This document defines the reference architecture for **Kings Guard Security**, implemented in the `kings-guard` repository and positioned within the wider **NetKingdom** ecosystem.
The architecture applies principles observed in biological immune systems to the design of a secure, resilient, multi-tenant and multi-purpose cloud platform. The biological analogy is used as an architectural reasoning model, not as a literal implementation prescription.
The system is intended to protect heterogeneous cloud environments containing:
- multiple independent tenants;
- multiple vendors and operators;
- human users, machine identities and autonomous agents;
- shared and tenant-dedicated infrastructure;
- applications with different criticality and trust requirements;
- data with different confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements;
- changing workloads, dependencies and threat conditions.
The architecture aims to preserve the platform's viability by enabling it to:
1. distinguish intended from harmful behaviour;
2. identify and contain disturbances near their origin;
3. adapt defensive measures to new evidence;
4. restore known-good operation after compromise;
5. learn without violating tenant confidentiality;
6. avoid damaging legitimate activity through uncontrolled defensive action.
---
## 2. Architectural Proposition
Kings Guard Security is a **recursive adaptive security control system**.
It continuously executes the following cycle:
```text
declare healthy intent
→ establish and attest identity
→ observe actual behaviour
→ compare behaviour with intent and policy
→ assess risk and confidence
→ respond within bounded authority
→ restore known-good operation
→ validate the outcome
→ retain governed security memory
```
The system does not treat trust as a permanent property.
Trust is a temporary, scoped and continuously reassessed condition derived from:
- identity;
- provenance;
- attestation;
- integrity;
- configuration;
- behaviour;
- requested operation;
- data sensitivity;
- current incident context;
- tenant and platform policy.
---
## 3. Scope
### 3.1 In Scope
This architecture covers:
- human, device, workload, service and agent identities;
- authentication, authorization and continuous trust evaluation;
- tenant compartmentation;
- workload isolation;
- network and data boundaries;
- policy distribution and enforcement;
- admission control;
- runtime detection;
- security event transport;
- local and global security decisions;
- automated and human-approved response;
- recovery and reconstitution;
- incident evidence;
- adaptive security memory;
- cross-tenant defensive learning;
- security governance and safety controls;
- security observability and assurance.
### 3.2 Out of Scope
This document does not prescribe:
- a single cloud provider;
- a single container or orchestration platform;
- a single identity provider;
- a single SIEM, SOAR, EDR or policy engine;
- a fixed commercial product stack;
- one mandatory deployment topology;
- detailed legal or regulatory mappings;
- application-specific business controls.
Implementations may use different products behind stable Kings Guard capability and interface contracts.
---
## 4. Core Terminology
### 4.1 Organism
The complete governed platform environment whose viability is to be preserved.
An organism may be:
- one cloud platform;
- one sovereign deployment;
- one company environment;
- a federation of cooperating platform environments.
### 4.2 Compartment
A bounded security domain with an explicit identity, authority, policy, telemetry and response scope.
Examples:
- tenant;
- cluster;
- namespace;
- application domain;
- data domain;
- management plane;
- sovereign environment.
### 4.3 Subject
An entity capable of performing or requesting an action.
Examples:
- person;
- service;
- workload;
- device;
- agent;
- pipeline;
- operator;
- external organization.
### 4.4 Resource
An entity on which an operation may be performed.
Examples:
- API;
- dataset;
- secret;
- queue;
- workload;
- deployment;
- infrastructure object;
- identity;
- policy.
### 4.5 Security Genome
The canonical description of intended healthy operation.
It includes:
- declared purpose;
- ownership;
- identities;
- permitted capabilities;
- dependencies;
- policies;
- provenance requirements;
- expected behaviour;
- recovery requirements;
- applicable risk profile.
### 4.6 Security Phenotype
The observable, attested state and behaviour of a subject or compartment at a point in time.
### 4.7 Immune Observation
A normalized statement about a security-relevant event or state, kept distinct from its interpretation.
### 4.8 Immune Signal
An authenticated, typed message used to coordinate security assessment or response.
