---
id: book-4-chapter-03
title: "OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE DISADVANTAGEOUS."
book: "4"
chapter: 3
artifact_type: content
---

CHAPTER III.
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON
THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH
THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE DISADVANTAGEOUS.



      Part I—Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints, even upon the
      Principles of the Commercial System.

      To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods of almost
      all kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade
      is supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the
      commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver.
      Thus, in Great Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home
      consumption, upon paying certain duties; but French cambrics and lawns are
      prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be
      warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of
      France than upon those of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By
      what is called the impost 1692, a duty of five and-twenty per cent. of the
      rate or value, was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other
      nations were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties,
      seldom exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt, and vinegar of
      France, were indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected to other
      heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same
      law. In 1696, a second duty of twenty-five per cent. the first not having
      been thought a sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French
      goods, except brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds
      upon the ton of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of
      French vinegar. French goods have never been omitted in any of those
      general subsidies or duties of five per cent. which have been imposed upon
      all, or the greater part, of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If
      we count the one-third and two-third subsidies as making a complete
      subsidy between them, there have been five of these general subsidies; so
      that, before the commencement of the present war, seventy-five per cent.
      may be considered as the lowest duty to which the greater part of the
      goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France, were liable. But
      upon the greater part of goods, those duties are equivalent to a
      prohibition. The French, in their turn, have, I believe, treated our goods
      and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not so well acquainted with
      the particular hardships which they have imposed upon them. Those mutual
      restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two
      nations; and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British
      goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles
      which I have been examining, in the foregoing chapter, took their origin
      from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going
      te examine in this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are,
      accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are
      so, even upon the principles of the commercial system.

      First, Though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between
      France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France,
      it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to
      England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be
      turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than
      those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more
      advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign
      linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany.
      Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be
      greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be
      diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were
      cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case,
      even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be
      consumed in Great Britain.

      But, Secondly, A great part of them might be re-exported to other
      countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return,
      equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods
      imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade, might
      possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India
      goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of
      them to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which
      carried on the trade, than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of
      the most important branches of the Dutch trade at present, consists in the
      carriage of French goods to other European countries. Some part even of
      the French wine drank in Great Britain, is clandestinely imported from
      Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and
      England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same
      duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon
      exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so
      advantageous to Holland.

      Thirdly, and lastly, There is no certain criterion by which we can
      determine on which side what is called the balance between any two
      countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National
      prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of
      particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment
      upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which
      have frequently been appealed to upon such occasions, the custom-house
      books and the course of exchange. The custom-house books, I think, it is
      now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of
      the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are
      rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so.

      When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at par,
      it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are
      compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a
      premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign
      that the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due
      from Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be sent out from
      the latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense, of exporting which,
      the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and
      credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said,
      by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of
      them imports from from other to a greater amount than it exports to that
      other, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when
      one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to
      that other, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a
      greater sum than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits
      of each do not compensate one another, and money must be sent out from
      that place of which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course
      of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt
      and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of the
      ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily
      regulate that state.

      But though the ordinary course of exchange shall be allowed to be a
      sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any
      two places, it would not from thence follow, that the balance of trade was
      in favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in
      its favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places
      is not always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings
      with one another, but is often influenced by that of the dealings of
      either with many other places. If it is usual, for example, for the
      merchants of England to pay for the goods which they buy of Hamburg,
      Dantzic, Riga, etc. by bills upon Holland, the ordinary state of debt and
      credit between England and Holland will not be regulated entirely by the
      ordinary course of the dealings of those two countries with one another,
      but will be influenced by that of the dealings in England with those other
      places. England may be obliged to send out every year money to Holland,
      though its annual exports to that country may exceed very much the annual
      value of its imports from thence, and though what is called the balance of
      trade may be very much in favour of England.

      In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been
      computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient
      indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that
      country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary
      course of exchange in its favour; or, in other words, the real exchange
      may be, and in fact often is, so very different from the computed one,
      that, from the course of the latter, no certain conclusion can, upon many
      occasions, be drawn concerning that of the former.

      When for a sum or money paid in England, containing, according to the
      standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver,
      you receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing,
      according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of
      pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France.
      When you pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is
      said to be against England, and in favour of France. When you pay less,
      you are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against
      France, and in favour of England.

