net-kingdom/runbooks/ssh-certificates/pack.yaml

spec: runbook-pack/v0.2
id: nk.ssh-certificates
title: Short-lived SSH credentials for admins, agents and automations
owner: net-kingdom
outcome: An actor obtains a short-lived CA-signed SSH certificate and uses it through an ops-bridge tunnel, with no static key doing the work.
engine: native
framing:
  - Certificate files must be mode 600 and are never reused across reconnects.
  - A non-zero cert_command exit is a failure and must trigger backoff.
  - ops-warden never vends API keys or passwords; route them with warden route find.
actors:
  - id: operator
    role: Operator
    description: Signs and inspects the certificate and brings the tunnel up, using their own identity.
    privileges: [sign-certificate, open-tunnel]
datapoints:
  - id: actor_name
    label: Actor name
    type: string
    default: agt-rehearsal
    pattern: "(adm|agt|atm)-[a-z0-9-]+"
    help: "Actor type prefix decides the maximum TTL: adm 48h, agt 24h, atm 8h. agt-rehearsal is an inert test actor (2h, a principal no host trusts); use your own actor for real access."
    dimensions: {actor: operator, kind: identity, subsystem: ops-warden}
    ask_in: ready
  - id: warden_config
    label: warden config file
    type: path
    default: ~/.config/warden/rehearsal/warden.yaml
    help: The rehearsal config uses a throwaway local CA that nothing trusts and has no flex-auth gate, so it proves the signing mechanics, not the policy gate. For real access use your production config, ~/.config/warden/warden.yaml.
    dimensions: {actor: operator, kind: location, subsystem: ops-warden}
    ask_in: ready
  - id: pubkey
    label: Public key path
    type: path
    default: ~/.ssh/agt-rehearsal_ed25519.pub
    dimensions: {actor: operator, kind: location, subsystem: ops-warden}
    ask_in: ready
  - id: tunnel
    label: Tunnel name
    type: string
    default: k3s-api-railiance01
    pattern: "[a-z0-9-]+"
    dimensions: {kind: target, subsystem: ops-bridge}
    ask_in: ready
  - id: test_target
    label: Is there a target that trusts your actor's principal?
    type: enum
    values: [available, none-yet]
    default: none-yet
    help: With the inert rehearsal actor no host trusts the certificate, so the tunnel cannot be proven. Choose available only with a real actor and a tunnel that uses it.
    dimensions: {kind: state, subsystem: ops-bridge}
    ask_in: connect
stages:
  - id: ready
    title: Before you start
    goal: You know what is in place and which certificates exist already.
    steps:
      - id: prerequisites
        title: Confirm the prerequisites
        actor: operator
        owner: workstation
        description: "In place before you start: the warden CLI is installed and your actor is in the principals inventory (ops-warden); the bridge CLI and a tunnel definition exist (ops-bridge); the target hosts trust the SSH CA and carry the actor principal (railiance-infra)."
        idempotent: idempotent
        verify:
          done_when: All three prerequisites hold
          expect: manual
      - id: status-before
        title: Look at current certificates
        actor: operator
        owner: ops-warden
        requires: [prerequisites]
        uses: [warden_config]
        command: WARDEN_CONFIG={{warden_config}} warden status
        idempotent: idempotent
        verify:
          done_when: You know which certificates are current and which are expired
          expect: manual
  - id: get-certificate
    title: Get a certificate
    goal: A short-lived certificate for the actor exists and its lifetime is within the limit for the actor type.
    requires: [ready]
    steps:
      - id: sign
        title: Sign a public key for the actor
        actor: operator
        owner: ops-warden
        uses: [actor_name, pubkey, warden_config]
        command: WARDEN_CONFIG={{warden_config}} warden sign {{actor_name}} --pubkey {{pubkey}} > /tmp/{{actor_name}}-cert.pub
        idempotent: idempotent
        idempotent_note: Each run issues a new certificate and overwrites the file; the old one expires on its own.
        rollback: Delete /tmp/{{actor_name}}-cert.pub; the certificate expires on its own.
        evidence: [certificate_valid_before]
        verify:
          done_when: A certificate file exists and is readable as a certificate
          command: ssh-keygen -L -f /tmp/{{actor_name}}-cert.pub
          expect: exit-0
      - id: inspect-ttl
        title: Check the certificate lifetime
        actor: operator
        owner: ops-warden
        requires: [sign]
        uses: [actor_name]
        command: ssh-keygen -L -f /tmp/{{actor_name}}-cert.pub | grep -E "Key ID|Principals|Valid"
        idempotent: idempotent
        verify:
          done_when: "Valid before is within the actor-type TTL (adm 48h, agt 24h, atm 8h)"
          expect: manual
    gates:
      - id: certificate-valid
        title: The certificate is valid and short-lived
        goal: short-lived-credentials
        blocking: true
        downstream_risk: A tunnel opened with a certificate that outlives its limit defeats the point of short-lived credentials.
        checks:
          - done_when: The lifetime is within the limit for the actor type
            expect: manual
          - done_when: The certificate file can be read
            command: ssh-keygen -L -f /tmp/{{actor_name}}-cert.pub
            expect: exit-0
  - id: connect
    title: Use it through a tunnel
    goal: The tunnel that uses the certificate is up and the signing is on record.
    requires: ["gate:certificate-valid"]
    steps:
      - id: tunnel-up
        title: Bring up the tunnel that uses cert_command
        actor: operator
        owner: ops-bridge
        uses: [tunnel, test_target]
        description: A tunnel only proves the certificate if a host trusts its principal. With the inert rehearsal actor none does, so record that no target exists yet; the stage is then not proven.
        idempotent: idempotent
        one_of:
          - id: bring-up
            title: Bring up the tunnel that uses the certificate
            recommended_when: {test_target: [available]}
            command: bridge up {{tunnel}}
            rollback: bridge down {{tunnel}}
            verify:
              done_when: The tunnel shows connected
              command: bridge status
              expect: output-contains
              contains: "{{tunnel}}"
          - id: no-target-yet
            title: No target trusts this actor yet; tunnel not proven
            recommended_when: {test_target: [none-yet]}
            verify:
              done_when: You have recorded that the tunnel stage was not proven
              expect: manual
      - id: audit
        title: Confirm the signing was audited
        actor: operator
        owner: ops-warden
        requires: [tunnel-up]
        uses: [warden_config]
        command: WARDEN_CONFIG={{warden_config}} warden log | tail -5
        idempotent: idempotent
        verify:
          done_when: Your signing appears in the history
          expect: manual
    gates:
      - id: tunnel-connected
        title: The tunnel is connected, or its absence is recorded
        goal: private-access
        blocking: true
        downstream_risk: A pass here could be read as proof that private access works.
        checks:
          - done_when: bridge reports the tunnel as connected, or "tunnel not proven" is recorded because no target exists
            expect: manual
ownership:
  - {concern: Certificate issuance and TTL policy, owner: ops-warden}
  - {concern: Tunnel lifecycle and refresh, owner: ops-bridge}
  - {concern: Host CA trust and principals, owner: railiance-infra}