### 4.9 Effector
A component authorized to perform a concrete defensive action.
Examples:
- reject;
- throttle;
- isolate;
- revoke;
- terminate;
- rotate;
- restore;
- rebuild.
### 4.10 Immune Memory
Governed knowledge derived from observations, incidents, threat intelligence, countermeasures and response outcomes.
### 4.11 Tolerance
The explicit permission for a known deviation, exception or variation that must not trigger an inappropriate defensive response.
### 4.12 Inflammation
A temporary elevated defensive posture with increased observation and restricted freedom of operation.
### 4.13 Reconstitution
The replacement of a compromised or uncertain component with a newly established known-good component.
| I2 Dedicated | Tenant-specific control and compute plane | Dedicated cluster or virtual cluster |
| I3 Sovereign | Independent authority and infrastructure boundary | Dedicated account, keys, control plane and operations |
| I4 Air-Gapped | Deliberately disconnected or highly mediated environment | Offline or broker-only exchange |
Isolation profile selection considers:
- data sensitivity;
- workload privilege;
- tenant risk;
- regulatory requirements;
- blast radius;
- recovery expectations;
- supply-chain trust;
- exposure to untrusted code;
- autonomous agent capabilities.
---
## 12. Shared Service Brokerage
Shared services must not become implicit trust bridges between tenants.
Every shared service is accessed through a **brokered contract** containing:
- authenticated subject;
- tenant context;
- declared purpose;
- permitted operations;
- rate and resource limits;
- data classification;
- isolation requirements;
- audit requirements;
- response integration;
- failure mode.
Examples include:
- object storage;
- message brokers;
- model inference;
- logging;
- email delivery;
- document conversion;
- secrets management;
- identity services.
Shared service operators must not infer permission merely from network reachability.
---
## 13. Admission and Deployment Education
Biological immune systems distinguish tolerated self through developmental processes. Kings Guard applies an analogous admission process.
Before a workload is admitted, the system verifies:
- declared owner;
- tenant affiliation;
- signed artifact;
- approved provenance;
- dependency declarations;
- software bill of materials where required;
- known vulnerabilities against policy;
- requested privileges;
- intended communication;
- secrets requirements;
- data classifications;
- resource limits;
- recovery capability;
- observability hooks;
- response compatibility.
### 13.1 Admission Outcomes
- admitted;
- admitted with restrictions;
- admitted to observation-only environment;
- admitted temporarily;
- quarantined for analysis;
- rejected.
### 13.2 Continuous Re-Education
Admission is not permanent.
Reassessment occurs when:
- artifact changes;
- configuration changes;
- dependency changes;
- policy changes;
- ownership changes;
- risk classification changes;
- new vulnerability intelligence appears;
- behaviour diverges from intent.
---
## 14. Control Loops
### 14.1 Fast Local Loop
Purpose: immediate containment.
```text
sense
→ match local rule
→ apply reversible constraint
→ report observation and outcome
```
Target latency: milliseconds to seconds.
Examples:
- reject malformed input;
- block prohibited syscall;
- deny unapproved egress;
- throttle abusive request;
- isolate a process.
### 14.2 Tenant Adaptive Loop
Purpose: contextual tenant response.
```text
correlate tenant observations
→ assess against tenant intent
→ select bounded response
→ observe outcome
→ update tenant memory
```
Target latency: seconds to minutes.
Examples:
- revoke a tenant session;
- restrict an application;
- rotate tenant credentials;
- isolate a tenant workload group;
- deploy a tenant-specific detection.
### 14.3 Platform Coordination Loop
Purpose: protect shared infrastructure and tenants.
```text
aggregate platform signals
→ identify shared or cross-tenant impact
→ coordinate platform response
→ validate containment
→ distribute safe countermeasures
```
Target latency: seconds to hours.
### 14.4 Strategic Learning Loop
Purpose: improve future architecture and policy.
```text
review incidents and outcomes
→ identify structural weaknesses
→ test improved controls
→ update genome, standards or architecture
→ measure long-term effectiveness
```
Target latency: days to quarters.