      But, first, We cannot always judge of the value of the current money of
      different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it
      is more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from
      that standard. But the value of the current coin of every country,
      compared with that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the
      quantity of pure silver which it ought to contain, but to that which it
      actually does contain. Before the reformation of the silver coin in King
      William’s time, exchange between England and Holland, computed in the
      usual manner, according to the standard of their respective mints, was
      five-and twenty per cent. against England. But the value of the current
      coin of England, as we learn from Mr Lowndes, was at that time rather more
      than five-and-twenty per cent. below its standard value. The real
      exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been in favour of England,
      notwithstanding the computed exchange was so much against it; a smaller
      number or ounces of pure silver, actually paid in England, may have
      purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure silver to be paid
      in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give, may in reality have got
      the premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the
      English gold coin, much less wore than the English, and was perhaps two or
      three per cent. nearer its standard. If the computed exchange with France,
      therefore, was not more than two or three per cent. against England, the
      real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the reformation of the
      gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of England, and
      against France.

      Secondly, In some countries the expense of coinage is defrayed by the
      government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people, who carry
      their bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue
      from the coinage. In England it is defrayed by the government; and if you
      carry a pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back
      sixty-two shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard
      silver. In France a duty of eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage,
      which not only defrays the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to
      the government. In England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin
      can never be much more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it
      actually contains. In France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to
      the value, in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French
      money, therefore, containing an equal weight of pure silver, is more
      valuable than a sum of English money containing an equal weight of pure
      silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase
      it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally
      near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money could
      not well purchase a sum of French money containing an equal number of
      ounces of pure silver, nor, consequently, a bill upon France for such a
      sum. If, for such a bill, no more additional money was paid than what was
      sufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real
      exchange might be at par between the two countries; their debts and
      credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange
      was considerably in favour of France. If less than this was paid, the real
      exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour
      of France.

      Thirdly, and lastly, In some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice,
      etc. foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money;
      while in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc. they are
      paid in the common currency of the country. What is called bank money, is
      always of more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A
      thousand guilders in the bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value
      than a thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between
      them is called the agio of the bank, which at Amsterdam is generally about
      five per cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally
      near to the standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays
      foreign bills in this common currency, while the other pays them in bank
      money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be in favour of that
      which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be in favour of
      that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the computed
      exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in money
      nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour
      of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late
      reformation of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam,
      Hamburg, Venice, and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what
      is called bank money. It will by no means follow, however, that the real
      exchange was against it. Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has
      been in favour of London, even with those places. The computed exchange
      has generally been in favour of London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and,
      if you except France, I believe with most other parts of Europe that pay
      in common currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was so
      too.

      Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of
      Amsterdam.

      The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally
      consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore,
      be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard
      value, the state, by a reformation of its coin, can effectually
      re-establish its currency. But the currency of a small state, such as
      Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom consist altogether in its own coin, but must
      be made up, in a great measure, of the coins of all the neighbouring
      states with which its inhabitants have a continual intercourse. Such a
      state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not always be able to reform
      its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in this currency, the
      uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain,
      must render the exchange always very much against such a state, its
      currency being in all foreign states necessarily valued even below what it
      is worth.

      In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous
      exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they
      began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted that
      foreign bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid, not in common
      currency, but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain
      bank, established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state,
      this bank being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly
      according to the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa,
      Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally
      established with this view, though some of them may have afterwards been
      made subservient to other purposes. The money of such banks, being better
      than the common currency of the country, necessarily bore an agio, which
      was greater or smaller, according as the currency was supposed to be more
      or less degraded below the standard of the state. The agio of the bank of
      Hamburg, for example, which is said to be commonly about fourteen per
      cent. is the supposed difference between the good standard money of the
      state, and the clipt, worn, and diminished currency, poured into it from
      all the neighbouring states.

      Before 1609, the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin which the
      extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the
      value of its currency about nine per cent. below that of good money fresh
      from the mint. Such money no sooner appeared, than it was melted down or
      carried away, as it always is in such circumstances. The merchants, with
      plenty of currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of good
      money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in
      spite of several regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a
      great measure uncertain.

      In order to remedy these inconveniencies, a bank was established in 1609,
      under the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin, and
      the light and worn coin of the country, at its real intrinsic value in the
      good standard money of the country, deducting only so much as was
      necessary for defraying the expense of coinage and the other necessary
      expense of management. For the value which remained after this small
      deduction was made, it gave a credit in its books. This credit was called
      bank money, which, as it represented money exactly according to the
      standard of the mint, was always of the same real value, and intrinsically
      worth more than current money. It was at the same time enacted, that all
      bills drawn upon or negotiated at Amsterdam, of the value of 600 guilders
      and upwards, should be paid in bank money, which at once took away all
      uncertainty in the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of
      this regulation, was obliged to keep an account with the bank, in order to
      pay his foreign bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain
      demand for bank money.

