key-cape/config/service-clients.example.yaml

# Non-secret static registration fragments for KeyCape's bounded JWT consumers. Merge these entries into the deployment-owned KeyCape config.
# The named environment variables must be materialized by an approved
# out-of-repository custody path; this file never contains their values.
clients:
  - clientId: "codex-railiance-platform"
    displayName: "Railiance platform coding agent"
    allowedScopes: ["openbao:login"]
    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
    clientType: "confidential"
    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_CODEX_RAILIANCE_PLATFORM_CLIENT_SECRET"
    serviceSubject: "service:codex:railiance-platform"
    tenant: "tenant:platform"
    roles: ["coding-agent"]
    tokenLifetime: "15m"

  - clientId: "secrets-engine-openbao"
    displayName: "secrets-engine OpenBao login"
    allowedScopes: ["openbao:login"]
    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
    clientType: "confidential"
    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_OPENBAO_CLIENT_SECRET"
    serviceSubject: "service:secrets-engine"
    tenant: "tenant:platform"
    roles: ["secrets-engine"]
    tokenLifetime: "15m"

  - clientId: "secrets-engine-approval"
    displayName: "secrets-engine approval consume client"
    audience: "approval-engine"
    allowedScopes: ["approval:read", "approval:consume"]
    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
    clientType: "confidential"
    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_APPROVAL_CLIENT_SECRET"
    serviceSubject: "service:secrets-engine"
    # Landlord-zone platform tenant, decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6.
    # Exact spelling; no alias to tenant:coulomb. See docs/tenant-claim-contract.md.
    tenant: "tenant:platform"
    roles: ["secrets-engine"]
    tokenLifetime: "15m"

  # WITHDRAWN BY THE REQUESTING OWNER, 2026-09-09. approval-engine asked that this
  # client not be provisioned: nothing in their repository obtains an OAuth token,
  # and scope by scope the bundle does not describe a single actor —
  # approval:approve now belongs to the informed-decision human client,
  # approval:emit is redundant (the server emits its own heartbeat with no token),
  # and no requester identity was ever settled for approval:create. It was a
  # convenience bundle written when a lifecycle operator was assumed to exist.
  #
  # Kept rather than deleted at their request: verifier custody CCR-2026-0018
  # stands, so the client stays authenticable if a presenter ever appears. It is
  # already live from the 2026-09-09 attended rollout, so this annotation does not
  # remove it — see KEY-WP-0013-T02.
  #
  # Do not widen it, and do not treat it as a template. When a presenter is named,
  # approval-engine will re-request NARROWED to that presenter's scopes, and
  # approval:approve must not travel with the operational scopes.
  - clientId: "approval-engine-operator"
    displayName: "approval-engine lifecycle operator (withdrawn: no presenter)"
    audience: "approval-engine"
    allowedScopes: ["approval:create", "approval:read", "approval:approve", "approval:revoke", "approval:supersede", "approval:observe", "approval:emit"]
    grantTypes: ["client_credentials"]
    clientType: "confidential"
    secretRef: "env:KEYCAPE_APPROVAL_ENGINE_OPERATOR_CLIENT_SECRET"
    serviceSubject: "service:approval-engine-operator"
    # Landlord-zone platform tenant, decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6.
    # Exact spelling; no alias to tenant:coulomb. See docs/tenant-claim-contract.md.
    tenant: "tenant:platform"
    roles: ["approval-operator"]
    tokenLifetime: "15m"

  # Human approver browser client. Submitted by informed-decision 2026-09-10
  # (INFD-WP-0001-T07) with the origin already live: both / and /auth/callback
  # return 200 from 92.205.62.239 on a Let's Encrypt certificate
  # CN=decisions.coulomb.social valid 2026-09-10 to 2026-12-09, deployed by
  # railiance-apps. The host is decisions.coulomb.social, NOT the
  # decide.coulomb.social an earlier draft proposed; register the string verbatim.
  #
  # The path currently serves an nginx placeholder while their surface is gated on
  # APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01. That does not affect this registration: the redirect is
  # matched as an exact string at /authorize and never fetched.
  #
  # No secretRef: this is a public client and authenticates with PKCE alone. No
  # serviceSubject or roles either — on a browser client both are silently ignored
  # and config validation rejects them (KEY-WP-0028); the subject and roles come
  # from the directory user.
  - clientId: "informed-decision-approver"
    displayName: "informed-decision approver surface"
    audience: "approval-engine"
    redirectUris:
      - "https://decisions.coulomb.social/auth/callback"
    allowedScopes: ["openid", "approval:read", "approval:approve"]
    grantTypes: ["authorization_code"]
    clientType: "public"
    # Declared, not inherited. Nothing populates domain.User.Tenant for approver
    # users, so this reaches the token by the GH-DEC-2026-013 declared-gap route
    # by construction, and the token says so: tenant_source is "registration",
    # never "directory". Admissible for approval-engine's store-isolation gate;
    # NOT admissible for any doctrine turning on this person's membership of the
    # zone. See docs/tenant-claim-contract.md.
    tenant: "tenant:platform"
    # Approval is a human-in-the-loop control, so MFA is required rather than
    # left to the provider default.
    mfaRequired: true

  # Separate create-only requester; actor matches the existing Flex Auth subject.
  - clientId: secrets-engine-requester
    displayName: Secrets Engine T03 approval requester
    audience: approval-engine
    allowedScopes:
    - approval:create
    grantTypes:
    - client_credentials
    clientType: confidential
    secretRef: env:KEYCAPE_SECRETS_ENGINE_REQUESTER_CLIENT_SECRET
    serviceSubject: secrets-engine
    tenant: tenant:platform
    roles:
    - secrets-engine-requester
    tokenLifetime: 15m

  # Compact sitting presenter; actor is informed-decision, not secrets-engine.
  # approval:read added 2026-11-01 for present_existing intake (INFD-WP-0010):
  # informed-decision GETs an approval another actor created before presenting it.
  # Read only: never approval:consume or approval:approve. Same subject, audience
  # and secret. See docs/sitting-requester-read-scope.md.
  - clientId: informed-decision-sitting-requester
    displayName: Informed Decision compact-sitting approval requester
    audience: approval-engine
    allowedScopes:
    - approval:create
    - approval:read
    grantTypes:
    - client_credentials
    clientType: confidential
    secretRef: env:KEYCAPE_INFORMED_DECISION_SITTING_REQUESTER_CLIENT_SECRET
    serviceSubject: informed-decision
    tenant: tenant:platform
    roles:
    - informed-decision-sitting-requester
    tokenLifetime: 15m