---
## 15. Viable System Model Mapping
| VSM function | Kings Guard responsibility |
|---|---|
| System 1 — Operations | Workload, application and tenant sentinels and effectors |
| System 2 — Coordination | Signal routing, deduplication, suppression and incident coordination |
| System 3 — Control | Tenant and platform response controllers |
| System 3* — Audit | Independent validation, forensic inspection and adversarial testing |
| System 4 — Intelligence | Threat research, simulation, adaptive policies and immune memory |
| System 5 — Policy | Security identity, principles, risk appetite and response authority |
The same mapping applies recursively to:
- workloads;
- applications;
- tenants;
- platforms;
- federated environments.
---
## 16. Response Authority Model
No component receives unlimited security authority.
### 16.1 Authority Dimensions
Authority is constrained by:
- tenant;
- compartment;
- resource type;
- action type;
- maximum severity;
- maximum blast radius;
- time-to-live;
- evidence threshold;
- approval requirement;
- operating mode.
### 16.2 Example Authority Grant
```yaml
response_authority:
authority_id: kg:authority:tenant-isolator
subject_id: kg:subject:tenant-immune-node-a
scope:
tenant_id: tenant-a
compartments:
- app-*
resource_types:
- workload
- service-identity
permitted_actions:
- constrain
- isolate
- revoke-ephemeral-credential
prohibited_actions:
- delete-persistent-data
- modify-platform-policy
- affect-other-tenant
limits:
maximum_ttl: PT1H
maximum_concurrent_targets: 20
minimum_confidence: 0.85
escalation_required_for:
- terminate
- restore-data
- revoke-human-admin
```
---
## 17. Defensive Posture Model
The system maintains explicit defensive posture.
| Posture | Meaning | Typical controls |
|---|---|---|
| Green | Normal healthy operation | Baseline observation and policy |
| Blue | Increased awareness | Additional telemetry and shorter trust leases |
| Amber | Credible local threat | Restricted capabilities and active investigation |
| Red | Active compromise | Isolation, revocation and reconstitution |
| Black | Platform viability threatened | Emergency segmentation and continuity mode |
Posture may be set at:
- workload;
- application;
- tenant;
- cluster;
- region;
- platform;
- federation.
A higher-level posture does not automatically require every lower-level compartment to take identical action. Policies translate posture into context-specific controls.
---
## 18. Failure Modes and Immune Pathologies
### 18.1 Autoimmunity
The system attacks legitimate behaviour.
#### Causes
- incorrect policy;
- incomplete intent;
- biased anomaly models;
- stale memory;
- excessive automation;
- missing tolerance records.
#### Controls
- shadow evaluation;
- simulation;
- canary enforcement;
- bounded authority;
- response leases;
- independent evidence;
- rollback;
- tenant appeal and override workflows.
### 18.2 Immunodeficiency
The system lacks sufficient coverage or response capability.
#### Causes
- missing sensors;
- unmonitored assets;
- broken signal paths;
- disabled effectors;
- expired policy;
- insufficient identity assurance.
#### Controls
- coverage measurement;
- mandatory minimum controls;
- sentinel health checks;
- control conformance tests;
- adversarial simulation;
- maturity assessments.
### 18.3 Chronic Inflammation
The environment remains permanently in elevated defensive mode.
#### Consequences
- alert fatigue;
- excessive cost;
- operational friction;
- degraded service;
- normalization of emergency access.
#### Controls
- posture expiry;
- response budgets;
- signal suppression;
- closure criteria;
- de-escalation validation;
- periodic review.
### 18.4 Immune Evasion
An attacker suppresses or imitates legitimate security signals.
#### Controls
- independent observation paths;
- remote attestation;
- missing-signal detection;
- immutable evidence;
- cross-sensor correlation;
- periodic re-attestation;
- protected time sources.
### 18.5 Malignant Growth
A legitimate capability expands beyond its intended purpose.
Examples:
- privilege accumulation;
- data hoarding;
- unauthorized dependency growth;
- uncontrolled agent autonomy;
- resource monopolization;
- hidden external communication.