      Bank money, over and above both its intrinsic superiority to currency, and
      the additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has likewise
      some other advantages, It is secure from fire, robbery, and other
      accidents; the city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a
      simple transfer, without the trouble of counting, or the risk of
      transporting it from one place to another. In consequence of those
      different advantages, it seems from the beginning to have borne an agio;
      and it is generally believed that all the money originally deposited in
      the bank, was allowed to remain there, nobody caring to demand payment of
      a debt which he could sell for a premium in the market. By demanding
      payment of the bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose this premium.
      As a shilling fresh from the mint will buy no more goods in the market
      than one of our common worn shillings, so the good and true money which
      might be brought from the coffers of the bank into those of a private
      person, being mixed and confounded with the common currency of the
      country, would be of no more value than that currency, from which it could
      no longer be readily distinguished. While it remained in the coffers of
      the bank, its superiority was known and ascertained. When it had come into
      those of a private person, its superiority could not well be ascertained
      without more trouble than perhaps the difference was worth. By being
      brought from the coffers of the bank, besides, it lost all the other
      advantages of bank money; its security, its easy and safe transferability,
      its use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over and above all this, it
      could not be brought from those coffers, as will appear by and by, without
      previously paying for the keeping.

      Those deposits of coin, or those deposits which the bank was bound to
      restore in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the
      whole value of what was represented by what is called bank money. At
      present they are supposed to constitute but a very small part of it. In
      order to facilitate the trade in bullion, the bank has been for these many
      years in the practice of giving credit in its books, upon deposits of gold
      and silver bullion. This credit is generally about five per cent. below
      the mint price of such bullion. The bank grants at the same time what is
      called a recipice or receipt, entitling the person who makes the deposit,
      or the bearer, to take out the bullion again at any time within six
      months, upon transferring to the bank a quantity of bank money equal to
      that for which credit had been given in its books when the deposit was
      made, and upon paying one-fourth per cent. for the keeping, if the deposit
      was in silver; and one-half per cent. if it was in gold; but at the same
      time declaring, that in default of such payment, and upon the expiration
      of this term, the deposit should belong to the bank, at the price at which
      it had been received, or for which credit had been given in the transfer
      books. What is thus paid for the keeping of the deposit may be considered
      as a sort of warehouse rent; and why this warehouse rent should be so much
      dearer for gold than for silver, several different reasons have been
      assigned. The fineness of gold, it has been said, is more difficult to be
      ascertained than that of silver. Frauds are more easily practised, and
      occasion a greater loss in the most precious metal. Silver, besides, being
      the standard metal, the state, it has been said, wishes to encourage more
      the making of deposits of silver than those of gold.

      Deposits of bullion are most commonly made when the price is somewhat
      lower than ordinary, and they are taken out again when it happens to rise.
      In Holland the market price of bullion is generally above the mint price,
      for the same reason that it was so in England before the late reformation
      of the gold coin. The difference is said to be commonly from about six to
      sixteen stivers upon the mark, or eight ounces of silver, of eleven parts
      of fine and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit which the bank
      gives for the deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coin, of which
      the fineness is well known and ascertained, such as Mexico dollars), is
      twenty-two guilders the mark: the mint price is about twenty-three
      guilders, and the market price is from twenty-three guilders six, to
      twenty-three guilders sixteen stivers, or from two to three per cent.
      above the mint price.

      The following are the prices at which the bank of Amsterdam at present
      {September 1775} receives bullion and coin of different kinds:


                              SILVER
     Mexico dollars .................  22  Guilders / mark
     French crowns ..................  22
     English silver coin.............  22
     Mexico dollars, new coin........  21  10
     Ducatoons.......................   3   0
     Rix-dollars.....................   2   8



      Bar silver, containing 11-12ths fine silver, 21 Guilders / mark, and in
      this proportion down to 1-4th fine, on which 5 guilders are given. Fine
      bars,................. 28 Guilders / mark.


                              GOLD
     Portugal coin.................  310  Guilders / mark
     Guineas.......................  310
     Louis d’ors, new..............  310
     Ditto        old..............  300
     New ducats....................    4  19  8  per ducat



      Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness, compared with
      the above foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark.
      In general, however, something more is given upon coin of a known
      fineness, than upon gold and silver bars, of which the fineness cannot be
      ascertained but by a process of melting and assaying.

