net-kingdom/history/2026-08-23-keycape-exposure-dependency-map.md

# KeyCape exposure dependency and rotation map

Date: 2026-08-23  
Incident: `KEYCAPE-EXPOSURE-20260823-01`  
Workplan: `NK-WP-0033`  
NetKingdom revision reviewed: `9ae4e24305f30c32059d6da5459171c8c07931c7`  
Platform contract reviewed: railiance-platform `453fed3`

This is value-safe planning evidence. It contains no credential value, encoded
Secret payload, reusable hash, private key, or token. It does not authorize a
live write.

## Rulings

1. The platform contract's single guarded KeyCape bundle is the correct
   anti-staleness boundary. `keycape-config` combines the signing private key
   and a full configuration document, so no independently generated full
   Secret may be applied during the incident.
2. The LLDAP credential has four runtime consumers in this estate, not the two
   named in the platform contract: Authelia, KeyCape, identity-provisioner, and
   privacyIDEA's persisted `lldap-coulomb` resolver.
3. Updating `sso/lldap-secrets` and restarting LLDAP does not by itself change
   the existing persistent `admin` account password. LLDAP documents
   `LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS` as initial-account input. The provider write must use
   a reviewed LLDAP password-change path; the Secret update is consumer and
   desired-state reconciliation.
4. The privacyIDEA value embedded in KeyCape is an administrative session JWT
   issued by `POST /auth`, not an individually managed privacyIDEA MFA token.
   Current privacyIDEA documentation gives these JWTs an `exp` claim and a
   default one-hour validity (policy may override it), but exposes no
   individual session-JWT revocation endpoint. `/token/revoke` concerns user
   MFA authenticators and must not be used for this credential.
5. Consequently, the platform contract cannot require both a 30-minute window
   and immediate predecessor-token revocation without another approved
   mechanism. T02 must choose either:
   - issue the successor, stop using the predecessor, retain a protected
     negative-test copy until its observed `exp`, and prove rejection after
     expiry; or
   - separately authorize rotation of privacyIDEA's JWT signing secret, with
     the wider impact and rollback limits documented. Changing the `pi-admin`
     password alone does not invalidate an already issued JWT.

Primary provider references:

- LLDAP configuration describes the admin password as initial-account input
  and offers a force-reset recovery setting:
  <https://github.com/lldap/lldap/blob/main/lldap_config.docker_template.toml>
- LLDAP scripting documentation describes its authentication and password
  interfaces:
  <https://github.com/lldap/lldap/blob/main/docs/scripting.md>
- privacyIDEA authentication documentation describes `/auth` JWT issuance,
  the `exp` claim, and default validity:
  <https://privacyidea.readthedocs.io/en/stable/modules/api/auth.html>

## Dependency map

| Exposed class | Authoritative provider write | Consumer state that must change | Reload/roll | Predecessor-denial proof |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| KeyCape RS256 signing key | KeyCape/railiance-platform guarded bundle apply using the KeyCape-approved signing strategy | `sso/keycape-config` `key.pem`; downstream JWKS caches | KeyCape and every declared downstream verifier | KeyCape-owned controlled old JWT rejection after explicit invalidation or overlap expiry |
| LLDAP bind/admin credential | Persistent LLDAP `admin` account through a reviewed official password-change path | `sso/lldap-secrets`; Authelia's `ldap_password`; KeyCape `lldap.bindPW`; identity-provisioner `LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD`; privacyIDEA resolver `lldap-coulomb` `BINDPW` | Authelia, KeyCape, identity-provisioner; update/test privacyIDEA resolver; LLDAP only if its declared provider method requires it | Protected old-value LDAP bind fails; replacement lookup passes in Authelia, KeyCape, identity-provisioner, and privacyIDEA |
| Authelia KeyCape client credential | Authelia client registration hash in `sso/authelia-secrets` | KeyCape `authelia.clientSecret` in the one guarded bundle | Authelia and KeyCape | Protected predecessor produces `invalid_client`; replacement completes the authorization-code exchange |
| privacyIDEA administrative JWT | privacyIDEA `POST /auth` while predecessor remains valid | KeyCape `privacyidea.adminToken` in the one guarded bundle; any separately maintained `keycape-pi-token` must be reconciled or retired as a duplicate source | KeyCape | Replacement performs the required MFA API call; predecessor rejects only after observed expiry unless global JWT-signing-secret invalidation is separately approved |

## Exact NetKingdom-owned sequence

These steps describe the required shape; they are not a live GO.