Controls compare actual scope with intended scope and trigger review when expansion is unexplained.
### 18.6 Memory Poisoning
False or adversarial evidence corrupts defensive learning.
#### Controls
- provenance;
- confidence scoring;
- source reputation;
- independent confirmation;
- quarantined learning;
- reversible policy rollout;
- counter-evidence;
- memory revocation.
### 18.7 Cytokine Storm
Security responses amplify one another and cause disproportionate damage.
Defines region, cluster or sovereign-environment rules.
4.**Tenant policy**
Defines tenant-specific requirements.
5.**Application policy**
Defines application behaviour.
6.**Workload policy**
Defines concrete runtime permissions.
7.**Temporary incident policy**
Defines time-bounded emergency controls.
### 20.2 Policy Resolution
A lower layer may strengthen a higher-layer requirement but may weaken it only through an authorized exception.
Policy decisions must expose:
- effective policies;
- precedence;
- exceptions;
- reason;
- decision inputs;
- resulting constraints.
---
## 21. Evidence Architecture
Evidence is treated as a protected asset.
### 21.1 Evidence Requirements
- immutable or tamper-evident storage;
- accurate time reference;
- source identity;
- integrity proof;
- tenant classification;
- access control;
- retention policy;
- legal hold capability;
- minimization;
- chain of custody where required.
### 21.2 Evidence Zones
- ephemeral local evidence;
- tenant incident evidence;
- platform incident evidence;
- audit evidence;
- forensic archive;
- shareable defensive intelligence.
---
## 22. Observability
Security observability includes both threat state and immune-system health.
### 22.1 Threat Observability
- unauthorized attempts;
- policy violations;
- anomalous behaviour;
- integrity failures;
- attack-path progression;
- credential abuse;
- data access deviations;
- cross-compartment interaction.
### 22.2 Immune-System Observability
- sentinel coverage;
- signal delivery latency;
- decision latency;
- response latency;
- failed effectors;
- stale trust posture;
- policy distribution lag;
- memory freshness;
- recovery readiness;
- false-positive rate;
- rollback success;
- response amplification.
### 22.3 Mandatory Health Signals
Every security component publishes:
- liveness;
- readiness;
- identity;
- software version;
- policy version;
- attestation state;
- last successful observation or action;
- degraded-mode state.
---
## 23. Key Performance Indicators
### 23.1 Protection
- percentage of assets with current genome records;
- percentage of subjects with attested identity;
- policy coverage by compartment;
- sentinel coverage;
- percentage of prohibited paths technically blocked.
### 23.2 Detection
- mean time to observe;
- mean time to correlate;
- proportion of incidents detected locally;
- evidence completeness;
- detection confidence calibration.
### 23.3 Containment
- mean time to constrain;
- mean time to isolate;
- containment success rate;
- average containment blast radius;
- cross-tenant incident count.
### 23.4 Recovery
- mean time to reconstitute;
- mean time to validate;
- percentage of workloads reproducibly redeployable;
- recovery test success rate;
- restoration integrity failure rate.
### 23.5 Regulation
- false-positive response rate;
- rollback success rate;
- number of expired temporary controls;
- number of chronic elevated-posture compartments;
- automated action override rate;
- response budget violations.
### 23.6 Learning
- countermeasure effectiveness;
- memory objects with valid provenance;
- stale-memory percentage;
- time from incident to tested policy improvement;
- repeated-incident rate.
