Deploy KeyCape client MFA override for coulomb-social

Register coulomb-social with mfaRequired: false, roll key-cape image that
honors client policy, and track NK-WP-0025 public registration orchestration.

WORK-RECORDS.md

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
 | workplan | NK-WP-0009 | backlog | — | workplans/NK-WP-0009-netkingdom-security-pattern-tutorials.md |
 | workplan | NK-WP-0011 | backlog | — | workplans/NK-WP-0011-enterprise-federation-saml.md |
 | workplan | NK-WP-0021 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0021-activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md |
-| workplan | NK-WP-0022 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md |
+| workplan | NK-WP-0022 | blocked | — | workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md |
 | workplan | NK-WP-0023 | finished | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md |
-| workplan | NK-WP-0024 | backlog | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| workplan | NK-WP-0024 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| workplan | NK-WP-0025 | active | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-07-02-T01 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md |
 | task | ADHOC-2026-07-02-T02 | done | — | workplans/ADHOC-2026-07-02.md |
 | task | NET-WP-0020-T01 | done | — | workplans/NET-WP-0020-openbao-unseal-custody-and-ssh-automation.md |
@@ -58,9 +59,14 @@
 | task | NK-WP-0023-T06 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0023-T07 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md |
 | task | NK-WP-0023-T08 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0023-user-engine-portal-platform-integration.md |
-| task | NK-WP-0024-T01 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
-| task | NK-WP-0024-T02 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
-| task | NK-WP-0024-T03 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
-| task | NK-WP-0024-T04 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0024-T01 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0024-T02 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0024-T03 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0024-T04 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0024-user-engine-portal-integration-expansion.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0025-T01 | done | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0025-T02 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0025-T03 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0025-T04 | progress | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
+| task | NK-WP-0025-T05 | todo | — | workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md |
 | intake | NK-IN-0001 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md |
 | intake | NK-IN-0002 | closed | blue | docs/intakes/activity-core-ops-sso-operators.md |

docs/public-registration-orchestration-contract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Public registration orchestration contract
+
+Status: implementation contract for NK-WP-0025-T02 and USER-WP-0022-T01/T02.
+
+## Boundary
+
+`user-engine` owns the public registration state machine. It never accepts an
+LLDAP password or an LLDAP administrator credential. A verification service
+proves mailbox control; the existing identity-provisioner creates the ordinary
+LLDAP identity and returns a provider-owned, single-use password-setup URL.
+
+The public browser is not an authenticated user-engine actor. It receives only
+opaque registration and verification handles. A verified applicant actor is
+constructed from consumed verification evidence and is authorized only for
+the registration instance named by that evidence.
+
+## Public flow
+
+1. `POST /api/v1/public/registrations`
+   accepts `username`, `email`, `display_name`, `client_id`, and optional
+   `tenant_hint`. Client and tenant values must be registered allow-list
+   entries; browser-provided return URLs are rejected.
+2. The response is always the same `202 Accepted` envelope for syntactically
+   valid requests, whether the username/email is new, duplicated, throttled,
+   or already pending. It contains no existence result.
+3. user-engine records an expiring registration intent and emits
+   `registration.verification_requested` through its transactional outbox.
+   The mail receiver obtains the recipient and an opaque verification handle;
+   the general event receiver gets only `recipient_present=true`.
+4. `POST /api/v1/public/registrations/verify` consumes the opaque handle.
+   Verification is single-use, expiry checked, purpose bound, and returns
+   normalized mailbox evidence bound to the registration ID and submitted
+   username.
+5. user-engine attaches the verified email factor, completes registration,
+   and calls identity-provisioner using the registration ID as the stable
+   idempotency key. Only the baseline ordinary-user group may be requested.
+6. The provisioner creates or resumes exactly one LLDAP identity, links the
+   provider subject to the user-engine user, and returns its single-use
+   password-setup URL. Provider collision is a reconciliation result, never a
+   second privileged identity.
+7. After provider password setup, the browser starts a fresh KeyCape
+   authorization-code/PKCE flow for the allow-listed client. Registration
+   state is never accepted as an application session.
+
+## Required state
+
+Registration intent persistence must include:
+
+- opaque registration ID and lifecycle status;
+- normalized username and email hash, with display values separately
+  protected from general event/audit output;
+- registered client ID and tenant;
+- verification handle digest, issued/expiry/consumed timestamps, attempt
+  counters, and purpose;
+- provisioning idempotency key and external provider result;
+- allow-listed post-setup authorization target identifier, not a raw URL;
+- correlation ID and redacted failure/compensation state.
+
+No password, verification token plaintext, LLDAP admin credential, MFA seed,
+or provider bearer token may enter registration state, logs, audit, State Hub,
+or the general event lane.
+
+## Validation and abuse controls
+
+- Usernames use the LLDAP-compatible canonical grammar, length limit, and
+  reserved-name list; case folding happens before uniqueness checks.
+- Email is normalized for comparison without provider-specific alias
+  rewriting. Mailbox verification proves control but does not authorize
+  linking to an existing user.
+- Rate limits apply per source network bucket, normalized email digest, and
+  username digest. Responses and timing remain non-enumerating.
+- CSRF applies to browser form submission; JSON callers additionally require
+  an allow-listed client registration and idempotency key.
+- Verification handles are random, high entropy, stored only as a digest,
+  purpose-bound, expiring, and atomically consumed.
+- Duplicate email/username, expired/replayed verification, and provider
+  conflict enter explicit reconciliation or terminal states. They never fall
+  back to auto-linking by email.
+
+## Provider contract
+
+The identity-provisioner request is the existing `ProvisioningRequest` plus a
+validated canonical username. The response remains `ProvisioningResult` with
+`external_subject`, `status`, and optional `password_setup_url`.
+
+For public registration the adapter must guarantee:
+
+- the same idempotency key returns the same external subject;
+- baseline membership only; no tenant-admin or platform groups;
+- password setup is provider-owned, single-use, and expiring;
+- partial creation is resumable/reconcilable and observable without exposing
+  credentials;
+- the external subject is linked before registration reports completion.
+
+## Activation gates
+
+Public registration stays disabled until all of the following pass together:
+
+1. verification issuer and mail receiver conformance, including replay and
+   expiry;
+2. user-engine persistence migration and anonymous-route abuse controls;
+3. flex-auth policy limiting the verified applicant actor to its registration;
+4. identity-provisioner canonical-username/idempotency conformance;
+5. KeyCape fresh-login return flow and client allow-list checks;
+6. disposable-user live tests and cleanup on railiance01.
+

sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/deployment.yaml

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ spec:
           # 2026-05-24: direct-imported into railiance01 k3s for the
           # bootstrap-console OIDC/MFA rollout. Use IfNotPresent while the
           # HTTP registry push/pull path is being cleaned up.
-          image: key-cape:90a2078
+          image: key-cape:mfa-client-20260809
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
 
           ports:

sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/register-coulomb-social.py

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ CLIENT = {
     "allowedScopes": ["openid", "profile", "email", "groups"],
     "grantTypes": ["authorization_code"],
     "clientType": "public",
+    # Ordinary coulomb.social sessions are AAL1 unless the client explicitly
+    # requests AAL2 through acr_values. Platform/admin clients keep their
+    # existing provider-driven mandatory MFA behavior.
+    "mfaRequired": False,
 }
 
 

workplans/NK-WP-0022-railiance01-identity-cutover-and-coulombcore-retirement.md

@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Cut over NetKingdom identity to railiance01 and retire CoulombCore"
 domain: infotech
 repo: net-kingdom
-status: active
+status: blocked
 owner: codex
 topic_slug: netkingdom
 created: "2026-07-27"
-updated: "2026-07-28"
+updated: "2026-08-08"
 depends_on:
   - USER-WP-0020
   - NK-WP-0023
@@ -313,9 +313,10 @@ Done when railiance01 is the sole authoritative identity stack, all evidence
 is reconciled, and the workplan is marked finished.
 
 Retention gate: keep the reversible CoulombCore identity resources through at
-least 2026-08-29. T08 then requires a successful railiance01 restore/restart
-drill and a new explicit approval for destructive deletion. Until both occur,
-the workplan remains active with only T08 waiting.
+least 2026-08-29. The workplan is blocked until that review date, when T08 can
+be checked for readiness to finish. Reaching the date does not authorize
+deletion or completion: T08 still requires a successful railiance01
+restore/restart drill and new explicit approval for destructive deletion.
 