      The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market
      price of gold bullion, are nearly the same. A person can generally sell
      his receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the
      market price. A receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, and
      it very seldom happens, therefore, that anybody suffers his receipts to
      expire, or allows his bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it
      had been received, either by not taking it out before the end of the six
      months, or by neglecting to pay one fourth or one half per cent. in order
      to obtain a new receipt for another six months. This, however, though it
      happens seldom, is said to happen sometimes, and more frequently with
      regard to gold than with regard to silver, on account of the higher
      warehouse rent which is paid for the keeping of the more precious metal.

      The person who, by making a deposit of bullion, obtains both a bank credit
      and a receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due, with his
      bank credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt, according as he judges
      that the price of bullion is likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and
      the bank credit seldom keep long together, and there is no occasion that
      they should. The person who has a receipt, and who wants to take out
      bullion, finds always plenty of bank credits, or bank money, to buy at the
      ordinary price, and the person who has bank money, and wants to take out
      bullion, finds receipts always in equal abundance.

      The owners of bank credits, and the holders of receipts, constitute two
      different sorts of creditors against the bank. The holder of a receipt
      cannot draw out the bullion for which it is granted, without re-assigning
      to the bank a sum of bank money equal to the price at which the bullion
      had been received. If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it
      of those who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion,
      without producing to the bank receipts for the quantity which he wants. If
      he has none of his own, he must buy them of those who have them. The
      holder of a receipt, when he purchases bank money, purchases the power of
      taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per
      cent. above the bank price. The agio of five per cent. therefore, which he
      commonly pays for it, is paid, not for an imaginary, but for a real value.
      The owner of bank money, when he purchases a receipt, purchases the power
      of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the market price is commonly
      from two to three per cent. above the mint price. The price which he pays
      for it, therefore, is paid likewise for a real value. The price of the
      receipt, and the price of the bank money, compound or make up between them
      the full value or price of the bullion.

      Upon deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grant receipts
      likewise, as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no
      value and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example,
      which in the currency pass for three guilders three stivers each, the bank
      gives a credit of three guilders only, or five per cent. below their
      current value. It grants a receipt likewise, entitling the bearer to take
      out the number of ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, upon
      paying one fourth per cent. for the keeping. This receipt will frequently
      bring no price in the market. Three guilders, bank money, generally sell
      in the market for three guilders three stivers, the full value of the
      ducatoons, if they were taken out of the bank; and before they can be
      taken out, one-fourth per cent. must be paid for the keeping, which would
      be mere loss to the holder of the receipt. If the agio of the bank,
      however, should at any time fall to three per cent. such receipts might
      bring some price in the market, and might sell for one and three-fourths
      per cent. But the agio of the bank being now generally about five per
      cent. such receipts are frequently allowed to expire, or, as they express
      it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for deposits of gold
      ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher warehouse rent, or
      one half per cent. must be paid for the keeping of them, before they can
      be taken out again. The five per cent. which the bank gains, when deposits
      either of coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, maybe considered as
      the warehouse rent for the perpetual keeping of such deposits.

      The sum of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, must be very
      considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank,
      which, it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the
      time it was first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt, or
      to take out his deposit, as, for the reasons already assigned, neither the
      one nor the other could be done without loss. But whatever may be the
      amount of this sum, the proportion which it bears to the whole mass of
      bank money is supposed to be very small. The bank of Amsterdam has, for
      these many years past, been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for
      which the receipts are very seldom allowed to expire, or, as they express
      it, to fall to the bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or of the
      credits upon the books of the bank, is supposed to have been created, for
      these many years past, by such deposits, which the dealers in bullion are
      continually both making and withdrawing.

      No demand can be made upon the bank, but by means of a recipice or
      receipt. The smaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are
      expired, is mixed and confounded with the much greater mass for which they
      are still in force; so that, though there may be a considerable sum of
      bank money, for which there are no receipts, there is no specific sum or
      portion of it which may not at any time be demanded by one. The bank
      cannot be debtor to two persons for the same thing; and the owner of bank
      money who has no receipt, cannot demand payment of the bank till he buys
      one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no difficulty in getting one
      to buy at the market price, which generally corresponds with the price at
      which he can sell the coin or bullion it entitles him to take out of the
      bank.

      It might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example,
      such as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then
      all eager to draw it out of the bank, in order to have it in their own
      keeping, the demand for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant
      height. The holders of them might form extravagant expectations, and,
      instead of two or three per cent. demand half the bank money for which
      credit had been given upon the deposits that the receipts had respectively
      been granted for. The enemy, informed of the constitution of the bank,
      might even buy them up, in order to prevent the carrying away of the
      treasure. In such emergencies, the bank, it is supposed, would break
      through its ordinary rule of making payment only to the holders of
      receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no bank money, must have
      received within two or three per cent. of the value of the deposit for
      which their respective receipts had been granted. The bank, therefore, it
      is said, would in this case make no scruple of paying, either with money
      or bullion, the full value of what the owners of bank money, who could get
      no receipts, were credited for in its books; paying, at the same time, two
      or three per cent. to such holders of receipts as had no bank money, that
      being the whole value which, in this state of things, could justly be
      supposed due to them.