---
## 24. Capability Decomposition
```text
kings-guard/
├── architecture/
│ ├── NetKingdomImmuneArchitecture.md
│ ├── TrustArchitecture.md
│ ├── TenantCompartmentArchitecture.md
│ ├── ImmuneControlLoops.md
│ └── DeploymentProfiles.md
│
├── security-genome/
│ ├── intent-registry/
│ ├── capability-registry/
│ ├── policy-canon/
│ ├── provenance-registry/
│ └── schemas/
│
├── identity-immunity/
│ ├── human-identity/
│ ├── workload-identity/
│ ├── agent-identity/
│ ├── attestation/
│ ├── trust-posture/
│ └── contracts/
│
├── compartment-control/
│ ├── tenant-isolation/
│ ├── application-boundaries/
│ ├── workload-boundaries/
│ ├── data-boundaries/
│ ├── shared-service-brokers/
│ └── isolation-profiles/
│
├── sentinel-mesh/
│ ├── edge-sentinel/
│ ├── identity-sentinel/
│ ├── admission-sentinel/
│ ├── runtime-sentinel/
│ ├── network-sentinel/
│ ├── data-sentinel/
│ └── observation-schema/
│
├── immune-coordination/
│ ├── signal-fabric/
│ ├── tenant-immune-node/
│ ├── platform-immune-node/
│ ├── federation/
│ └── signal-schema/
│
├── immune-decision/
│ ├── policy-evaluation/
│ ├── risk-evaluation/
│ ├── attack-hypothesis/
│ ├── response-selection/
│ └── decision-schema/
│
├── immune-response/
│ ├── response-orchestrator/
│ ├── effectors/
│ ├── authority-control/
│ ├── escalation/
│ └── response-schema/
│
├── immune-recovery/
│ ├── reconciliation/
│ ├── reconstitution/
│ ├── secret-rotation/
│ ├── data-restoration/
│ └── validation/
│
├── immune-memory/
│ ├── evidence-store/
│ ├── incident-graph/
│ ├── countermeasure-graph/
│ ├── outcome-learning/
│ ├── memory-federation/
│ └── memory-governance/
│
├── immune-regulation/
│ ├── tolerance-control/
│ ├── safety-envelopes/
│ ├── response-budgets/
│ ├── simulation/
│ ├── audit/
│ └── emergency-control/
│
└── reference-implementations/
├── kubernetes/
├── vm-platform/
├── serverless/
├── edge/
└── sovereign/
```
---
## 25. Stable Architecture Contracts
The architecture should stabilize contracts before selecting implementations.
### 25.1 Required Contracts
- Identity Contract;
- Attestation Contract;
- Trust Posture Contract;
- Security Genome Contract;
- Immune Observation Contract;
- Immune Signal Contract;
- Decision Contract;
- Response Authority Contract;
- Effector Contract;
- Response Outcome Contract;
- Recovery Contract;
- Memory Object Contract;
- Tenant Federation Contract;
- Audit Challenge Contract.
### 25.2 Effector Contract
```yaml
effector_request:
request_id: uuid
decision_ref: kg:decision:123
target_ref: kg:subject:456
action: isolate
scope: workload
ttl: PT15M
authority_ref: kg:authority:tenant-isolator
expected_outcome: "No network or workload execution outside forensic channel."
rollback:
mode: automatic
condition: "ttl-expired or explicit-release"
validation:
required: true
checks:
- network-isolation-confirmed
- execution-suspended
```
```yaml
effector_result:
request_id: uuid
effector_id: kg:effector:runtime-01
started_at: 2026-07-23T18:00:03Z
completed_at: 2026-07-23T18:00:04Z
status: successful
observed_outcome:
network_isolated: true
execution_suspended: true
evidence_refs:
- evidence://action/123
```
---
## 26. Deployment Profiles
### 26.1 Shared Kubernetes Profile
Suitable for:
- moderate-risk tenants;
- standard SaaS applications;
- stateless services.
Typical characteristics:
- shared cluster;
- tenant namespaces;
- workload identities;
- network policies;
- admission control;
- runtime sentinels;
- tenant-specific policy bundles;
- shared platform immune node;
- logical tenant memory separation.
### 26.2 Reinforced Kubernetes Profile
Suitable for:
- sensitive workloads;
- untrusted code;
- autonomous agents.
Typical characteristics:
- virtual clusters or dedicated node pools;
- sandboxed runtimes;
- tenant-specific trust domains;
- stronger egress mediation;
- dedicated tenant immune node;
- isolated evidence stores.
### 26.3 Dedicated Tenant Profile
Suitable for:
- high-value tenants;
- strict regulatory environments;
- large blast-radius concerns.
