns the
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// parsed token response. On any HTTP or status error it returns a non-nil error.
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func (a *AutheliaAdapter) exchangeCode(_ context.Context, code string) (*tokenResponse, error) {
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tokenURL := strings.TrimRight(a.tokenBaseURL(), "/") + "/api/oidc/token"
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body := url.Values{}
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body.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
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body.Set("code", code)
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body.Set("redirect_uri", a.cfg.RedirectURI)
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body.Set("client_id", a.cfg.ClientID)
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, tokenURL, strings.NewReader(body.Encode()))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: build token request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
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req.SetBasicAuth(a.cfg.ClientID, a.cfg.ClientSecret)
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resp, err := a.client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: token exchange: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: token endpoint returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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raw, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: read token response: %w", err)
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}
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var tr tokenResponse
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tr); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: decode token response: %w", err)
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}
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return &tr, nil
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}
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func (a *AutheliaAdapter) authorizeBaseURL() string {
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if a.cfg.BrowserBaseURL != "" {
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return a.cfg.BrowserBaseURL
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}
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return a.cfg.BaseURL
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}
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func (a *AutheliaAdapter) tokenBaseURL() string {
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if a.cfg.TokenBaseURL != "" {
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return a.cfg.TokenBaseURL
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}
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return a.cfg.BaseURL
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}
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// parseIDTokenClaims extracts the JWT payload claims without verifying
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// anything. It is NOT part of the authentication path: HandleCallback verifies
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// through idTokenVerifier. Kept for tests and diagnostics that need to read a
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// token's payload without asserting it is trustworthy.
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func parseIDTokenClaims(idToken string) (map[string]interface{}, error) {
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parts := strings.Split(idToken, ".")
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if len(parts) != 3 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: malformed id_token: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
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}
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payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: decode id_token payload: %w", err)
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}
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var claims map[string]interface{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("authelia: unmarshal id_token claims: %w", err)
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}
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return claims, nil
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}
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// stringClaim extracts a string value from a claims map, returning "" if
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// the key is absent or the value is not a string.
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func stringClaim(claims map[string]interface{}, key string) string {
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v, ok := claims[key]
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if !ok {
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return ""
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}
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s, ok := v.(string)
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if !ok {
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return ""
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}
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return s
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}
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