      Even in ordinary and quiet times, it is the interest of the holders of
      receipts to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and
      consequently the bullion which their receipts would then enable them to
      take out of the bank ) so much cheaper, or to sell their receipts to those
      who have bank money, and who want to take out bullion, so much dearer; the
      price of a receipt being generally equal to the difference between the
      market price of bank money and that of the coin or bullion for which the
      receipt had been granted. It is the interest of the owners of bank money,
      on the contrary, to raise the agio, in order either to sell their bank
      money so much dearer, or to buy a receipt so much cheaper. To prevent the
      stock-jobbing tricks which those opposite interests might sometimes
      occasion, the bank has of late years come to the resolution, to sell at
      all times bank money for currency at five per cent. agio, and to buy it in
      again at four per cent. agio. In consequence of this resolution, the agio
      can never either rise above five, or sink below four per cent.; and the
      proportion between the market price of bank and that of current money is
      kept at all times very near the proportion between their intrinsic values.
      Before this resolution was taken, the market price of bank money used
      sometimes to rise so high as nine per cent. agio, and sometimes to sink so
      low as par, according as opposite interests happened to influence the
      market.

      The bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is deposited
      with it, but for every guilder for which it gives credit in its books, to
      keep in its repositories the value of a guilder either in money or
      bullion. That it keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for
      which there are receipts in force for which it is at all times liable to
      be called upon, and which in reality is continually going from it, and
      returning to it again, cannot well be doubted. But whether it does so
      likewise with regard to that part of its capital for which the receipts
      are long ago expired, for which, in ordinary and quiet times, it cannot be
      called upon, and which, in reality, is very likely to remain with it for
      ever, or as long as the states of the United Provinces subsist, may
      perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam, however, no point of faith is
      better established than that, for every guilder circulated as bank money,
      there is a correspondent guilder in gold or silver to be found in the
      treasures of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should be so. The
      bank is under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters who are
      changed every year. Each new set of burgomasters visits the treasure,
      compares it with the books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it over,
      with the same awful solemnity to the set which succeeds; and in that sober
      and religious country, oaths are not yet disregarded. A rotation of this
      kind seems alone a sufficient security against any practices which cannot
      be avowed. Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in
      the government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused
      their predecessors of infidelity in the administration of the bank. No
      accusation could have affected more deeply the reputation and fortune of
      the disgraced party; and if such an accusation could have been supported,
      we may be assured that it would have been brought. In 1672, when the
      French king was at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid so readily, as left
      no doubt of the fidelity with which it had observed its engagements. Some
      of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories, appeared to
      have been scorched with the fire which happened in the town-house soon
      after the bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain
      there from that time.

      What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank, is a question which
      has long employed the speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture
      can be offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned, that there are
      about 2000 people who keep accounts with the bank; and allowing them to
      have, one with another, the value of £1500 sterling lying upon their
      respective accounts (a very large allowance), the whole quantity of bank
      money, and consequently of treasure in the bank, will amount to about
      £3,000,000 sterling, or, at eleven guilders the pound sterling, 33,000,000
      of guilders; a great sum, and sufficient to carry on a very extensive
      circulation, but vastly below the extravagant ideas which some people have
      formed of this treasure.

      The city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank.
      Besides what may be called the warehouse rent above mentioned, each
      person, upon first opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten
      guilders; and for every new account, three guilders three stivers; for
      every transfer, two stivers; and if the transfer is for less than 300
      guilders, six stivers, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small
      transactions. The person who neglects to balance his account twice in the
      year, forfeits twenty-five guilders. The person who orders a transfer for
      more than is upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent. for the
      sum overdrawn, and his order is set aside into the bargain. The bank is
      supposed, too, to make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign
      coin or bullion which sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts,
      and which is always kept till it can be sold with advantage. It makes a
      profit, likewise, by selling bank money at five per cent. agio, and buying
      it in at four. These different emoluments amount to a good deal more than
      what is necessary for paying the salaries of officers, and defraying the
      expense of management. What is paid for the keeping of bullion upon
      receipts, is alone supposed to amount to a neat annual revenue of between
      150,000 and 200,000 guilders. Public utility, however, and not revenue,
      was the original object of this institution. Its object was to relieve the
      merchants from the inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange. The
      revenue which has arisen from it was unforeseen, and may be considered as
      accidental. But it is now time to return from this long digression, into
      which I have been insensibly led, in endeavouring to explain the reasons
      why the exchange between the countries which pay in what is called bank
      money, and those which pay in common currency, should generally appear to
      be in favour of the former, and against the latter. The former pay in a
      species of money, of which the intrinsic value is always the same, and
      exactly agreeable to the standard of their respective mints; the latter is
      a species of money, of which the intrinsic value is continually varying,
      and is almost always more or less below that standard.