Typical characteristics:
- dedicated cluster;
- dedicated keys;
- dedicated tenant control plane;
- tenant-specific recovery environment;
- platform federation through signed defensive signals.
### 26.4 Sovereign Profile
Suitable for:
- national, critical-infrastructure or highly regulated contexts.
Typical characteristics:
- independent cloud account or physical environment;
- tenant-controlled roots of trust;
- local operations;
- restricted federation;
- explicit intelligence exchange;
- independent audit.
### 26.5 Edge Profile
Suitable for:
- intermittently connected environments;
- remote installations;
- industrial or physical systems.
Typical characteristics:
- strong local innate loop;
- cached policy;
- bounded autonomous response;
- delayed evidence synchronization;
- local recovery;
- federation after reconnection.
---
## 27. Example Incident Flow
### Scenario
A tenant workload attempts an external connection that is not declared in its Security Genome.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant W as Workload
participant S as Runtime Sentinel
participant N as Tenant Immune Node
participant D as Decision Engine
participant R as Regulation Controller
participant E as Network Effector
participant M as Immune Memory
participant H as Recovery Controller
W->>S: Attempt prohibited external connection
S->>S: Block attempt using local rule
S->>N: Publish observation and evidence
N->>D: Request contextual assessment
D->>D: Compare identity, intent, posture and history
D->>R: Propose temporary workload isolation
R->>R: Validate authority, blast radius and TTL
R->>E: Authorize isolation
E->>W: Isolate workload
E->>N: Return action outcome
N->>H: Request credential rotation and reconstitution
H->>W: Replace with known-good workload
H->>N: Return validation result
N->>M: Store evidence, action and outcome
M->>D: Update future decision context
```
### Result
- the local attempt is blocked immediately;
- the tenant compartment contains the possible compromise;
- credentials are rotated;
- the workload is replaced rather than merely restarted;
- the restored workload is validated;
- the incident becomes governed tenant memory;
- a shareable attack characteristic may be submitted to platform memory without exporting tenant-private evidence.
---
## 28. Federation and Collective Immunity
Federated environments may share defensive knowledge without sharing unrestricted telemetry.
### 28.1 Shareable Objects
- component vulnerability;
- attack technique;
- malicious artifact digest;
- defensive rule;
- mitigation guidance;
- response outcome summary;
- anonymized behaviour characteristic.
### 28.2 Non-Shareable by Default
- raw tenant logs;
- tenant data content;
- user identifiers;
- business process details;
- tenant-specific topology;
- unrestricted forensic images;
- confidential incident narrative.
### 28.3 Federation Requirements
- signed objects;
- source identity;
- confidence;
- scope;
- handling classification;
- expiry;
- revocation;
- compatibility information;
- policy-controlled import;
- quarantine before automatic enforcement.
---
## 29. Implementation Independence
Potential implementations may include:
- human identity providers;
- workload identity and attestation systems;
- policy engines;
- admission controllers;
- eBPF runtime sensors;
- service meshes;
- network policy engines;
- message brokers;
- evidence stores;
- graph databases;
- SIEM and SOAR systems;
- backup and restore systems;
- infrastructure reconciliation systems.
No implementation becomes part of the constitutional architecture merely because it is selected for an initial deployment.
Each implementation must map to one or more Kings Guard capabilities and conform to the corresponding contracts.
---
## 30. Security Assurance
### 30.1 Continuous Assurance
The architecture requires continuous validation of:
- identity issuance;
- attestation;
- policy enforcement;
- network boundaries;
- workload restrictions;
- response authority;
- recovery capability;
- evidence integrity;
- signal isolation;
- federation controls.
### 30.2 Adversarial Validation
The system should support:
- policy unit tests;
- architecture conformance tests;
- attack simulations;
- chaos-security experiments;
- credential compromise exercises;
- tenant-isolation tests;
- recovery exercises;
- memory-poisoning tests;
- response-amplification tests.
### 30.3 Independent Audit Path
Audit components must be able to challenge operational security conclusions.
