63 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
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---
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entity_slug: commercial_jealousy_mechanism
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evaluator: null
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evaluated_at: '2026-02-23T04:58:35.395116'
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overall_score: 2.8
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scores:
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- name: definition_precision
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value: 1.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: There is no definition provided, only context. The context describes
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a broad phenomenon but lacks the precision needed to distinguish this as a specific
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mechanism versus general mercantilist behavior.
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- name: source_grounding
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value: 3.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: While Smith does discuss how nations restrict trade with rivals and favor
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allies in Book IV, Chapter 6, the specific framing as a "commercial jealousy mechanism"
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appears to be an interpretive overlay rather than Smith's own conceptualization.
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The underlying phenomena are present but the mechanistic framing is imposed.
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- name: domain_placement
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: The "Regulation" domain is appropriate since this describes how nations
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regulate trade relationships based on political considerations. This fits well
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within Smith's broader critique of regulatory interventions in commerce.
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- name: vsm_relevance
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value: 4.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: This maps well to S4 (intelligence/environmental adaptation) as it describes
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how nations respond to perceived threats from rivals, and potentially S5 (identity/policy)
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as it involves national identity and strategic policy decisions. The mechanism
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has clear VSM relevance.
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- name: explanatory_value
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value: 2.0
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max_value: 5.0
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rationale: While it identifies a real pattern in mercantilist policy, it doesn't
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illuminate the underlying structural mechanisms that drive this behavior beyond
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restating that nations act on jealousy and self-interest. It names the phenomenon
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without explaining why it persists or how it operates systematically.
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---
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# Evaluation: Commercial Jealousy Mechanism
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## definition_precision — 1.0 / 5.0
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There is no definition provided, only context. The context describes a broad phenomenon but lacks the precision needed to distinguish this as a specific mechanism versus general mercantilist behavior.
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## source_grounding — 3.0 / 5.0
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While Smith does discuss how nations restrict trade with rivals and favor allies in Book IV, Chapter 6, the specific framing as a "commercial jealousy mechanism" appears to be an interpretive overlay rather than Smith's own conceptualization. The underlying phenomena are present but the mechanistic framing is imposed.
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## domain_placement — 4.0 / 5.0
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The "Regulation" domain is appropriate since this describes how nations regulate trade relationships based on political considerations. This fits well within Smith's broader critique of regulatory interventions in commerce.
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## vsm_relevance — 4.0 / 5.0
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This maps well to S4 (intelligence/environmental adaptation) as it describes how nations respond to perceived threats from rivals, and potentially S5 (identity/policy) as it involves national identity and strategic policy decisions. The mechanism has clear VSM relevance.
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## explanatory_value — 2.0 / 5.0
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While it identifies a real pattern in mercantilist policy, it doesn't illuminate the underlying structural mechanisms that drive this behavior beyond restating that nations act on jealousy and self-interest. It names the phenomenon without explaining why it persists or how it operates systematically.
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