      PART II.—Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary Restraints,
      upon other Principles.

      In the foregoing part of this chapter, I have endeavoured to show, even
      upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay
      extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those
      countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be
      disadvantageous.

      Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the
      balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all
      the other regulations of commerce, are founded. When two places trade with
      one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither
      of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side,
      that one of them loses, and the other gains, in proportion to its
      declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A
      trade, which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and
      commonly is, disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to
      be established, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade
      which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on
      between any two places, is always advantageous, though not always equally
      so, to both.

      By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of
      gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce
      of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual
      revenue of its inhabitants.

      If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist
      altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon
      most occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very
      nearly equally; each will, in this case, afford a market for a part of the
      surplus produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been
      employed in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus
      produce of the other, and which had been distributed among, and given
      revenue and maintenance to, a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part
      of the inhabitants of each, therefore, will directly derive their revenue
      and maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged, too, are
      supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade
      will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal; and both being
      employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the
      revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the
      inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and
      maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller, in
      proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually
      amount to £100,000, for example, or to £1,000,000, on each side, each of
      them will afford an annual revenue, in the one case, of £100,000, and, in
      the other, of £1,000,000, to the inhabitants of the other.

      If their trade should be of such a nature, that one of them exported to
      the other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other
      consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would
      still be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They
      would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and
      the inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native
      commodities, would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England,
      for example, should import from France nothing but the native commodities
      of that country, and not having such commodities of its own as were in
      demand there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large
      quantity of foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India
      goods; this trade, though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of
      both countries, would give more to those of France than to those of
      England. The whole French capital annually employed in it would annually
      be distributed among the people of France; but that part of the English
      capital only, which was employed in producing the English commodities with
      which those foreign goods were purchased, would be annually distributed
      among the people of England. The greater part of it would replace the
      capitals which had been employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and
      which had given revenue and maintenance to the inhabitants of those
      distant countries. If the capitals were equal, or nearly equal, therefore,
      this employment of the French capital would augment much more the revenue
      of the people of France, than that of the English capital would the
      revenue of the people of England. France would, in this case, carry on a
      direct foreign trade of consumption with England; whereas England would
      carry on a round-about trade of the same kind with France. The different
      effects of a capital employed in the direct, and of one employed in the
      round-about foreign trade of consumption, have already been fully
      explained.

      There is not, probably, between any two countries, a trade which consists
      altogether in the exchange, either of native commodities on both sides, or
      of native commodities on one side, and of foreign goods on the other.
      Almost all countries exchange with one another, partly native and partly
      foreign goods. That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the
      greatest proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always
      be the principal gainer.

      If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and silver,
      that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the
      balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being
      paid for with commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however,
      would in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the
      inhabitants of both countries, but more to those of France than to those
      of England. It would give some revenue to those of England. The capital
      which had been employed in producing the English goods that purchased this
      gold and silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given
      revenue to, certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced, and
      enabled to continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no
      more be diminished by this exportation of gold and silver, than by the
      exportation of an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it
      would, in most cases, be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for
      which the demand is supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of
      which the returns, consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at
      home than the commodities exported. If the tobacco which in England is
      worth only £100,000, when sent to France, will purchase wine which is in
      England worth £110,000, the exchange will augment the capital of England
      by £10,000. If £100,000 of English gold, in the same manner, purchase
      French wine, which in England is worth £110,000, this exchange will
      equally augment the capital of England by £10,000. As a merchant, who has
      £110,000 worth of wine in his cellar, is a richer man than he who has only
      £100,000 worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man
      than he who has only £100,000 worth of gold in his coffers. He can put
      into motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, maintenance,
      and employment, to a greater number of people, than either of the other
      two. But the capital of the country is equal to the capital of all its
      different inhabitants; and the quantity of industry which can be annually
      maintained in it is equal to what all those different capitals can
      maintain. Both the capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of
      industry which can be annually maintained in it, must generally be
      augmented by this exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for
      England that it could purchase the wines of France with its own hardware
      and broad cloth, than with either the tobacco of Virginia, or the gold and
      silver of Brazil and Peru. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always
      more advantageous than a round-about one. But a round-about foreign trade
      of consumption, which is carried on with gold and silver, does not seem to
      be less advantageous than any other equally round-about one. Neither is a
      country which has no mines, more likely to be exhausted of gold and silver
      by this annual exportation of those metals, than one which does not grow
      tobacco by the like annual exportation of that plant. As a country which
      has wherewithal to buy tobacco will never be long in want of it, so
      neither will one be long in want of gold and silver which has wherewithal
      to purchase those metals.