### Prepare without provider writes

1. Pin the reviewed non-secret KeyCape client configuration and all three
   repositories named by the platform contract.
2. Create a mode-`0700` private workspace with a cleanup trap. Receive each
   replacement through protected input into a separate mode-`0600` file.
3. Produce the Authelia bcrypt client hash from protected stdin/file, never a
   command argument. Do not record the hash as evidence.
4. Build field-specific replacements for `authelia-secrets` and
   `lldap-secrets`. Preserve their unrelated fields from an owner-controlled
   input, not from captured agent output and not from a stale bootstrap bundle.
5. Build exactly one complete KeyCape configuration and signing-key pair from
   the pinned non-secret client source and the replacement files.
6. Prepare the privacyIDEA resolver update for `lldap-coulomb` with its complete
   non-secret resolver settings and the replacement bind value. Do not run the
   broad realm bootstrap, which also rewrites realms and policies.

### Bounded cutover

1. Guard all prepared writes on the approved Kubernetes UIDs/resource
   versions and Git revisions.
2. Install the field-specific Authelia Secret changes without restarting it.
3. Change the persistent LLDAP `admin` password using the reviewed provider
   path. Do not assume a Deployment restart applies the new value.
4. Reconcile `sso/lldap-secrets`, update privacyIDEA resolver
   `lldap-coulomb`, and restart identity-provisioner. The resolver update must
   be a dedicated `/resolver/lldap-coulomb` operation, not full realm repair.
5. Apply the single guarded `sso/keycape-config` bundle without rendering a
   manifest, then roll Authelia and KeyCape. The Authelia Secret update and the
   KeyCape bundle must contain the same LLDAP and client-credential revisions.
6. Prove replacement LLDAP access through all four consumers, replacement
   Authelia client authentication, and replacement privacyIDEA access.
7. Prove old LLDAP and Authelia credentials fail using protected inputs.
   Handle the old privacyIDEA JWT according to the corrected T02 decision.

After any provider write, abort is forward-only: finish or repair with the new
revision. The exposed bundle and exposed predecessors are never rollback
material.

## Existing helper assessment

| Helper | Assessment for this incident |
| --- | --- |
| `sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh` | Prohibited. It prints replacements; its LLDAP branch omits identity-provisioner and privacyIDEA; its LLDAP provider change is manual; and its signing branch deliberately invalidates immediately. |
| `sso-mfa/k8s/authelia/create-secrets.sh` | Not suitable as the cutover writer. It reconstructs the whole Secret from local bootstrap files, may generate unrelated signing material, and passes plaintext/hash values in command arguments. Its field mapping is useful as design evidence only. |
| `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/create-secrets.sh` | Not suitable. It reconstructs the full bundle from local files, can generate a new key implicitly, and its inline client list can lag the live reviewed source. |
| `sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/refresh-pi-token-live.sh` | Not suitable. It reads the exposed live KeyCape payload, rebuilds the full Secret, and has no predecessor-expiry/revocation proof. |
| `sso-mfa/k8s/privacyidea/repair-realm-live.sh` | Too broad. It updates the resolver but also reapplies realm, default-realm, and policy state. A dedicated resolver-only path is required. |
| `sso-mfa/k8s/lldap/break-glass.sh` password mutation | Not accepted as the provider path. It passes the password in process arguments and assumes a GraphQL cleartext mutation that is not the documented general LLDAP password interface. |

## Remaining gates

- KeyCape must publish and acknowledge its signing/JWKS/cache strategy.
- Railiance-platform must correct the LLDAP consumer list and the privacyIDEA
  predecessor disposition in its owner contract.
- NetKingdom must implement and review provider-specific, file-input helpers
  before T03 can complete. They must have dry-run/static tests proving that
  values cannot reach argv or stdout.
- A named operator window, driver, abort operator, provider authority, and
  protected verification method are still required before any live action.