# MAS Postfix integration profile

Configures an installed Postfix (tested: 3.7, Debian bookworm) to receive
mail for one MAS domain and hand every recipient, unchanged, to
`mas-gateway`. This is the setup that runs live on mas.coulomb.social
(`deploy/railiance/entrypoint.sh`). It is tested by
`experiments/postfix-probe` and `tests/test_postfix_profile.py`.

```sh
integrations/postfix/install.sh --domain great-service.example \
  --statute /srv/statute/.well-known/mas \
  --app-url http://127.0.0.1:8024/mas-events --auth
opendkim -f -x /etc/opendkim.conf &      # only with --auth
opendmarc -f -c /etc/opendmarc.conf &    # only with --auth
postfix start-fg
```

The script needs a `mas` system user and `mas-gateway` on the path (or
`--gateway CMD`). It writes `/etc/postfix/mas_rcpt.regexp` and, with
`--auth`, also `/etc/postfix/ar_strip.regexp`, `/etc/opendkim.conf` and
`/etc/opendmarc.conf`.

## Why the stock configuration fails

A default Postfix silently loses every P2 address (`ticket!callback@D`)
(`docs/experiment-review.md`, *Email infrastructure*):

- `reject_unauth_destination` treats a local-part that contains `!` or `%`
  as sender-specified routing and refuses it, even for a local domain.
- When relaying is allowed, `swap_bangpath=yes` rewrites `a!b@D` to `b@a`
  and `allow_percent_hack=yes` rewrites `a%b@D` to `a@b`. The mail then
  goes somewhere else, or bounces.
- An access-map `OK` for such an address is ignored unless
  `allow_untrusted_routing=yes`.

## main.cf

| Setting | Why |
|---|---|
| `mydestination = D`, `relay_domains =` | D is the only domain received; nothing is relayed. |
| `mynetworks = 127.0.0.0/8` | Only loopback (your app's replies) may send out. |
| `smtpd_relay_restrictions = permit_mynetworks, check_recipient_access regexp:/etc/postfix/mas_rcpt.regexp, reject` | Replaces `reject_unauth_destination`. The final `reject` refuses everything else, and smtpd will not start without a reject-class entry. |
| `allow_untrusted_routing = yes` | Without it, the regexp result is ignored for `!`/`%` local-parts. It is safe only because `relay_domains` is empty and nothing rewrites such addresses. |
| `swap_bangpath = no`, `allow_percent_hack = no` | Never rewrite MAS syntax. |
| `local_transport = mas`, `local_recipient_maps =` | Every recipient of D goes to the MAS pipe, with no local-user lookup. The gateway and statute decide. |
| `mas_destination_recipient_limit = 1` | One recipient per gateway call, so `${recipient}` is that recipient. |
| `recipient_delimiter = +` | Postfix knows that facets exist. `${recipient}` is unaffected. |
| `disable_vrfy_command`, `smtpd_helo_required`, `smtpd_recipient_limit = 20` | Hygiene for a receive-only endpoint. |

`mas_rcpt.regexp` (dots in D escaped):

```
/@great-service\.example$/ permit
```

The match runs the `permit` restriction rather than returning `OK`.

## master.cf

```
mas       unix  -       n       n       -       -       pipe
  flags=Rq user=mas argv=/usr/local/bin/mas-gateway
  --statute <statute> --trusted-authserv-id D
  pipe --app-url <url> --recipient ${recipient}
```

`flags=q` quotes the recipient for the shell-free argv. Postfix passes
`${recipient}` in RFC 5321 canonical form, which can differ from the bytes
sent: needless quotes are dropped (`"ticket=PR42"` becomes `ticket=PR42`) and
quotes are added around non-dot-atoms (`.bernd` becomes `".bernd"`). Spec §3
treats both forms as equivalent, and a re-quoted form is never a valid MAS
address.

## Outbound (`--relay HOST:PORT --relay-credentials DIR`)

Only loopback may send out (`mynetworks`), so outbound mail is your app's
replies. With `--relay`, they go through an authenticated submission relay
(`relayhost`, `smtp_sasl_*`, `smtp_tls_security_level = secure`); DIR holds
the files `username` and `password`. Postfix's own bounces (null sender)
are discarded rather than relayed
(`sender_dependent_default_transport_maps = inline:{<>=discard:}`). Then
the app's own send cap bounds everything sent through the relay. The
reference ticket service has `--max-sent`. Without `--relay`,
`default_transport = error:` makes outbound mail fail at once instead of
queueing.

## Sender authentication (`--auth`)

The gateway trusts `Authentication-Results` only for its own authserv-id
(spec §14 item 10). The MTA does SPF/DKIM/DMARC, because these need DNS:

- OpenDKIM in verify mode (`Mode v`) and OpenDMARC with
  `SPFSelfValidate true` both write A-R headers with authserv-id D.
  `RejectFailures false` and `milter_default_action = accept` mean they
  annotate only: they never reject, and mail is accepted if a milter is
  down. Loopback is in OpenDKIM's `PeerList`, so your own replies are
  skipped.
- `header_checks = regexp:/etc/postfix/ar_strip.regexp` drops every
  incoming `Authentication-Results: D ...` header. Header checks do not see
  headers that milters add, so only the milters' own results survive, and a
  sender cannot forge a pass. OpenDKIM's `RemoveARFrom` did not remove
  them in testing.
- Run both milters in the foreground (`-f`). Daemonized, OpenDKIM died on
  its first connection in a container.

## Not covered here

- The send cap itself is the application's job (ticket service
  `--max-sent`). The application must never reply to a null sender
  (spec §14).
- TLS certificates, banner, size limits and chroot: deployment specifics,
  see `deploy/railiance/entrypoint.sh`.
- Exim: see `integrations/exim/NOTES.md`.