      It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the
      alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry
      on with a wine country, may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I
      answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing
      trade. In its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though,
      perhaps, somewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer,
      and even that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary
      divisions of labour as any other. It will generally be more advantageous
      for a workman to buy of the brewer the quantity he has occasion for, than
      to brew it himself; and if he is a poor workman, it will generally be more
      advantageous for him to buy it by little and little of the retailer, than
      a large quantity of the brewer. He may no doubt buy too much of either, as
      he may of any other dealers in his neighbourhood; of the butcher, if he is
      a glutton; or of the draper, if he affects to be a beau among his
      companions. It is advantageous to the great body of workmen,
      notwithstanding, that all these trades should be free, though this freedom
      may be abused in all of them, and is more likely to be so, perhaps, in
      some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may sometimes ruin their
      fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented liquors, there seems to
      be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in every country there are
      many people who spend upon such liquors more than they can afford, there
      are always many more who spend less. It deserves to be remarked, too, that
      if we consult experience, the cheapness of wine seems to be a cause, not
      of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The inhabitants of the wine countries are
      in general the soberest people of Europe; witness the Spaniards, the
      Italians, and the inhabitants of the southern provinces of France. People
      are seldom guilty of excess in what is their daily fare. Nobody affects
      the character of liberality and good fellowship, by being profuse of a
      liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On the contrary, in the countries
      which, either from excessive heat or cold, produce no grapes, and where
      wine consequently is dear and a rarity, drunkenness is a common vice, as
      among the northern nations, and all those who live between the tropics,
      the negroes, for example on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment
      comes from some of the northern provinces of France, where wine is
      somewhat dear, to be quartered in the southern, where it is very cheap,
      the soldiers, I have frequently heard it observed, are at first debauched
      by the cheapness and novelty of good wine; but after a few months
      residence, the greater part of them become as sober as the rest of the
      inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the excises upon
      malt, beer, and ale, to be taken away all at once, it might, in the same
      manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary
      drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would
      probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety. At
      present, drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of
      those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A gentleman drunk
      with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints upon the wine
      trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder
      the people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from going
      where they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine
      trade of Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is
      said, indeed, are better customers for our manufactures than the French,
      and should therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us
      their custom, it is pretended we should give them ours. The sneaking arts
      of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the
      conduct of a great empire; for it is the most underling tradesmen only who
      make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader
      purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without
      regard to any little interest of this kind.

      By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their
      interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been
      made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations
      with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss.
      Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations as among individuals,
      a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of
      discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has
      not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the
      repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and
      manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an
      ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can
      scarce admit of a remedy: but the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit,
      of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the
      rulers of mankind, though it cannot, perhaps, be corrected, may very
      easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of anybody but
      themselves.

      That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and
      propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted and they who first taught it,
      were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it
      always is, and must be, the interest of the great body of the people, to
      buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is
      so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it;
      nor could it ever have been called in question, had not the interested
      sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of
      mankind. Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of
      the great body of the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a
      corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any
      workmen but themselves; so it is the interest of the merchants and
      manufacturers of every country to secure to themselves the monopoly of the
      home market. Hence, in Great Britain, and in most other European
      countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by
      alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those
      foreign manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence,
      too, the extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all sorts
      of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed
      to be disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity
      happens ta be most violently inflamed.

      The wealth of neighbouring nations, however, though dangerous in war and
      politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility, it
      may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own;
      but in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to
      exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either
      for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is
      purchased with that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better
      customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood, than a poor, so
      is likewise a rich nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a
      manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the
      same way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest
      number, profit by the good market which his expense affords them. They
      even profit by his underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same
      way with him. The manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may
      no doubt be very dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very
      competition, however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who
      profit greatly, besides, by the good market which the great expense of
      such a nation affords them in every other way. Private people, who want to
      make a fortune, never think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces
      of the country, but resort either to the capital, or to some of the great
      commercial towns. They know, that where little wealth circulates, there is
      little to be got; but that where a great deal is in motion, some share of
      it may fall to them. The same maxim which would in this manner direct the
      common sense of one, or ten, or twenty individuals, should regulate the
      judgment of one, or ten, or twenty millions, and should make a whole
      nation regard the riches of its neighbours, as a probable cause and
      occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that would enrich itself
      by foreign trade, is certainly most likely to do so, when its neighbours
      are all rich, industrious and commercial nations. A great nation,
      surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians, might,
      no doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its
      own interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in
      this manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired
      their great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign
      commerce, and the modern Chinese, it is known, hold it in the utmost
      contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws.
      The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of
      all our neighbours, so far as they are capable of producing their intended
      effect, tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible.