 ## Safety gates
 

workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+id: NK-WP-0025
+type: workplan
+title: "Provide NetKingdom self-registration and application first-login provisioning"
+domain: infotech
+repo: net-kingdom
+status: active
+owner: codex
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+created: "2026-08-09"
+updated: "2026-08-09"
+depends_on:
+  - NK-WP-0024
+  - USER-WP-0022
+  - KEY-WP-0008
+  - CSOC-WP-0003
+state_hub_workstream_id: "1638183b-e2cb-4da2-92b8-d39592d62e86"
+---
+
+# NK-WP-0025 - public registration and application JIT provisioning
+
+Provide two safe entry paths for ordinary users of NetKingdom-enabled
+applications, beginning with coulomb.social:
+
+1. an existing LLDAP user signs in through KeyCape and receives an
+   application-local profile on first successful login; and
+2. a new person self-registers through a NetKingdom-owned flow, verifies the
+   address, establishes an LLDAP login, then continues through the same
+   application first-login path.
+
+The design is additive to coulomb.social's local-account model. NetKingdom
+owns authentication and identity lifecycle; coulomb.social/helix-forge owns
+its application profile, preferences, content, and application authorization.
+An OIDC subject is linked to an application profile, not merged with an
+unverified email-only local account.
+
+## T01 - Ratify identity and account-linking semantics
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "523d5894-6ab6-4097-a28c-0f77880744b1"
+```
+
+Record the source-of-truth split, stable key `(issuer, subject)`, optional
+verified-email matching rules, explicit-link requirements for pre-existing
+local accounts, unlink/recovery behavior, username/display-name handling, and
+collision policy for `tegwick` and `bernd.worsch@gmail.com`.
+
+Done when email alone cannot silently take over an existing application
+account and the standalone application-account decision remains intact.
+
+Implemented by coulomb.social's unique `(issuer, subject)` Member binding and
+idempotent first-login creation. Email and username remain mutable profile
+attributes and are not account-link keys.
+
+## T02 - Provide secure LLDAP self-registration orchestration
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T02
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "bc220e2b-4cd1-4dcf-b107-12ef3595fe14"
+```
+
+Expose a NetKingdom registration service behind user-engine. Validate and
+normalize username/email, verify mailbox control, create the LLDAP identity
+through the existing privileged provisioning adapter, establish password via
+a one-time provider-owned handoff, assign only the ordinary baseline group,
+and support idempotent resume/expiry/cleanup. Browsers and user-engine must
+never receive LLDAP admin credentials.
+
+Done when an unknown user can reach a normal KeyCape login without operator
+provisioning and without acquiring tenant-admin or platform authority.
+
+Implementation resumed with
+`docs/public-registration-orchestration-contract.md`. The contract fixes the
+anonymous/verified actor boundary, non-enumerating start response, durable
+verification request, digest-only single-use verification state, baseline
+group provisioning, provider-owned password setup, and fresh OIDC handoff.
+The user-engine registration domain already requires verified factors and
+uses the privileged provisioning adapter; the next implementation slice is
+the persisted intent and verification-port API. Source implementation now
+includes allow-listed, non-enumerating anonymous start and purpose-bound
+verification consumption. Verification attaches an email factor only after
+client/tenant/username binding checks and deliberately stops before user or
+LLDAP creation. The remaining slice is resumable completion, baseline
+provisioning, provider-subject linking, and password-setup handoff.
+
+## T03 - Integrate registration entry points and return flow
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T03
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "3ec4a9a0-cbce-4c63-8ed8-db36f4cae0fb"
+```
+
+Publish a NetKingdom registration URL and allow applications to provide
+`return_to`, client, and tenant hints through a signed/allow-listed state
+envelope. Add "Create account" beside "Sign in" on the coulomb.social landing
+page. After registration, start a fresh OIDC authorization-code/PKCE flow;
+never treat the registration browser session as application authentication.
+
+Done when direct NetKingdom registration and coulomb.social-initiated
+registration converge on the same verified identity flow without open
+redirects or client confusion.
+
+## T04 - Apply optional MFA policy safely
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T04
+status: progress
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "cf2e4d05-fd07-4bc3-92ff-b2a5ade97846"
+```
+
+Replace global mandatory MFA for this consumer with the KeyCape policy from
+KEY-WP-0008. Ordinary coulomb.social login is password-only unless the
+application profile, requested action, tenant policy, or risk/assurance rule
+requires step-up. Platform administration and other existing high-assurance
+clients remain MFA protected.
+
+Done when lowering assurance for this application cannot lower assurance for
+OpenBao, platform administration, or another client.
+
+Source implementation adds a per-client minimum override and honors explicit
+`acr_values=aal2`; only the coulomb-social static registration selects AAL1.
+Other clients retain provider-driven mandatory MFA. Live rollout remains.
+
+## T05 - Prove both cases end to end
+
+```task
+id: NK-WP-0025-T05
+status: todo
+priority: high
+state_hub_task_id: "5d13f9f6-16b1-44c9-8e1d-4630cfe60a7b"
+```
+
+Test an existing LLDAP identity with no coulomb.social profile, a completely
+new registrant, repeated callback/JIT, existing-email collision, expired and
+replayed verification, duplicate username, provider outage and compensation,
+cross-tenant attempts, optional MFA, profile-requested step-up, unlink, and
+offboarding. Use `tegwick` only for the attended positive acceptance test;
+automated tests use disposable identities.
+
+Done when both user journeys work on railiance01 and all negative cases leave
+no orphaned privileged identity or duplicate application profile.