The audit path should be organizationally and technically separated from the components it validates where practical.
---
## 31. Incremental Realization Roadmap
### Phase 1 — Security Genome and Identity Foundation
Deliver:
- tenant, subject and resource identifiers;
- workload identity;
- Security Genome schema;
- baseline policy hierarchy;
- signed deployment provenance;
- initial trust posture model.
Success condition:
Every protected workload has an attributable identity and declared intended behaviour.
### Phase 2 — Compartment and Membrane Foundation
Deliver:
- tenant isolation profiles;
- ingress and egress policy;
- shared-service brokerage;
- management-plane separation;
- tenant-specific encryption and secret boundaries.
Success condition:
A tenant compromise cannot trivially cross into another tenant.
### Phase 3 — Sentinel and Signal Mesh
Deliver:
- observation schema;
- edge, identity, runtime and network sentinels;
- tenant-scoped signal transport;
- evidence references;
- sentinel health monitoring.
Success condition:
Security-relevant behaviour is attributable, normalized and routed to the correct compartment.
### Phase 4 — Tenant Immune Nodes
Deliver:
- tenant-local correlation;
- policy evaluation;
- trust posture integration;
- response recommendations;
- tenant-private memory.
Success condition:
Common tenant incidents can be assessed without central manual correlation.
### Phase 5 — Bounded Automated Response
Deliver:
- response authority model;
- reversible effectors;
- response leases;
- rollback;
- action validation;
- response budgets.
Success condition:
Selected high-confidence incidents can be contained automatically without uncontrolled blast radius.
### Phase 6 — Recovery and Reconstitution
Deliver:
- immutable workload replacement;
- secret rotation;
- recovery workflows;
- restoration validation;
- recovery readiness metrics.
Success condition:
Compromised workloads can be replaced and validated predictably.
### Phase 7 — Adaptive Memory
Deliver:
- incident graph;
- countermeasure graph;
- response outcome learning;
- policy improvement workflow;
- memory review and decay.
Success condition:
Past incidents measurably improve future detection, containment and recovery.
### Phase 8 — Federated Collective Immunity
Deliver:
- shareable intelligence schema;
- signed federation;
- import quarantine;
- tenant privacy controls;
- countermeasure distribution.
Success condition:
Multiple environments can share useful defensive knowledge without exposing tenant-private evidence.
---
## 32. Initial Repository Deliverables
The initial `kings-guard` repository should contain:
1.`INTENT.md`
2.`NetKingdomImmuneArchitecture.md`
3.`SecurityGenomeSpecification.md`
4.`IdentityAndAttestationContract.md`
5.`TenantCompartmentStandard.md`
6.`ImmuneObservationSchema.md`
7.`ImmuneSignalSchema.md`
8.`ResponseAuthorityStandard.md`
9.`EffectorInterfaceSpecification.md`
10.`ImmuneMemoryModel.md`
11.`DeploymentProfiles.md`
12.`ThreatAndFailureModeCatalog.md`
13.`ImplementationRoadmap.md`
14.`ArchitectureDecisionRecords/`
---
## 33. Architectural Decisions
### AD-001 — Self Is Attested Intent-Conformant Identity
A subject is not trusted because it is internal. It is treated as self only while its identity, state and behaviour remain consistent with declared intent and policy.
### AD-002 — Tenants Are Immune Compartments
Every tenant has an explicit security boundary, policy scope, evidence scope, response authority and memory scope.
### AD-003 — Security Is Recursive
The same observation, decision, response, recovery and learning pattern applies from workload to federation level.
### AD-004 — Evidence Is Distinct From Interpretation
Raw evidence, observations, hypotheses, decisions and actions are separate entities.
### AD-005 — Automated Responses Are Bounded
Every automated action is limited by scope, authority, duration, evidence threshold and rollback requirements.
### AD-006 — Recovery Is a First-Class Security Capability
A security architecture is incomplete without tested restoration and reconstitution.
The result is not merely a collection of security products. It is a governed security organism designed to remain viable under continuous change, uncertainty and attack.