      It is in consequence of these maxims, that the commerce between France and
      England has, in both countries, been subjected to so many discouragements
      and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to consider their
      real interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national animosity,
      the commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great Britain than
      that of any other country, and, for the same reason, that of Great Britain
      to France. France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In the trade
      between the southern coast of England and the northern and north-western
      coast of France, the returns might be expected, in the same manner as in
      the inland trade, four, five, or six times in the year. The capital,
      therefore, employed in this trade could, in each of the two countries,
      keep in motion four, five, or six times the quantity of industry, and
      afford employment and subsistence to four, five, or six times the number
      of people, which all equal capital could do in the greater part of the
      other branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of France and Great
      Britain most remote from one another, the returns might be expected, at
      least, once in the year; and even this trade would so far be at least
      equally advantageous, as the greater part of the other branches of our
      foreign European trade. It would be, at least, three times more
      advantageous than the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in
      which the returns were seldom made in less than three years, frequently
      not in less than four or five years. France, besides, is supposed to
      contain 24,000,000 of inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never
      supposed to contain more than 3,000,000; and France is a much richer
      country than North America; though, on account of the more unequal
      distribution of riches, there is much more poverty and beggary in the one
      country than in the other. France, therefore, could afford a market at
      least eight times more extensive, and, on account of the superior
      frequency of the returns, four-and-twenty times more advantageous than
      that which our North American colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great
      Britain would be just as advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the
      wealth, population, and proximity of the respective countries, would have
      the same superiority over that which France carries on with her own
      colonies. Such is the very great difference between that trade which the
      wisdom of both nations has thought proper to discourage, and that which it
      has favoured the most.

      But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free
      commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have
      occasioned the principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours,
      they are necessarily enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes,
      upon that account, more formidable to the other; and what would increase
      the advantage of national friendship, serves only to inflame the violence
      of national animosity. They are both rich and industrious nations; and the
      merchants and manufacturers of each dread the competition of the skill and
      activity of those of the other. Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both
      inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity,
      and the traders of both countries have announced, with all the passionate
      confidence of interested falsehood, the certain ruin of each, in
      consequence of that unfavourable balance of trade, which, they pretend,
      would be the infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce with the other.

      There is no commercial country in Europe, of which the approaching ruin
      has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system,
      from all unfavourably balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however,
      which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost
      all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour, and against
      their neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has
      been, in any respect, impoverished by this cause. Every town and country,
      on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all
      nations, instead of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of
      the commercial system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it.
      Though there are in Europe indeed, a few towns which, in same respects,
      deserve the name of free ports, there is no country which does so.
      Holland, perhaps, approaches the nearest to this character of any, though
      still very remote from it; and Holland, it is acknowledged, not only
      derives its whole wealth, but a great part of its necessary subsistence,
      from foreign trade.

      There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very
      different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to
      be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity
      or decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and
      consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has
      already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital
      of the society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The
      society in this case lives within its revenue; and what is annually saved
      out of its revenue, is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as
      to increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of
      the annual produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption,
      the capital of the society must annually decay in proportion to this
      deficiency. The expense of the society, in this case, exceeds its revenue,
      and necessarily encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must
      necessarily decay, and, together with it, the exchangeable value of the
      annual produce of its industry.

      This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what is
      called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no
      foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may
      take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth,
      population, and improvement, may be either gradually increasing or
      gradually decaying.

      The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of a
      nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against
      it. A nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a
      century, perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during
      all this time, may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin
      may gradually decay, different sorts of paper money being substituted in
      its place, and even the debts, too, which it contracts in the principal
      nations with whom it deals, may be gradually increasing; and yet its real
      wealth, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and
      labour, may, during the same period, have been increasing in a much
      greater proportion. The state of our North American colonies, and of the
      trade which they carried on with Great Britain, before the commencement of
      the present disturbances, {This paragraph was written in the year 1775.}
      may serve as a proof that this is by no means an impossible supposition.
