193 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
193 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
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# Wealth of Nations — Core Entities Reference
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A curated selection of WoN entities from the infospace at
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`../infospace-with-history/output/entities/`, chosen for their relevance
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to supply chain analysis. Use these as mapping targets in the
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`map-to-won` pipeline stage.
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---
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## Division of Labour
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Slug: `division-of-labour`
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The specialisation of tasks among workers or firms, each focusing on a
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narrow function to increase overall productive efficiency. Smith argues
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this is the primary source of economic progress, enabled by the certainty
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that surplus production can be exchanged.
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VSM: S1 (primary operational mechanism)
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---
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## Effectual Demand
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Slug: `effectual-demand`
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The demand of those who are willing and able to pay the natural price of
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a commodity. Effectual demand, not total desire, is what calls productive
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resources into action. When effectual demand exceeds supply, market price
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rises above natural price; when it falls short, market price falls below.
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VSM: S2 (coordination signal — regulates resource allocation)
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---
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## Natural Price as Central Price
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Slug: `natural-price-as-central-price`
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The natural price is the centre around which market prices continually
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gravitate. When the market price exceeds the natural price, capital is
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attracted; when it falls below, capital exits. The natural price is thus
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an equilibrium attractor that Smith likens to a centre of gravity.
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VSM: S2 (coordination signal — equilibrium reference point)
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---
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## Market Price Adjustment Mechanism
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Slug: `market-price-adjustment-mechanism`
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The process by which market price moves toward natural price through
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changes in supply. Excess supply depresses market price; scarcity raises
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it. The mechanism depends on capital mobility: if capital can freely enter
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and exit a sector, prices will converge to natural levels. Restrictions on
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capital mobility (monopoly, regulation) prevent convergence.
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VSM: S2 (coordination mechanism — negative feedback loop)
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---
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## Circulating Capital
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Slug: `circulating-capital`
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The component of capital that is used up in the course of a single
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productive cycle and must be continually replaced. Includes raw materials,
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work-in-progress, and the wages fund. Distinguished from fixed capital
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(machinery, buildings) by the fact that it yields its return only by
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changing hands. The speed of circulation determines how productively
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a given capital stock can be employed.
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VSM: S1 / S3 (operational resource; managed for return velocity)
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---
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## Accumulation of Stock
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Slug: `accumulation-of-stock`
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The process of building up capital reserves from savings (frugality),
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enabling future investment in productive capacity. Smith argues that
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capital accumulation precedes and enables division of labour — you cannot
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specialise workers until you have stock to sustain them while production
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is in progress. Stock functions as a buffer between production and
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consumption.
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VSM: S3 (capital management — enables S1 operations)
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---
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## Merchant Capital
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Slug: `merchant-capital`
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Capital employed by merchants who buy goods in one market and sell them in
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another, earning a profit from price differentials without directly engaging
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in production. Merchant capital performs the function of distribution:
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connecting producers and consumers who would otherwise face prohibitive
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search and transaction costs. Smith notes that merchants are mobile — they
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have no necessary attachment to any particular country — and that this
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mobility gives them leverage over producers and governments.
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VSM: S2 / S4 (coordination; also market intelligence function)
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---
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## Monopoly in Trade
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Slug: `monopoly-in-trade`
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A situation in which a single seller or a privileged group of sellers
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control supply in a market, enabling them to set prices above the natural
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level. Smith argues monopoly prices are always the highest that can be
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extracted from buyers, whereas competition drives prices toward the
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natural level. Monopoly distorts resource allocation by keeping prices
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high and restricting supply below what free competition would provide.
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VSM: S5 (policy distortion — violates S2 equilibrating function)
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---
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## Combination of Masters
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Slug: `combination-of-masters`
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The coordinated action by employers to restrain wages or otherwise
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improve their negotiating position relative to workers. Smith observes
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that such combinations are common but rarely discussed publicly. The
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practical effect is monopsony-like suppression of the returns to labour
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below their natural level.
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VSM: S3* (audit / anti-competitive practice — distorts S2 signals)
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---
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## Higgling and Bargaining of the Market
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Slug: `higgling-and-bargaining-of-the-market`
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The process of price discovery through negotiation between buyers and
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sellers. Smith describes it as the mechanism by which value in exchange
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is determined in practice — not by abstract calculation but by the
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push-and-pull of each party pursuing their own interest, with the result
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tending toward a price both can accept.
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VSM: S2 (real-time coordination mechanism)
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---
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## Invisible Hand Mechanism
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Slug: `invisible-hand-mechanism`
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The process by which individuals pursuing their private economic interest
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unintentionally produce outcomes beneficial to the whole economy. Smith
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uses this metaphor specifically for domestic investment decisions: a
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merchant who prefers domestic to foreign investment for security reasons
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inadvertently maximises domestic productive capacity. The mechanism does
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not require coordination — it is an emergent property of distributed
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self-interested action under competitive conditions.
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VSM: S4 (distributed intelligence — environmental adaptation without
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central direction)
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---
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## Capital Security Preference
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Slug: `capital-security-preference`
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Smith's observation that capital owners systematically prefer less risky
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applications of their capital over more risky ones, even when the expected
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return might favour the riskier option. This preference shapes the
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allocation of capital across sectors and geographic areas.
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VSM: S3 (capital management — explains capital allocation patterns)
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---
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## Market Communication Channels
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Slug: `market-communication-channels`
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The mechanisms through which information about prices, quantities, and
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conditions flows between market participants. Smith implicitly relies on
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such channels for his account of price adjustment — if buyers and sellers
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cannot learn each other's prices and terms, the equilibrating mechanism
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breaks down.
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VSM: S2 (information infrastructure for coordination)
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